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vForeword
A
lthough 22 percent of land in sub-Saharan Africa is arid or semiarid rangeland, de-
velopment policies have long been biased toward crop agriculture. In the wake of the
Green Revolution, international and national agricultural research institutions focused
on crop systems and plant breeding. As a result, the customary tenure arrangements that en-
abled pastoralists to move their livestock from one grazing ground to another fell out of favor.
As climate-related crises and desertification have spiraled, however, research and policy interest
in rangeland management issues have been renewed.
As part of its strategy to seek policies for the efficient functioning of global food systems,
IFPRI has been in the forefront of this research. In the 1990s, as part of a shared CGIAR ini-
tiative on property rights and collective action, IFPRI, in collaboration with the International
Livestock Research Institute, began work on a project called “Property Rights, Risk, and Live-
stock Development,” with a focus on rangeland systems in sub-Saharan Africa.
The research on resource management conducted for this report in three drought-prone
countries of sub-Saharan Africa—Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Niger—is related to that work.
This study analyzes the links between risk and the kinds of property rights that have evolved
to provide the mobility needed to raise livestock where rainfall fluctuates, and it evaluates the
impact of cooperation on resource management in these environments. Three interesting con-
clusions emerge from the analyses with respect to economic vulnerability and natural resource
management in these environments. First, there is little evidence of dramatic misuse of land
resources by herders; rather, evidence suggests that overstocking, limited herd mobility, and
encroachment of farmland on common pastures vary a good deal both within and across coun-
tries. Second, stock densities are lower precisely in areas with very high rainfall variability,
whereas herd mobility is strongly related to recent rainfall patterns. Finally, greater coopera-
tive capacity significantly reduces grazing pressure on home resources. While it remains a
challenge for policymakers to design and implement mechanisms to increase cooperative





eople living in semiarid-to-arid regions of the world face a high degree of climatic
variability, mostly in the form of rainfall patterns that vary both spatially and tempo-
rally. In these regions, livestock is generally the predominant production activity,
although cropping can also be important in semiarid regions. The ability to move livestock to
different pastures is a key strategy for mitigating exposure to erratic rainfall, and reliable
access to a wide range of pasture resources has long been essential to the viability and sus-
tainability of such systems. In addition, various types of common-tenure regimes facilitate
herd mobility.
Although the flexibility inherent in such common-tenure systems enables herders to cope
with different rainfall patterns and thus limits their exposure to this risk, one potential cost of
such systems may be in terms of the use and management of the natural resource base. As is
well known, common resources may be subject to externalities; these externalities open up the
possibility that resources will not be well managed. Thus, there may be a trade-off in terms of
flexible access to mitigate risk and the use and management of common-pool pastures.
In this report, we look at three community-level outcomes that can be affected by both cli-
mate variability and by externalities generated when managing the commons is costly. In the
second chapter, we develop a theoretical model incorporating variability and costly coopera-
tion. The model generates the following hypotheses: greater variability will lead to lower stock
densities, increased herd mobility, and, likely, larger amounts of land allocated to the common
pastures. Furthermore, when cooperation is costly, stock densities will be too high, herd mo-
bility will be too low, and pressure will build to encroach on common pasture for private uses.
To capture the costs of cooperation, we consider factors that affect cooperative capacity,
hypothesizing that greater cooperative capacity reduces the costs of cooperation.
Empirical results indicate that there are some general lessons to be drawn. First,
greater cooperative capacity does indeed lead to lower stock densities and increased mobility,
as we expect from the theoretical model. Cooperative capacity has a more limited impact on
land allocated to private uses vs. common pastures, although its impact is particularly strong
in Burkina Faso. Also of interest is the great variability in the capacity of communities to man-
age pastures and allocate land to its best use, both within and across countries. Factors that are
generally associated with greater cooperative capacity include relatively small community
size, more equal distribution of wealth, and fewer adults migrating for wage work, all of which
should reduce negotiation and enforcement costs of undertaking collective action. Other fac-
tors affecting cooperation differ across countries. For instance, external pressure to use com-
munity resources appears to have a much greater impact on cooperation in Ethiopia than in
Burkina Faso or Niger. Higher productivity rangelands and higher effective livestock prices
are associated with greater cooperative capacity in Ethiopia, but have no impact in Burkina
Faso. Thus, the evidence suggests that more favorable livestock market conditions either in-
crease cooperative capacity or have no impact; there is nothing to suggest that better market
conditions erode this capacity.
viiSecond, there is little evidence to suggest that livestock owners accumulate larger herds to
mitigate vulnerability to rainfall shocks in high variability environments. Our results instead
indicate that herd sizes do increase with rainfall variability at relatively low variability, but de-
crease precisely in the higher variability environments. In other words, we would expect that
policies and programs that directly “insure” livestock owners—through feed subsidies in re-
sponse to drought, for instance—would likely lead to larger herds precisely in the environ-
ments subject to the greatest variability. We must emphasize that our results are consistent with
this hypothesis, but, given the one-period nature of the survey, we did not test the hypothesis
directly. This is still a contentious issue, as a wide range of researchers, policymakers—and
indeed, herders themselves—believe that holding onto more livestock is a strategy to mitigate
the impact of such climate shocks as drought.
Results presented here imply that policymakers designing crises mitigation strategies—
including those in many governments that are signatories to the UN Convention to Combat
Desertification—must carefully consider insurance and crises mitigation mechanisms that do
not lead to dramatic increases in the size of the national herd. Not only do policymakers need
to consider the impact of such programs on herd size, but also on herd mobility. Mobility
remains an important part of these systems; our results indicate that current rainfall patterns—
and thus, locally available feed resources—heavily influence the extent of herd mobility.
Given the rather complicated patterns of herd mobility into and out of community areas in
Ethiopia, we were not able to gather good enough data to include this variable in the statisti-
cal analyses. Still, more than 84 percent of the communities surveyed relied on mobility for at
least part of the previous year, and in the 12 communities for which data were quite good,
herds were mobile for nearly 40 percent of the year. The number of communities where at least
some members engaged in herd mobility is lower in Niger and Burkina Faso, but mobility is
still practiced in more than 40 percent of communities in both these countries. And, as noted
above, better cooperative capacity within communities supports greater herd mobility. None-
theless, herders’ rights to access traditional grazing areas are generally eroding everywhere.
Results indicate that communities with more traditional pastoralists do tend to rely more
heavily on herd mobility, but the impact is weak and not robust across specifications. Thus,
pastoral land tenure and drought mitigation policies will need to take into account the contin-
ued reliance on herd mobility—even by those not considered to be traditionally pastoralist—




he arid and semiarid rangelands located throughout sub-Saharan Africa are estimated
to support nearly 60 million people and comprise nearly 22 percent of the total land
area of sub-Saharan Africa, an area of more than 550 million hectares (Dixon et al.
2001). Yet, even though these rangelands cover large areas and support many people, the his-
torical record of development policies and paradigms starkly reveals a pervasive bias toward
the development of sedentary crop agriculture. There are a number of plausible explanations:
sedentarized crop farmers tend to be located closer to urban centers, where infrastructure
development is far more advanced; the more isolated and dispersed populations in semiarid
and arid areas tend to have more limited opportunities and fewer mechanisms to participate
effectively in the national political arena and grab the attention of donors and nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs); after the successes of the green revolution, both international and
national agricultural research institutions focused largely on crops systems and plant breed-
ing; and urban elites, who often hold important positions in postindependence governments,
inherited the view of colonial regimes that the production systems and customary tenure re-
lations prevailing in the semiarid and arid regions were “backward” and would have to be
reformed. As stated in Bruce et al. (1995, p. 1): “The new elite who came to power . . . be-
lieved that these community-based tenure systems were outmoded and had to be replaced.”
Despite a history of misunderstanding and neglect, rangeland management issues in sub-
Saharan Africa are generating renewed interest and attention in policy circles (Niamir-Fuller
and Turner 1999; Kirk 1999). Stronger pastoralist associations; cumulative experience of
government ministries, donor agencies, and NGO personnel; and local and national research
results have convinced many policymakers that a better understanding of these systems is
required to inform policymaking in such areas as land reform, decentralization and devolution
for natural resource management, climate-related crises mitigation strategies, and investment
in infrastructure.
Perhaps one of the key failures of earlier development strategies was the failure to under-
stand the role and importance of climate variability in shaping production systems and tenure
institutions.1 In highly variable environments, households must adopt mechanisms to manage
the variability in production of crops and livestock and to mitigate the impacts of drought
when it does occur. Among the many risk-management strategies that have been identified,
1It appears that Sandford (1982) catalyzed researchers to seriously consider the importance of mobility and “op-
portunistic” grazing in the semiarid and arid rangelands, leading to the development of a body of research now
referred to as the “new range ecology.” The collected volumes by Behnke et al. (1993) and Niamir-Fuller (1999)
contain many works highlighting the importance of mobility in these systems.
1livestock mobility is often seen as one of the
most valuable, as it enables herders to im-
prove mean output as well as decrease out-
put fluctuations associated with both spatial
and temporal variability in rainfall (e.g.
Sandford 1982; Fleuret 1986; Painter et al.
1994; Swallow 1994; van den Brink et al.
1995). Mobility is facilitated by the com-
mon-pool nature of most grazing resources,
which significantly reduces the transaction
costs associated with mobility (Niamir-
Fuller 1999). But the common-pool nature
of grazing resources also means that there
are potential externalities, which can lead to
costs associated with resource management.
These externalities, and the extent to which
they are managed, will also affect such de-
cisions as stock densities, herd mobility, and
land allocation patterns.
It is interesting to note that the flexi-
bility of access to a wide range of grazing
resources that generally do not have well-
defined boundaries is considered one of the
key strengths of traditional pastoral sys-
tems, whereas in the literature on common
property, “well-defined boundaries” are
considered one of the key ingredients to
successful cooperation in resource manage-
ment (Ostrom 1990). The apparent contra-
diction arises because most of the com-
mon-property literature does not explicitly
consider the value of flexible access to the
individual; rather, well-defined boundaries
are considered important to ensure that col-
lective action taken by community members
will result in benefits for those who con-
tribute. Thus, flexibility is likely to have both
private benefits and collective costs.
In historical assessments of the func-
tioning of these systems, most observers
believe that such flexible systems based on
mobility were very effective in terms of
efficient resource use and support of the
herding families dependent on them. Also,
the notion that customary tenure relations
in these areas was insufficient to guarantee
security for the multiple claimants is likely
to have been greatly overstated. As we now
know, lack of formal, legal title to land does
not necessarily imply lack of tenure secu-
rity; customary tenurial arrangements have
often been seen as secure by those operating
within those systems (Okoth-Ogendo 1995;
Place and Hazell 1993; but note that these
studies are often concerned with cropland).
Nonetheless, with the advent of high popu-
lation pressure, increased market activity,
and diminished authority of traditional lead-
ers, a need for adapting these property rights
regimes to the increased pressure on the fi-
nite natural resource base has also been rec-
ognized (Bromley and Cernea 1989; North
1994; Pender et al. 1999). Unfortunately,
previous attempts at land reform imposed
either state ownership or, in a few cases, pri-
vatization. Even the simple declaration of
state ownership often weakened traditional
authority structures, but states rarely then
put into place mechanisms to replace the
roles and responsibilities previously under-
taken by traditional authorities, a situation
that often led to open-access situations
(Niamir-Fuller 1999). Privatization schemes,
loosely based on the “western” ranch
model, are considered to have failed primar-
ily because ranch areas were not suffi-
ciently large to support enough livestock
units per family, given the high spatial and
temporal variation in rainfall and forage. A
secondary reason for failure was that, in cer-
tain cases, large and powerful pastoralists
became the de facto “owners” of the ranch,
effectively excluding large segments of
the population and capturing rents on the
ranches while still using remaining non-
ranch-based common pastures (Behnke and
Scoones 1993; Niamir-Fuller and Turner
1999). In these cases, the reforms certainly
failed in terms of equity, and often in terms
of efficiency as well (Swallow and Kamara
1999).
To summarize, mobility and thus access
to a relatively large number of rangeland
“patches” is required, and such mobility is
much more easily accommodated when
rangelands are communal (see Behnke et al.
2 CHAPTER 11993; Niamir-Fuller 1999).2 Nonetheless,
pressures to privatize common and open-
access grazing lands are likely to increase
with increases in population densities, and
perhaps in response to market integration
and government policies, such as those
that promote sedentary crop agriculture. The
pressure to restrict access and/or privatize
land, in part, will be a function of how pro-
ductive and profitable pastures are vis-à-vis
alternative uses, as well as of other external
pressures, local customs and norms, and/or
government policies and changes in legis-
lation (van den Brink et al. 1995; McCarthy
et al. 1998). Where communities can man-
age their rangeland resources,3 different
forms of common property may well be
the most efficient (and, perhaps, equitable)
property-rights structure, and we should
observe less pressure to privatize, all else
being equal. Private property will only be-
come “optimal” when management of the
common rangeland is so poor that it be-
comes economically beneficial to individu-
ally appropriate land (Seabright 1997).
In such situations, it becomes critical to
examine what factors affect the use and
management of common-pool resources.
There are now many hundreds of empirical
case studies on common-pool resource
management;4 empirical evidence supports
the hypotheses that not all common-pool
resources suffer from overexploitation and
that at least some communities are capable
of attaining a high degree of cooperation in
the use and management of the natural re-
source base (see the case studies in Ostrom
1990; Bromley et al. 1992; Berkes and Folke
1998; Ostrom et al. 2002). However, there
is still little consensus on what explanatory
variables actually affect the success of col-
lective action, either conceptually or empir-
ically. For instance, many researchers posit
that sociocultural heterogeneity will make
collective action more difficult, because
members will not share the same social
norms, or perhaps mutual trust among mem-
bers will be lower (Ostrom 1990; White
and Runge 1994; Seabright 1997 and refer-
ences therein; Bardhan 2000). Other ob-
servers argue that sociocultural diversity
increases the stock of knowledge and expe-
rience over a range of potential mechanisms
to effect collective action and also dimin-
ishes the tendency toward institutional iner-
tia (Begossi 1998); indeed, the latter expla-
nation is more consistent with the benefits
of diversity often discussed in the context of
developed countries. This is but one ex-
ample of the disagreements that still exist
on the impact of such variables as group
size, economic heterogeneity, and degree of
market integration. One of the key criti-
cisms of much of the earlier work on com-
mon-pool resource management has been
that too much empirical work focuses on
too few communities, with little attempt to
put these case studies into a wider context
and thus to draw conclusions that can be
generalized. In fact, there has been a ten-
dency to both research and publish studies
on communities where collective action is
working particularly well. These studies have
provided invaluable information to help
refine hypotheses regarding the impacts of
various factors on collective action, and, in
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2These environments are often termed “nonequilibrial,” or “at disequilibrium.” Semiarid rangelands with a co-
efficient of variation of rainfall above approximately .3–.33 are characterized as being nonequilibrial (Scoones
1994).
3We use the term “can manage” to imply that external agents recognize their authority to manage and that the
community itself is capable of implementing management decisions made internally.
4In the bibliography on the CAPRi website (System-Wide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights),
there are over 800 references for empirical case studies on collective action and/or property rights (http://www
.capri.org/bibliography.asp, accessed September 13, 2004). particular, to help elucidate the process of
decisionmaking and enforcement. But our
approach in the empirical work presented in
this report has been to collect information
on a sufficient number of communities
such that we could run regression analyses
at the community level to test model hy-
potheses. Agrowing number of studies have
followed this empirical strategy (Seabright
1997; Bardhan 2000; Dayton-Johnson
2000; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2000; Isham and
Kahkonen 2002). There are advantages and
drawbacks to each empirical strategy; the
strategy taken here, for instance, sheds less
light on the processes by which communi-
ties reach and enforce decisions than do in-
depth case studies, but the benefits are that
we can statistically test hypotheses about
factors that affect collective action and sub-
sequently evaluate the impact of collective
action on natural resource management.
The research presented in this report
was undertaken expressly to contribute to
the current debate on resource management
in highly variable environments, focusing
on the impact of climate variability and the
role of cooperation in resource manage-
ment. More specifically, a conceptual
framework is developed to analyze the im-
pact of climate variability and cooperative
capacity on land allocation patterns (com-
mon pastures vs. private uses), stock den-
sities, and patterns of herd mobility. Thus,
the primary level of analysis is the commu-
nity. To test model hypotheses, we collected
data in communities located in southern
Ethiopia, southwestern Niger, and north-
eastern Burkina Faso. All three study areas
are semiarid regions where livestock pro-
duction is the dominant activity, but the
importance of cropping varies both across
communities within countries and across
countries.
In Chapter 2, a theoretical framework in-
corporating the impact of climate risk and
cooperation on land allocation, land use, and
herd mobility is developed. The framework
is based on insights from different theo-
retical models that capture different aspects
of natural resource management, which are
then integrated into a unified conceptual
framework. We begin by considering a
model of the use of common pastures sub-
ject to climate variability (output variabil-
ity) by risk-averse producers. We then ex-
tend the model to consider the additional
strategic choice of whether to engage in
herd mobility. In the third step, we consider
the additional decision to allocate land to
common pastures vs. individually cropped
plots. All three of these steps focus on de-
termining the impact of climate variability
on the outcomes of community-level stock
density, herd mobility, and land allocation,
assuming the two “extreme” assumptions of
either noncooperation or joint maximiza-
tion. The nature of the externalities involved
in this system, dependent on access to com-
mon pastures, is highlighted by the compar-
ison of outcomes resulting from these two
assumptions.
The second section of Chapter 2 then
considers the role of cooperation in deter-
mining community-level outcomes. We de-
velop a model of cooperation in which the
costs of cooperation are a function of indi-
vidual incentives to deviate—given by the
externalities generated under the assump-
tion of noncooperation highlighted in the
earlier models—and cooperative capacity at
the community level. From this model, we
derive first-order conditions and the equilib-
rium outcomes for stock densities, herd
mobility, and land allocation, finishing the
section with a system of equations that can
be empirically estimated.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 present the results
of econometric analyses using data col-
lected in Ethiopia, Niger, and Burkina Faso,
respectively. In each of these chapters, we
begin by considering measures of coopera-
tive capacity and the factors affecting this
capacity, to obtain proxies of cooperative
capacity. After obtaining such measures, we
proceed to test the impact of cooperative ca-
4 CHAPTER 1pacity and climate variability on community-
level stock densities and land-allocation
patterns. With the exception of Ethiopia, we
also estimate herd mobility. Chapter 6 pre-
sents a comparative analysis of the three
countries. In Chapter 7, we consider the
results in terms of broad policy conclusions,






n this chapter, we develop a framework for analyzing community-level decisions on land
use and allocation when externalities are generated from the use of common land and when
stochastic rainfall causes variability in both crop and livestock returns. Decision variables
include stock densities, the extent of mobility, and the proportion of total community land to
allocate to common pasture and to individually exploited cropland. The final model developed
is a community-level model of land use and allocation that includes the costs of cooperation.
This model of costly cooperation is adapted from a simpler model found in McCarthy et al.
(1998). As noted in Chapter 1, many authors have noted that, empirically, the actual use and
management of many common-pool resources appear to fall somewhere in between the per-
fect cooperation and complete noncooperation outcomes; Oakerson (1992) stressed the need
to account for costs of collective action when evaluating the use of these resources. In the
model developed here, these costs are a function of the externalities generated in land use,
and their magnitude is determined by the difference between outcomes resulting from a non-
cooperative game and outcomes arising from a social optimizer who jointly maximizes expected
utility over all community members. But, it is difficult to gain intuition into the hypotheses
stemming from this final model, so we develop the model in steps to highlight the externalities
at each stage as we add additional decision variables.
First, we consider the impact of including variable rainfall on the stock density decision when
herders are risk-averse, under the assumptions of either perfect cooperation or noncooperation.
We then consider the decision to engage in mobility given stock densities, and subsequently
consider the simultaneous decision to choose stock densities and mobility when herders are
risk-neutral, and when they are risk-averse. Third, we allow herders to choose the amount of
land allocated to cropland and common pastures, although we defer adding the mathematical
representation of this decision until the final model. Finally, we consider the role of cooperation.
As the model development shows, there are a number of externalities generated by the provi-
sion of lands for common pasture and by stock densities realized on home pastures, which
themselves are affected by the decision to engage in herd mobility. In this report, cooperation
refers to the extent to which externalities are successfully addressed (internalized). Coopera-
tion, however, is costly, and we develop the final model to incorporate costs of cooperation as
a function of externalities and the underlying cooperative capacity that exists in the commu-
nity. Cooperative capacity itself is an abstract construct, and we also digress to consider how
we measure this capacity in the empirical chapters. In the final section of this chapter, we de-
velop a system of equations that can be empirically estimated.Climate Variability and 
Stock Density Decision
The use of climate variability and/or indi-
cators of climate shocks as explanatory
variables in household decisions has been
applied in many cases, including studies
by Paxson (1992), Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1993), Udry (1994), and Fafchamps et al.
(1999). These studies are primarily con-
cerned with the impact of transitory produc-
tion shocks on savings and consumption
smoothing, particularly the use of livestock
as a consumption-smoothing mechanism.
For the studies undertaken in Africa (Udry
1994; Fafchamps et al. 1999), there is little
evidence that livestock, particularly large
livestock, are used as a savings mechanism
to smooth consumption in the face of gen-
eralized rainfall shocks.5 In other words,
there is little empirical evidence to support
the hypothesis that livestock are held primar-
ily as precautionary savings for coping with
transitory shocks, although the evidence does
indicate that small ruminants may to some
degree play such a role.
Here, we do not focus on the consumer,
but rather, on the effect of climate variabil-
ity on the producer. Standard noncoopera-
tive, one-period game models of use rates of
common rangelands indicate that use rates
are greater on the commons than would be
the case under the social optimum, and that
the degree of overexploitation increases
with the number of members involved (Das-
gupta and Heal 1979). In one of the few ar-
ticles on risk and common-pool resource
use, Sandler and Sterbenz (1990) develop a
model incorporating variable returns that
results in risk-averse decisionmakers reduc-
ing inputs as variability increases. Thus, even
with common-pool resources, risk reduces
input use. These results mirror the standard
results in production theory when all inputs
are implicitly assumed to be private.
Contrary to the hypothesis of lower input
use resulting from the Sandler and Sterbenz
(1990) model, a group of researchers have
posited that herders will attempt to hold
onto more livestock in high-variability en-
vironments. The reasoning here is that in-
creased herd size going into a drought is
thought to imply a greater probability of
coming out of the drought with relatively
more animals (Livingstone 1991; Faf-
champs 1998; Niamir-Fuller 1999),6 which
itself would seem to imply that overall herd
variability is decreasing in herd size, al-
though it is not at all clear why this would
be the case. Similarly, proponents of the
“new range ecology” also argue that hold-
ing larger herds in areas subject to high cli-
mate variability is the best strategy in these
disequilibrium environments, particularly
because, in these environments, it is thought
that forage productivity is driven almost
exclusively by rainfall, with limited or no
impact of stock densities on future forage
productivity (see Behnke et al. 1993). One
of the main hypotheses to be tested in the
empirical sections is the sign of the impact
of rainfall variability on stock densities,
and whether there is a different effect in
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5As noted above, Udry (1994) and Fafchamps et al. (1999) derive empirical estimates of the importance of live-
stock’s role in consumption smoothing. In both studies, which use data collected in West Africa, the results show
no role for large ruminants and a limited role for small ruminants. The authors conclude that livestock plays a
limited role as savings. Alternatively, Dercon and Krishnan (1998) investigate the distribution of asset holdings
in Tanzania and Ethiopia: livestock holdings and income from livestock both increase with increases in total
wealth. They thus conclude that livestock is not likely being used as a risk-coping measure, because otherwise,
we would expect that poor households would have a higher share of income from livestock.
6This line of reasoning ignores the fact that even though such a strategy might be rational when pasture is either
perfectly managed or held as private land, the extent of herd build-up may be significantly greater when pastures
are not perfectly managed.communities with relatively high variability
—a coefficient of variation of about .3—as
proposed by the new range ecology.
We extend the Sandler and Sterbenz
(1990) model to explicitly derive testable
hypotheses from a one-period model of
the stock density decision. This model im-
plicitly assumes that there is no value to
precautionary savings or precautionary asset
build-up; we can thus contrast the results
from the one-period model with those from
the different multiple-period models.
Theoretical Model
To characterize the externalities arising
from noncooperation, we derive both the
noncooperative and joint-maximization out-
comes (see Dasgupta and Heal 1979). Joint
maximization implies that a group can per-
fectly manage its common resources (in the
sense that all externalities are internalized,
and costs for this management are zero).
Conversely, noncooperation implies that
each individual is concerned only with his/
her own profit maximization; we use the
standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept
to arrive at the equilibrium outcome. To in-
corporate the impact of risk aversion on pro-
ducer decisions, we use the mean-variance
approximation for expected utility (Hirsch-
leifer and Reilly 1992) and a multiplicative
specification for climate risk. We consider
that overexploitation occurs if the number
of livestock occurring under the noncooper-
ative game is greater than the level associ-
ated with joint maximization.
Model results show that, as in Sandler
and Sterbenz (1990), the total input level
under climate risk is less than the corre-
sponding case under certainty. Furthermore,
we establish that over a certain range, aver-
age profits are actually higher, but expected
utility lower, when there is variability in
production and a noncooperative game is
played. Higher average profits are possible
because as stock densities are reduced, they
become closer to joint-maximization levels
that obtain under no risk. In contrast, input
levels, expected utility, and average profits
all decline with increases in risk under
joint maximization. Increasing the number
of players reduces average profits, and thus
reduces the range over which profits




Risk vs. No Risk in Production
We first consider the case in which there
are two players, i = 1,2. We hypothesize
that either a social optimizer jointly maxi-
mizes expected utility (EU) of profits (π),
ΣEU(π)JM, or that the ith individual maxi-
mizes his or her expected utility of profit
under a noncooperative game, EUi(πi)NC. In
the riskless scenario, we use a standard pro-
duction function that captures negative ex-
ternalities, lif(li+lj;β), where liis the num-
ber of livestock held by the ith player and
f(li + lj; β) is the average product function,
which is a function of total stock densities.
Total profits are Pli f(li + lj; β) – cli, where
P is livestock output price, β is a vector of
technical coefficients, and c is the constant
marginal cost of livestock. Under output
risk,  the mean-variance representation of
expected utility is written as
Plif(li + lj; β) – cli
–
1 – 2σ2
θφA[Plif(li + lj; β)]2
where σ2
θ is variance in rainfall, and φA is
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion,
which is assumed to be the same for both
players.7
The expected utility maximization equa-
tions are given here for the following two-
8 CHAPTER 2
7An extension to consider differences either in terms of marginal costs or risk preferences is given in McCarthy
(1999).player scenarios: (1) joint maximization,
no climate risk, (2) noncooperative game, no
climate risk, (3) joint maximization, cli-
mate risk, and (4) noncooperative game,
climate risk. Additionally, we assume that
under jpint maximization, the social opti-
mizer sets l1 = l2 = l. Immediately following
are the respective first-order conditions.




= P[l1f(l1 + l2; β) 
+ l2f(l1 + l2; β)] – cl1 – cl2 (2.1)
Scenario 2: Noncooperative Game, Two












= Pl2f(l1 + l2; β)] – cl2 (2.2b)
Scenario 3: Joint Maximization, Climate
Risk
max
l1,l2 ΣEU(πJM) = [Pl1f(l1 + l2; β)] 
– cl1 –
1 – 2σ2
θφA[Plif(li + lj; β)]2]
+ [Pl2f(l1 + l2; β)] – cl2
–
1 – 2σ2
θφA[Pl2f(li + lj; β)]2] (2.3)





NC) = [Pl1f(l1 + l2; β)] – cl1
–
1 – 2σ2




NC) = [Pl2f(l1 + l2; β)] – cl2
– 
1 – 2σ2
θφA[Pl2f(li + lj; β)]2] (2.4b)
First-Order Conditions
To simplify notation when writing the first-
order conditions, we use f for f(li + lj; β),
and R for the variance multiplied by the co-
efficient of absolute risk aversion, (σ2
θφA).










These assumptions have been widely made
in the theoretical literature and hold that “in-
puts” are equally productive across produc-
ers, so that each producer’s share of total
output is equal to their share of variable in-
puts applied.8 Below, we give the first-order
conditions for each scenario outlined above,
substituting l = l1 = l2 in the joint maxi-
mization scenarios.
Scenario 1: Joint Maximization, No Climate
Risk
∂EUJM
——— = P[f + lf′] + Plf ′ – c
∂l
+ P[f + lf′] + Plf ′ – c = 0 (2.5)
or equivalently,
2P[f + 2lf′] – 2c = 0 (2.6)
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8In cases where the common-pool resources (CPRs) are being exploited by a group of people using the same
underlying technology (e.g., herders stocking the same breed of livestock or fishermen using the same type of
boats), this assumption is justified, as it is in our study sites. However, it would not be justified if we considered
a herder who held low-growth, indigenous cattle and who shared common pastures with another herder who held
high-growth, improved stock (assuming that both types of animals are otherwise identical), or a community in
which some members have adopted a modern fishing technology but others were still using traditional methods.Scenario 2: Noncooperative Game, Two
Players, No Climate Risk
∂EUi — –— + P[f + lf′] – c = 0 (2.7)
∂li
for i = 1,2.
Scenario 3: Joint Maximization, Climate
Risk
∂EUJM
——— = P[f + lf′] – RP2lf[f + lf′] 
∂l
+ Plf ′ – RP2l2ff′ – c + P[f + lf′] 
– RP2lf[f + lf′] + Plf ′ – RP2l2ff′
– c = 0 (2.8)
or equivalently,
2P[f + 2lf′ – PRlf(f + 2lf′)] 
– 2c = 0 (2.9)
Scenario 4: Noncooperative Game, Two
Players, Climate Risk
∂EUNC
——— = P[f + lif′– Rilif[P( f + lif′)]]
∂li
– c = 0 (2.10)
for i = 1,2.
The first two implications of the model
are not surprising, and coincide with the
general effect of variability and noncooper-
ation on exploitation levels. Comparing the
first-order conditions for the variability and
no variability scenarios, we see that ex-
ploitation levels are lower when there is
climate risk under both joint maximization
(compare equations [2.6] and [2.9]) and
noncooperation (compare equations [2.7]
and [2.10]). We can also see the standard
result that input levels are higher under non-
cooperation than under joint maximization,
with and without climate risk (see the proof
supplied in Appendix 1).
What is more interesting is that input
levels under noncooperation and climate risk
may be equal to or lower than the levels
under no risk joint maximization (proof
provided in Appendix 1), which is the basis
for the conclusion in Sandler and Sterbenz
(1990) that risk mitigates the “tragedy of the
commons.” Nonetheless, note that to obtain
this result, we must make a comparison
across two different levels of risk, as well
as across two types of management regimes.
That is to say, this result depends on using
the joint-maximization solution in the ab-
sence of variability as the basis for calculat-
ing the degree of overexploitation. If instead,
we compared the noncooperative outcome
to the joint-maximization solution at the
same level of climate risk, it is simply not
necessary that overexploitation—defined
here as the difference between the joint-
maximization and noncooperative levels—
decreases with increases in climate risk.
Next, we can examine average profits
and expected utility accruing under both sce-
narios as the level of climate risk is in-
creased, as shown graphically in Figure 2.1.9
Starting from a point of no variability, as
variability increases, both total and individ-
ual input levels decline, and average profits
under noncooperation increase to the point
at which input levels coincide with the op-
timal stock levels associated with the joint-
maximization solution under no climate risk.
At this point, further increases in variability
will reduce both average profits and ex-
pected utility. As also shown in Figure 2.1,
increases in variability will always reduce
both average profits and expected utility
under joint-maximization. In fact, we see
that average profits are actually lower under
joint-maximization vs. noncooperation over
a range of values for output variance; how-
10 CHAPTER 2
9The model is parameterized based very roughly on prices, costs, and productivity parameters from the Ethiopia
case study; income is high, because there are only two players in the game, as opposed to the average of 79 house-
holds per community in Ethiopia.ever, note that expected utility is always
lower under noncooperation. Thus, where
producers are risk-averse, we may very well
observe input levels that produce average
profits at—or even above—average profits
that coincide with joint maximization.
Another interesting way to highlight the
difference between the variability and no-
variability situation is to consider how the
externality changes as variability increases.
The difference between the first-order con-
ditions for joint-maximization vs. nonco-
operation under certainty is equal to lf′
(compare equations [2.5] and [2.6]). This is
the standard crowding externality. The dif-
ference between the first-order conditions
for joint-maximization vs. noncooperation
under climate risk is equal to lf′ – RPl2ff ′,
where the second term, –RPl2ff ′, is here-
after referred to as the risk externality. Note
that whereas lf ′ is negative, –RPl2ff ′ is pos-
itive, so that the externalities are offsetting.
Using a general functional form for pro-
duction, the overall change in the total ex-
ternality (crowding plus risk) as climate risk
increases is indeterminate, although the total
externality itself will always be negative (the
crowding externality is always absolutely
greater than the risk externality, regardless
of the functional form for production, as
long as the production function is concave).
However, a sufficient condition for the total
externality to increase (become less nega-
tive) is that the absolute value of the elastic-
ity of input demand with respect to climate
variance be less than 1, the proof of which
is provided in Appendix 2. In this case, we
might say that the “tragedy of the com-
mons” is indeed reduced in the sense that
the associated absolute level of the total ex-
ternality decreases as variability increases.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the case for the linear
quadratic production function, in which the
elasticity condition holds.
Now consider an increase in the num-
ber of players. As shown in Appendix 1,
increasing the number of players always
increases the difference between the first-
order condition resulting from noncoop-
eration and that arising from the social
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Figure 2.1 Expected utility and average profits as functions of variability: 
joint maximization and noncooperationoptimum, so that overall stock densities in-
crease with the number of players.
Next consider the impact of other model
variables. Any variables positively affecting
profitability—greater output prices, shorter
distances to market, and lower input prices
—lead to higher stock densities, as long as
herders are not too risk-averse. Differentiat-
ing any of the first-order conditions given
above with respect to output prices, for in-
stance, yields a positive term that captures
the direct impact on the marginal product of
livestock and a negative term that captures
the impact of increased prices on the mar-
ginal cost of risk. Thus, the overall impact is
ambiguous. Note that greater profitability
has a similar effect on both the social opti-
mum and the noncooperative game, as is
true for other variables. Although fairly ob-
vious, this similarity is often forgotten when
discussing the impact of profitability on re-
source use and management. Better agro-
ecological conditions that increase average
product will lead to higher stock densities
under both management regimes. Finally,
consider the impact of outsiders using home
pastures. If we take this use as a given—
perhaps by custom or tradition—then it
simply decreases the average product func-
tion, thereby decreasing stock levels held
by community members. The latter requires
that use by outsiders is not influenced by
strategic choice—it is simply a given. Also,
note that, to this point, we are only examin-
ing the direct impact of various factors on
stock densities, assuming either noncooper-
ation or joint maximization. As we develop
more fully later in this chapter, many of
these variables also have indirect impacts
on stock densities through an impact on co-
operative capacity. Use of home pastures
by outsiders is one such variable: although
the direct impact is to reduce community
members’ stock, such use may make coop-
eration more difficult and thus have an indi-
rect positive impact on community livestock
holdings.
To summarize, we hypothesize that
greater rainfall variability leads to lower
stock densities, and that cooperation in
the use of home pastures also reduces
stock levels. An increase in the number of
herders increases the size of the externalities
under noncooperation, and thus leads to
higher stock densities. Greater profitability
and better underlying agro-ecological con-
ditions—higher output prices, lower input
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Figure 2.2 Production, risk, and total externalities as functions of risk aversionsoils, less field slope—all increase stock
densities.
Mobility
In van den Brink et al. (1995), the authors
consider the effect of rainfall and variability
in rainfall on producer decisions to either
engage in mobile livestock production or
become sedentary farmers. Their model con-
siders returns to livestock vis-à-vis cropping
quite generally; the emphasis is on rainfall
variability and the comparative advantage
that mobile herds may offer. However, in
their analysis, neither traditional externalities
associated with the use of common pastures
nor the ability of communities to cooperate
is explicitly considered, so that the impact
of variability on cooperation and land use
are not considered.
Furthermore, although many researchers
have discussed the benefits of mobility in
capturing the value of ex post adjustments
to actual rainfall realizations for the individ-
ual herder (Thompson and Wilson 1994;
van den Brink et al. 1995), few economic
models have considered the incentives for
individual herders to engage in mobility
when one’s own choice on mobility is af-
fected by the choices of others who share
access to the same pastures at home.
Schoonmaker-Freudenberger and Schoon-
maker-Freudenberger (1993) discuss patterns
of mobility observed in the Ferlo region of
Senegal. They argue that the individual’s
decision to engage in mobility depends on
how many other individuals choose to re-
main at home. The description implies that
the structure of incentives to engage in mo-
bility resemble a “chicken game,” in which
the best response to another herder’s action
is to do the opposite. Under normal rainfall
conditions, each herder would prefer to stay
at home while at least a certain fraction of
others migrate, but a herder also prefers to
move in the case in which no others do so.
Under other rainfall conditions, however, all
community members may prefer to be mo-
bile or all stay at home, so that the fraction
moving in any given period will depend on
relative rainfall realizations across the re-
gion of potential mobility. Mobility will also
be a function of relative differences in pas-
ture productivity, the transactions costs of
mobility, and the number of members within
a community.
With respect to economic heterogeneity,
it is quite possible that wealthier herders
may have as a dominant strategy to always
move, whereas poorer herders may tend to
remain at home, as discussed in Ruttan
(2000). As the number of members in the
community increases, the probability that
wealthier herders now find it profitable to
move increases, because profits on the home
area will decrease with increasing commu-
nity population, but profits accruing to the
herder engaged in mobility do not change
when the number of members increases.10
Thus, the fraction of herders moving in any
period will also be a positive function of the
extent of economic heterogeneity.
Below, we develop a game-theoretic
model of stock densities and herd mobility,
in which herders all use community pas-
tures in the first period, but face a discrete
decision whether or not to migrate to non-
community pastures in the second period.
The model is similar to those developed to
analyze oligopolistic behavior, in which
firms choose to invest in the first period (see
Mas-Colell et al. 1995) and play a quantity-
choice game in the second stage, although in
our model, both the first and second stages
are characterized by different games.
Returning to our particular case of herd
size and mobility, the decision on mobility
results in outcomes in which either both
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10This is the case when the available pasture in the “rest of the world” is not subject to the same negative exter-
nalities that characterize the use of home pastures.migrate, neither migrates, or one (or a frac-
tion) of the herders migrate in equilibrium,
and relative rainfall realizations plus trans-
action costs of mobility largely determine
the extent of mobility. We then extend the
model to allow herders to choose stock den-
sities in the first period and mobility in the
second period. As shown below, results in-
dicate that noncooperation is likely to lead
to higher stock densities and lower mobility,
although it is also possible that stock densi-
ties increase to the extent that more mobility
is undertaken. It is also possible, if home pas-
tures are very productive but higher stock
densities have a large impact on the crowd-
ing externality, that both stock densities and
mobility will be lower under noncooperation.
In any case, returns are lower than those that
accrue under the social optimum. As is often
the case, incorporating risk-averse behavior
leads to ambiguous results. Risk aversion
increases the value of mobility vis-à-vis the
case in which mobility is not an option and
likely leads to both greater mobility and
higher stock levels, although the latter is by
no means certain. The lower the covariance
between rainfall realized at the two sites, the
greater will be the mobility and, potentially,
the stock densities.
In the next section, we develop a simple,
two-period model of stock densities and
mobility, assuming herders are risk-neutral.
We posit that herders use home pastures in
period 1, but have the choice to stay at home
or engage in mobility to outside pastures
in period 2. The second period decision is
discrete: either a herder must migrate with
the entire herd, or remain at home with the
entire herd.11 We then consider the impact
of risk aversion, and conclude by present-
ing testable hypotheses stemming from the





NC) = E(PθH1l1f(l1 + l2; β)
– cl1 + V2) (2.11)
subject to
V2 = max(E(PθH2l1f(LH; βH) – cl1),
E(PθA2g(l1; βA) – cl1 – cMobl1)) (2.12)
where E(⋅) is the expectations operator, and
g(⋅) is the total product obtained on array
pastures. Rainfall is specified to have a
multiplicative impact on total returns, cap-
tured by the terms θH1, θH2, θA2, where the
letters in the superscripts refer to the loca-
tion of pastures—H signifies home pastures,
A signifies away pastures—and the num-
bers in the subscripts refer to either the first
or second period. The quantities βH and βA
are productivity parameters for home and
away pastures, respectively; c is the per unit
costs of holding livestock; LH is the number
of animals remaining on home pastures dur-
ing the second period; cMob represents per
unit costs of mobility, and all other variables
are as defined earlier in the chapter in the
stock density decision model. Suppressing
the productivity parameters in the production
functions, setting the output price equal to 1,





NC) = E(θH1l1f(l1 + l2) 
– cl1 + V2) (2.13)
subject to
V2 = max(E(θH2l1f(LH) – cl1),
E(θA2g(l1) – cl1 – cMobl1)) (2.14)
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11This is done for expositional simplicity: results do not change if a fraction of an individual’s herd can be moved,
except when different animals have different marginal costs of herding. Even in this case, the proportion of cat-
tle that migrate at the community level does not depend on which animals actually move (in the different-cost
case, there will be a fraction of different types engaged in mobility at the community level). So, for instance, if
there were two “types” of animals, then there would be two subgames. The same holds if different types are sub-
ject to different shocks; although, in this case, the analysis is more complicated. Nonetheless, the qualitative
results remain; equilibrium outcomes continue to resemble a chicken game.After taking expectations, we subsitute the
mean realization of these variables in the
maximization problem, θ ¯H1, θ ¯H2, θ ¯A2. Re-
turns on home pastures realized in the sec-
ond period are a function of LH, βH, and the
mean rainfall on home pastures. Returns
on away pastures are a function of the indi-
vidual herder’s stock levels, l1, and not on
anyone else’s stock levels. Returns to away
pastures are also a function of βA and cMob.
Lower c and higher output prices, P l, in-
crease returns to stock levels whether ani-
mals are home or away.
Consider the second-period problem, in
which the herder must choose whether to
stay at home or migrate with the herd. Ini-
tially, we assume that there are only two
herders. The player has two potential strate-
gies in his strategy set Si = {si
H, si
A}. There






























A) =θ ¯A2g(l1) – cl1 – cMob
Note that the expected profits from migrat-
ing are the same for player 1, irrespective
of whether player 2 stays at home or also
migrates. Next, we can determine player 1’s
best response to a strategy undertaken by
player 2; this choice is easily seen in the
typical 2 × 2 representation of the normal
form game.
If player 2 stays at home, player 1 will
also stay at home if
θ ¯H2l1f(l1 + l2) >θ ¯A2g(l1) – cMob
otherwise, he chooses to move. If player 2
migrates, then player 1 will remain at
home if
θ ¯H2l1f(l1) >θ ¯A2g(l1) – cMob
First note that if
θ ¯H2l1f(l1 + l2) >θ ¯A2g(l1) – cMob
then surely
θ ¯H2l1f(l1) >θ ¯A2g(l1) – cMob
because
θ ¯H2l1f(l1) >θ ¯H2l1f(l1 + l2)
That is, if player 1 chooses to stay home
when player 2 stays home, then clearly the
former will also choose to stay home when
player 2 is away. Given alternative parame-
ter values, the game might be fully privi-
leged, in the sense that either both players
stay at home or both players engage in
mobility; these Nash equilibria are also the
social optimums. Or, the game might resem-
ble a chicken game, with two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria, in which one player mi-
grates and the other stays at home. This
happens when
θ ¯H2l1f(l1) >θ ¯A2g(l1) – cMob
>θ ¯H2l1f(l1 + l2)
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Player 2—Home Player 2—Away
Player 1— θ ¯H2l1f(l1 + l2) – cl1, θ ¯H2l1f(l1) – cl1,
Home θ ¯H2l2f(l1 + l2) – cl2 θ ¯A2g(l2) – cl2 – cMob
Player 1— θ ¯A2g(l1) – cl1 – cMob θ ¯A2g(l1) – cl1 – c ¯
Mob,
Away θ ¯H2l2f(l2) – cl2 θ ¯A2g(l2) – cl2 – cMobAs with the fully privileged equilibria, the
Nash equilibria are also socially optimal, for
given l1 and l2. Because we have set up the
game as a one-period game (one period in
which mobility is a choice), we write the ex-
pected value of V2 in terms of the mixed-
strategy Nash equilibria:
EV2 =
1 – 2[θ ¯H2l1f(LH) – cl1] 
+
1 – 2[θ ¯A2g(l1) – cl1– cMob] (2.15)
Note that it is not possible for the game to
resemble an assurance game, characterized
as having two Nash equilibria, one in
which both remain at home and the other
with both migrating. An assurance game
would require
θ ¯H2l1f(l1 + l2) >θ ¯A2g(l1) – cMob
and
θ ¯A2g(l1) – cMob >θ ¯H2l1f(l1)
which is not possible. Also, the game can
never resemble a prisoner’s dilemma, be-
cause a prisoner’s dilemma would require
not only
θ ¯H2l1f(l1 + l2) >θ ¯A2g(l1) – cMob
and
θ ¯H2l1f(l1) >θ ¯A2g(l1) – cMob
but also that
θ ¯A2g(l1)  – cMob >θ ¯H2l1f(l1 + l2)
which obviously contradicts the first require-
ment. The latter holds because the returns to
player 1 from migrating are not a function
of the other player’s decision.
Mobility will be chosen when
θ ¯A2g(l1)  – cMob >θ ¯H2l1f(l1 + l2)
and it is easy to see that this inequality is
more likely to hold the greater the mean
rainfall at away pastures and the more
productive those pastures relative to home
pastures. We noted above that the Nash
equilibria to the mobility game are the same
strategies that would be chosen by a social
optimizer, for given l1 and l2. However, to
the extent that
[θ ¯H2l1f(l1 + l2)]NC
< [θ ¯H2l1f(l1 + l2)]JM
then it is more likely that mobility is under-
taken. In other words, if returns to home
pastures are driven down by noncoopera-
tion at home, then mobility is promoted.
This result gives insight into the more so-
phisticated game developed below, in which
the proportion of herds engaging in mo-
bility under noncooperation may be greater
than or less than that proportion under the
social optimum.
We now extend the game to consider N
players and consider that each player has
two choice variables: the number of animals
to hold and the proportion of a season spent





NC) =θ ¯H1l1f(l1 +Σ
j≠1
lj)
– cl1 +θ ¯H2[dH1(l1f (ΣlidHi) – cl1)]
+θ ¯A2(1 – dH1)[g(l1) – cl1] 
– cMob (2.16)
such that
dH + dA = 1
where dH is the proportion of days in the
second season that herders remain at home,
and dA = 1 – dH is the proportion of days
spent in migration. Taking the derivative of
the above problem with respect to the num-
ber animals and the number of days in mi-
gration yields:




NC =θ ¯H1[f + l1 ——–] – c
∂l1
∂f(ΣdHili)
+ [θ ¯H2(dH1f + dH1l1 —————) – c] ∂l1
∂g(l1)




NC=θ ¯H2[l1f + dH1l1 —————] ∂dH1
– θ ¯A2g(l1) (2.18)
Again assuming that the social optimizer
jointly maximizes over all individuals and
suppressing the arguments in the average
product function for use of home pastures, f,






JM =θ ¯H1[f + l1 —–  +Σ
j≠1
lj —–] ∂l1 ∂l1
∂f




dH1l1 —–) – c] ∂l1
∂g









ljdHj —–] – θ ¯A2g(l1) (2.20)
∂l1
Under both noncooperation and the social
optimum, the first-order condition with re-
spect to herd size has three terms. The first
term represents the marginal impact of
adding an additional animal on revenues
deriving from the use of home pastures dur-
ing the first period. The second term is the
marginal impact on returns from using home
pastures the second period multiplied by
proportion of the season that the individual
will stay at home. The third term is the mar-
ginal impact of an additional animal on re-
turns from engaging in mobility during the
second period multiplied by the proportion
of the season that the individual engages in
mobility. The first-order condition with re-
spect to days is composed of the marginal
returns to remaining on home pastures and
the marginal returns to migrating.
Comparing the first-order conditions
(FOCs), we see that FOCl1
NC > FOCl1
JM
when evaluated at the same li,dHi pair, as
FOCl1
JM contains two additional terms:
















which is also negative. The former is the
conventional negative externality arising
from adding an additional head of livestock,
the latter externality captures the negative




JM and/or  dH1
NC ≠
dH1
JM in equilibrium. Either increasing l1
NC
or increasing dH1 would reduce FOCl1
NC,
FOCdH1





JM is a possible equilibrium out-










JM. The only combination that





can consider under what circumstances each
outcome is likely to arise. First, note that
l1
NC < l1
JM would lead to an increase in all
three terms in FOCl1
NC whereas increasing
dH1 would only lead to a decrease in the
second two terms. Also, dH1 is bounded by
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 171, so there is a limit to which dH1 can be in-
creased.12 Thus, this outcome is not likely
unless marginal returns to away pastures are
very large but diminish slowly, and the av-
erage product of home pastures is relatively




NC is more likely to be greater than
dH1
JM when marginal returns to home and
away pastures are relatively similar and di-
minish at a similar rate; dH1
NC is more likely
to be less than dH1
JM when stock densities
have a large impact on externalities at the
margin, and away pastures are of relatively
high productivity. That is, when home and
away pastures have similar characteristics,
which is quite likely in the semiarid agro-
ecological environments where case studies






Finally, we consider the implications of
combining this model of mobility with the
model of the stock density decision by risk-
averse herders detailed in the previous sec-







mean returns realized during the first and
second periods from home and away pas-
tures, σθH
H2, σθA
A2 represent the variance of re-
turns on home and away pastures during the
second period, and assuming, for simplicity,
that rainfall on home pastures in the first
period is nonstochastic (σθH
H1 = 0), we can
write the following maximization problem:
max
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Although it is difficult to compare much
without the aid of a simulation model and
empirical parameter estimates, we can still
easily note that the lower the covariance, the
greater will be either stock levels or mobil-
ity, or both. Because mobility reduces the
variance of returns, however, we expect that
under most parameter values, risk-averse
herders will choose a greater level of herd
mobility.
In our empirical work, we do not have
long time-series data on mobility, only ob-
servations on the extent of mobility under-
taken during the 12 months previous to the
survey. Actual mobility will adjust to cur-
rent rainfall realizations relative to long-
term values. The higher the rainfall real-
izations on home pastures (relative to
long-term mean rainfall and rainfall occur-
ring on away pastures), the lower will be
the mobility in this period. For other pa-
rameters, we note that comparative statistics
of this four-variable system with risk aver-
sion are, in general, ambiguous, but as long
as risk aversion is not too great and strate-
gic effects not too large, then the lower the
costs of mobility and the lower the relative
productivity of home vs. away pastures,
the greater will be mobility. Higher output
prices and lower costs per animal are ex-
pected to increase stock densities and thus,
mobility.
Land Allocation
The ultimate decision to be made is on the
allocation of land between usufruct (de facto
private) cultivation by individual house-
holds and common pastures. The decision
by community members on stock rates on
home pastures determines the marginal pro-
ductivity of land allocated to pastures. This
productivity will be equated to that arising
from cultivation. Thus, to the extent that
noncooperation reduces the productivity of
home pastures, there will be pressure for
land to be reallocated to individual crops. In
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SO.addition, even if there is perfect cooperation
over stock densities on community pastures,
there will be a tendency to underprovide
land to the commons, so that the number
of members has both a positive direct effect
on land allocated to crops and an indirect
positive effect via stock densities, to the
extent that the latter are overexploited (de
Janvry et al. 1998). Put differently, allo-
cating land to the common pool is similar
to providing a public good, and, as such,
there will be a tendency to underprovide
that good, irrespective of how the land is
used. If members know that the common-
pool pastures will subsequently be over-
exploited, then there will be a tendency to
reduce the allocation of land to the com-
mon pastures. These are two distinct effects,
often referred to as provision and appropri-
ation (de Janvry et al. 1998). Following this
model, below we assume that under a non-
cooperative game, the ith individual decides
how much of his/her share of total land,
which we assume to be A/N will be allo-
cated to crops, aci, and to pastures, api, with
the constraint:
aci + api = Ai = A/N 
With respect to the addition of rainfall
variability in this model, given that live-
stock herding is less subject to the vagaries
of climate than is crop production, it would
seem trivial to show that more land would
be allocated to livestock than to crops in
higher variability environments. However
—as so often happens with models incorpo-
rating multiple covariate risks—the effect
is actually ambiguous (McCarthy 1999).
This comes about as a result of externalities
generated by the use of common pastures
that do not arise under individual crop farm-
ing. The presence of both crowding and risk
externalities has a positive impact on the
proportion of land allocated to individual
crops vs. common pastures, because of indi-
viduals’ incentives to minimize this exter-
nality, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, because
our empirical work has been undertaken in
relatively marginal semiarid regions, we
hypothesize that the overall impact of rain-
fall variability on cropland allocation is neg-
ative, whereas the impact of higher rainfall
on cropland is positive.
To summarize, we make the following
hypotheses: greater negative externalities
generated on common pasture lead to a
greater proportion of land allocated to
crops, and larger membership in the com-
munity also leads to more land allocated
to crops, because the provision externality
increases. Other factors will also affect
cropland allocation. We hypothesize that
population density will lead to more land
in crops when density-driven intensification
favors productivity improvements in crops
vs. livestock, that higher relative ratios of
crop:livestock prices increase cropland, that
more crop-specific assets held within the
community and more infrastructure in-
crease cropland, and finally, that higher
mean rainfall leads to more cropland,
whereas greater rainfall variability reduces
cropland.
Cooperation
Given that formal rules and regulations on
stock densities and land allocation do not
exist in any of the communities studied,
then following the noncooperative model,
overexploitation should be captured solely
by the number of members. However, there
is a large body of empirical evidence to
support the notion that communities are
unlikely to either fully cooperate or com-
pletely not cooperate (Ostrom 1990; Baland
and Plateau 1996); instead, outcomes are
likely to be between the two extremes, be-
cause achieving collective action is likely to
be costly (Oakerson 1992). In other words,
observed outcomes in a community are not
likely to be the result of a binary choice be-
tween perfect cooperation and absolute
noncooperation, but rather a function of
variables often posited to affect the “suc-
cessfulness” of cooperation that have an
impact at the margin.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 19Nonetheless, theoretical models of co-
operation and how such cooperation can
affect equilibrium outcomes are fairly rare.
In a theoretical model of costly cooperation
developed in McCarthy et al. (1998), equi-
librium use levels are directly affected by
agro-ecological conditions and demo-
graphic and market characteristics, but an
indirect effect also arises via an impact
through community-level capacity to coop-
erate, which shifts equilibrium use rates.
Here, we develop a simplified representa-
tion of this model. In the model as devel-
oped thus far, the choice variables are the
total herd size at the community level, the
number of days the livestock migrate to
away pastures, and the amount of land allo-
cated to crops and pasture. For each of these
choices, we assume that the social optimizer
maximizes the sum of each individual’s util-
ity. Thus, the externalities not internalized
under noncooperation are additive. For in-






















l1 indicates the production exter-
nality generated by player 1 with respect to
the choice of herd size, l. The above expres-






R1 equal the complicated income
variance term, api equal the allocation of
hectares allocated to pasture, and assuming
that the total land endowment constraint
aci + api = Ai
is binding, we can write the individual’s
maximization problem as:
l1,d1,ap1





























where the superscripts P and R refer to pro-
duction and risk externalities, respectively.
From the development of the model’s con-
stituent parts above, we note that ExtP
l1,
ExtP
d1 < 0, capturing the standard crowding
externalities, whereas ExtR
l1, ExtR
d1 > 0, be-
cause higher stock densities and greater
herd mobility actually reduce overall vari-
ability of returns for other players. How-
ever, ExtP
ap1 > 0, capturing the public goods
nature of allocating more land to common
pastures, but ExtR
ap1 < 0, because increasing
the size of the pastures will reduce variabil-
ity for all players, an effect not taken into
account by the individual.
Finally, we consider the social opti-
mizer’s problem. Following McCarthy et al.
(1998), we posit that social optimizer jointly
maximizes members’ utility functions, sub-
ject to the cost of ensuring cooperation,
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13Note that these externalities are exactly the Pigouvian tax required needed to induce the socially optimal stock
levels (see Dasgupta and Heal 1979).CCoop, which is a function of the external-
ities generated under noncooperation
CCoop = f(Ext, λCoop)
A very simple cost function is:
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which posits that individual-specific costs
of cooperation will be a linear function of
the capacity to cooperate, λCoop, and the
utility function of all other individuals. We
write the “costly” social optimizer’s prob-
lem (SOCst) as:
l1,d1,hp1
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0 ≤λ Coop ≤ 1
















+ (1 – λCoop) (ExtP
hp1 + ExtR
hpl) (2.29)
Note that λCoop is bounded below by 0 and
above by 1; when cooperative capacity
equals zero, the cost of cooperation will be
such that the noncooperative solution is re-
produced, when capacity equals one, all ex-
ternalities will be internalized and the “cost-
less” social optimum will be reached.
Variables expected to influence λCoop
include the size of the group, sociocultural
and economic heterogeneity, the extent and
nature of interactions with external organi-
zations or government agencies, whether cer-
tain resources are shared with noncommu-
nity members, and “exit” opportunities (the
opportunity cost of labor dedicated to under-
taking collective action). An increase in the
number of members at first reduces the cost
of cooperation because of lower fixed costs
per member, but at some point, higher trans-
actions costs of making and enforcing
agreements coupled with greater marginal
costs (due to greater cumulative incentives
to cheat) lower the relative gains to cooper-
ating and thus lead directly and indirectly
to higher stock densities (Sandler 1992; de
Janvry et al. 1998; Bardhan 2000). Hetero-
geneity in terms of different marginal costs,
wealth levels, cash constraints, and the like,
reduces the scope over which mutually ben-
eficial agreements might be made, thereby
making cooperation more costly (Johnson
and Libecap 1982; Alesina and La Ferrara
1999). As discussed in Chapter 1, social
heterogeneity is almost always hypothesized
to have a negative effect on cooperation, be-
cause different social norms may make cre-
ating and enforcing decisions more costly
(Ostrom 1990; White and Runge 1994; Sea-
bright 1997 and references therein; Bardhan
2000). However, at least some researchers
posit that sociocultural homogeneity may
lead to a stagnation of ideas and foster insti-
tutional inertia, thus leading to lower overall
institutional capacity relative to communities
with greater sociocultural diversity (Begossi
1998).
Distance to market centers and/or towns
where local government offices are located
may either increase or decrease community-
level capacity. To the extent that proximity
to population centers increases opportuni-
ties to learn about different organizations
and their structures and functioning, then
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Figure 2.3 Conceptual frameworkcapacity (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2000). The
presence and density of external non-
government organizations (NGOs) may also
affect cooperative capacity. NGOs may in-
crease capacity by actively helping com-
munity members develop cooperative efforts
(Chopra and Gulati 1998; Khwaja 2000);
however, NGOs may erode cooperative
capacity by substituting their activities for
community-based collective action (Pender
and Scherr 1999; Gebremedhin et al. 2004).
In our particular case, whether or not out-
siders regularly use home pastures will be an
important indicator of the degree to which
community members can be assured that
benefits to decisions made by community
members accrue to them, and/or signifies
increased negotiation and enforcement costs.
Capacity is also hypothesized to be nega-
tively affected by higher opportunity costs
of labor; for instance, engaging in outside
wage work increases the opportunity costs





At this stage, we can summarize our in-
sights from the theoretical model devel-
opment in a diagrammatic representation
of the framework to be used to analyze
land use (stock levels and mobility) and
allocation patterns observed in communi-
ties, illustrated in Figure 2.3. Underlying
demographic, market and infrastructure,
and agro-ecological characteristics deter-
mine the relative profitability of crops and
livestock production, and also determine
the nature and extent of externalities in land
use and allocation. These characteristics
essentially form the scope for collective ac-
tion in resource management activities. Thus,
the cooperative capacity of the community
can be brought to bear on the mitigation of




Rewriting the first-order conditions found
in equations (2.31)–(2.33), we can write the
reduced-form optimal stock densities, mo-
bility, and land allocated to crops as:
Σli
* ≡ L* = f(λCoop, AgEcol, Comm,
Mkt)
Σdi
* ≡ D* = f(λCoop, AgEcol, Comm,
Mkt)
Σapi
* ≡ AP* = f(λCoop, AgEcol,
Comm, Mkt)
We note that the explicit representation of
the externalities drops out of the reduced
form equations, as they are a function of the
same variables as expected utility; we defer
a discussion of the implications for the
econometrics until the next subsection.
Higher λCoop reduces costs of cooperation,
and is thus expected to lead to lower stock
densities, more mobility, and more land in
pastures. Agri-ecological characteristics,
AgEcol, include average rainfall or current
relative rainfall, long-term rainfall variabil-
ity, and land quality. For instance, greater
rainfall is expected to increase stock densi-
ties and reduce land allocated to pastures (as
crops are considered to have a greater
marginal response to higher rainfall than
do livestock). Greater relative rainfall this
period is expected to decrease mobility.
Higher land quality is expected to increase
stock densities and decrease mobility; the
impact on land allocated to crops vs. pasture
is ambiguous. Community characteristics,
Comm, include such things as community
infrastructure (schools, health clinics, trans-
portation), population density, ethnic tradi-
tions, experience with livestock vs. crop
production, and the land endowment of the
community. More infrastructure and higher
population densities are hypothesized to
lead to greater inventiveness and produc-
tivity, and perhaps reduced transaction costs
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 23of purchasing inputs and selling products;
both are expected to lead to greater stock
densities, but the impacts on mobility and
crops are ambiguous. Greater relative expe-
rience with livestock than with crops, often
captured in whether or not the major ethnic
group in the community is considered tradi-
tionally pastoralist, is expected to lead to
higher stock densities, more mobility (by
lowering the costs of mobility), and more
land allocated to pastures. Agreater land en-
dowment is expected to reduce mobility, but
to have an ambiguous impact on stock den-
sities and land allocated to pastures. Finally
market variables, Mkt, include relative live-
stock:grain prices and the distance to market.
Higher relative livestock prices and lower
distances to market are hypothesized to
increase stock densities, mobility (via the
impact on higher stock densities), and land
allocated to pasture.
Measuring Cooperative Capacity
Theoretically, it is simple enough to define
cooperation as the actions taken to inter-
nalize externalities. As previously noted,
however, we do not observe explicit rules
on stocking rates or land allocation adopted
by the community. We also have limited
information on the resource-specific trans-
action costs of cooperation. Instead, in the
empirical case studies presented later in this
report, we attempt to recover indicators of
cooperative capacity. We posit that the ca-
pacity of a community to cooperate on man-
aging externalities can be recovered by ob-
servable indicators of cooperation in other
activities. In recent years, many such indi-
cators have been described as comprising
“social capital,”14 although some observers
have noted that a community also requires
the capacity to draw on this social capital
(see Krishna 2001). There is less agreement
on how to construct measures of social cap-
ital, although one of two avenues is usually
followed. Factors hypothesized to affect
cooperative capacity, such as ethnic or eco-
nomic heterogeneity, can be entered directly
as regressors (McCarthy et al. 1998; Bard-
han 2000; Dayton-Johnson 2000). Alter-
natively, direct measures of social capital or
cooperative capacity can be used, such as
the extent of disputes or political feuding
(Seabright 1997) or the density of networks
(Pender and Scherr 1999; Berhanu et al.
2003).
A less common approach to measuring
social capital is to construct indices of social
capital or “agency” (Krishna 2001; Isham
and Kahkonen 2002; McCarthy et al., in
press). We follow this approach, construct-
ing indicators of cooperative capacity based
on such characteristics as the number of
meetings held, active participation by mem-
bers in various collective activities, density
of networks, rules, activities, and violations
of rules. This empirical strategy is followed
because a direct measure of cooperative
capacity enables us to separate the direct
and indirect impacts of such variables. Often,
factors thought to affect collective action
also have a separate direct impact on land
use and allocation outcomes at the commu-
nity level. For instance, more favorable land
quality and higher output prices are hypoth-
esized to increase cooperative capacity,
which should reduce stock densities, all else
being equal. But the direct impact should
be to lead to higher stock densities, because
stock levels increase with higher pasture
productivity and higher output prices under
both the social optimum and the noncooper-
ative game. There are a wide variety of
measures that might be used to measure
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14The World Bank has produced a number of documents useful for operationalizing the concept of social capital,
including a working-paper series from the Local Level Institutions Study, which are available from Social De-
velopment Family, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network and the Environmentally
and Socially Sustainable Development Division; and the papers prepared for the Social Capital Initiative
(www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/scindex.htm). Also, see Dasgupta and Seregeldin (2000).cooperative capacity, although the effect of
many measures is still debated in the wider
literature. For instance, meeting attendance
can be high if members are dedicated or if
there are many conflicts; many groups might
imply that members are focusing on taking
advantage of different opportunities or that
the community is socially splintered, and the
like. Thus, we hypothesize that communi-
ties’scoring consistently on a wide range of
indicators across many different groups/
institutions is a better proxy for underlying
cooperative capacity than relying on one
indicator alone. And, to test whether these
indicators actually measure cooperative ca-
pacity, we regress them on exogenous fac-
tors thought to affect cooperative capacity.15
Econometric Model
Using the categories of variables for sim-
plicity, and using the subscript k to denote
the community, the econometric equations
of land use and allocation to be estimated in
the following country studies are:
Lk =α L +β 1λk
Coop +β 2AgEcolk
+β 3Commk +β 4Mktk + e1
D*
k =α D +γ 1λk
Coop +γ 2AgEcolk
+γ 3Commk +γ 4Mktk + e2
AP k
* =α HP +δ 1λk
Coop +δ 2AgEcolk
+δ 3Commk +δ 4Mktk + e3
where the αs are the intercept terms, β, γ,
and δare the coefficients to be estimated, and
the es are error terms. As noted earlier,
Ext = f(λCoop, AgEcol, Comm, Mkt)
so that it is not possible for us to separate
out the direct production impacts from the
externality impacts. Although it is quite re-
strictive to assume that there are no cross
effects between cooperative capacity and
variables affecting externalities and cooper-
ative capacity, empirically, this specification
is chosen for parsimony.16
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15Such an index could only be constructed for Ethiopia and Burkina Faso; in Niger, we directly include exogenous
factors hypothesized to affect collective action.
16Consider the following structural input-demand equation:
L = aXbe(1–cλCoop)lXm
Taking logarithms gives:
L = ln a + b ln X + 1 – cλCoop + ln l + mX
or
L = ln a + ln l + 1 + (b + m) ln X – cλCoop
Substituting A for the first three constant terms gives:
L = A + (b + m) ln X – cλCoop
This is essentially the form of the equations we estimate in the following chapters, with all the assumptions this
form entails on cross effects.CHAPTER 3
Ethiopia
I
n this chapter, we examine resource use and management, using community-level data col-
lected in southern Ethiopia.17 These semiarid southern rangelands support the livestock
that are highly valuable to Ethiopia for direct consumption and income for the Borana
people, for the provision of draft power, and for export to generate foreign exchange. Despite
the consensus on the region’s high ecological potential for livestock production, the area is
seen as one that has chronically been in and is still in crisis today, mostly due to pressure on
the common rangelands, high population growth rates, and increased privatization for both
cultivation and grazing (Coppock 1994; Kerven and Cox 1996; Hogg 1997).
The Borana Rangelands are located on the southernmost part of the Ethiopian lowlands,
occupying a total land area of about 95,000 km2. They are located in the area 4–6° N and
36–42° E, sloping gently from 1,600 meters altitude in the northeast to about 1,000 meters in
the extreme south, bordering on northern Kenya. The area is still predominantly in pasture and
is mainly comprised of flat plains. There are occasional mountains, massive valleys, and de-
pressions. Occupied almost entirely by pastoral populations, natural resources are largely
communal, although individual crop cultivation and private enclosures appear to be increas-
ing in recent decades. The area exhibits a bimodal pattern of precipitation, with the long rains
falling between March and May, and the short rains between September and November. Spa-
tial and temporal variability in both the quantity and distribution of rainfall renders the area
semiarid, with an average annual rainfall varying from 353 to 873 mm/year, and coefficient of
variation of rainfall (CoV) ranging from .2 to .6.
A field survey was conducted in 40 rural communities in the six districts of the Borana
rangelands from September 1997 through March 1998. Acommunity in this study consists of
two or more pastoral settlements having common access to pastures and water resources, to
which they bear a common claim, called an arda. The communities were selected to represent
different rainfall patterns (level and variation). Rainfall data from 11 weather stations18 located
across the area were used to classify the communities into four different rainfall categories:
high mean with high variation; high mean with low variation; low mean with high variation;
and low mean with low variation. Alist of all communities within approximately 50 kilometers
of each rainfall station was collected, with the aid of district agricultural officers and chairmen
of peasant associations. Between two and five communities were randomly selected.
17This chapter is based on empirical results presented in McCarthy et al. (2003).
18For eight of the stations, rainfall data were complete for the period 1982–1996; for the remaining three stations,
data were missing for some years between 1982 and 1996, and so values for mean rainfall and CoV were gener-
ated based on eight to 11 observations for these three stations.
26The first phase of the data collection em-
ployed a combination of standard question-
naires and rapid rural appraisal techniques.
Respondents included community elders,
heads of encampments, or other key in-
formants, responding in a group setting.
Social mapping was used to assess the pro-
portion of land under different types of land
uses—different types of common-property
grazing areas, transhumance routes, culti-
vated area, private enclosures, and the like.
This phase was followed by a wealth-ranking
exercise and the implementation of a close-
ended questionnaire capturing total livestock
holdings, the proportion of members en-
gaged in nonfarm income-generating ac-
tivities, rules and regulations regarding the
various resources, and basic information on
demographics and infrastructure. The phys-
ical boundaries of the arda were obtained
by use of a global positioning system (GPS)
instrument that determined the coordinates
of community border points. These data were
later digitized and analyzed to generate
community maps and land areas. Finally, a
range condition score was developed for
each community by a range specialist from
the International Livestock Research Insti-
tute, Addis Ababa; information was col-
lected on such measures as dry matter and
crude protein content along transects within
an arda, slope measurements, and the area
covered by barren land.
Descriptive Statistics
The communities studied consist of more
than 200 settlements and/or pastoral en-
campments, with an average of five settle-
ments per community. These constitute a
total of 3,141 households, with an average
of 79 households per community and seven
people per household. The total human pop-
ulation of all the communities is 21,637
people, with a mean of 541 people per com-
munity. About 26 percent of the households
are headed by women. The majority of the
households are classified as poor (67 per-
cent), about 21 percent as middle class, and
only 12 percent as wealthy.19
Cattle are by far the most important live-
stock species held by the Borana pastoral-
ists and account for more than 90 percent
of the tropical livestock units (TLU). This
amounts to about 50,000 TLU or 64,470
head of cattle.20 The remaining 10 percent
consists of small ruminants, camels, and
equines. The mean number of livestock per
community is 1,249 TLU, with a minimum
of 82 and a maximum of 5,900 TLU. Aver-
age livestock holdings at the household level
vary between 2 TLU for poorer households
to above 100 TLU for wealthier ones, with
an aggregate mean of 19 TLU.
Current Land Use Patterns
and Property Rights
About 84 percent of the total land area is
allocated to livestock production, and 16 per-
cent is cropped. However, land allocated to
livestock production is managed under dif-
ferent forms of common property, including
warra, fora, communal enclosures, and in-
dividual enclosures. Warra grazing is by far
the most common form of common prop-
erty in the area, constituting nearly half of
the total land area. These are communal
grazing areas for milking cows, calves, and
sick or weak animals during the year, and
are generally used by dry herds during the
rainy seasons. They are accessible to all
ETHIOPIA 27
19This is based on the wealth stratification criteria suggested by the respective communities according to their
definitions and perceptions of wealth.
20The tropical livestock unit is a unit of parameterization for livestock of different sizes and species to facilitate
aggregate computation. The TLU is taken to be the equivalent of an animal of 250 kilograms liveweight. Fol-
lowing Jahnke (1982), we used a conversion factor of .7 for cattle and donkeys, .1 for sheep and goats, and 1 for
camels.members of a community, usually at speci-
fied periods of the year and for specified
types of animals, but may be used by out-
siders during some times of the year upon
obtaining permission from the community.
Thus, warra areas largely fit the definition
of a common property resource with a well-
defined membership.
Communal enclosures for calves and
sick or weak animals account for about
9 percent of the total land area; these enclo-
sures may be accessible to the entire com-
munity, or in many cases, to only a subset
of households in one encampment. Unlike
warra areas, they are rarely open to non-
arda members. Community-level enclosures
and warra areas are present in 83 percent
of the sample communities and hence, con-
stitute the most important forms of com-
mon property resources. Forra areas are
unrestricted communal grazing areas for
dry herds—nonlactating livestock—for all
members of the Borana pastoral ethnic
group. Spatial and temporal access to such
areas is unregulated at all times. Forra areas
generally constitute the largest communal
grazing areas in Borana, but because they
are generally unsettled, they largely fall out-
side the boundaries of the communities
under investigation, and thus comprise only
about 1.22 percent of the total land area.
The remaining noncropped land is mostly
comprised of transhumance corridors and
areas around major wells and other water
sources, and we include this land in the land
available for grazing when constructing
stock densities. Individual holdings account
for 24 percent of the total land area, allocated
mainly to crop production (16 percent), partly
to enclosed private grazing (4 percent), and
partly to enclosed areas for draft animals
grazing around cultivated fields (4 percent).
Privatization of common pastures is negoti-
ated by individuals with community elders
or representatives of the government-
sponsored local peasant associations, or
both; privatization is thus a complex pro-
cess that differs across communities and is
not easily observed by outsiders. Private en-
closures for grazing are relatively new phe-
nomena, illustrating a new dimension in the
dynamics of property rights in the area. Such
trends were observed in nearly 20 percent of
the communities under investigation. Finally,
we note that the quality of herd mobility
data did not enable us to estimate separately
the proportion of the herd migrating in any
of the four seasons. We simply have infor-
mation on whether any herds migrated out
of the community during the rainy and dry
seasons. Thus, we could not separately esti-
mate herd mobility at the community level,
but we do return to this issue in the Niger
and Burkina Faso case studies. The depen-
dent variables in our analysis are stock den-
sities, the proportion of land allocated to
private crops, and the proportion of land al-
located to private pasture enclosure. Stock
densities are calculated as total TLU divided
by total grazing land available, including
the rangeland, transhumance corridors, and
areas around wells. Stock densities are high
at 1.03, although the median density is .79;
when calculated over the total land endow-
ment, densities are .91, with a median of
.62.21 The proportion of land in crops,
PAcrops, and in private pastures, PApvtpas,
are as described earlier in the chapter.
Appendix 3 contains descriptive statis-
tics of the remaining variables used in the
subsequent analysis, for the whole sample
and by four categories determined by rainfall
and variability of rainfall characteristics.
Model Development
Here we develop an empirical model based
on the conceptual framework outlined in
28 CHAPTER 3
21Our stock densities are higher than those previously reported. This is because we took the land area for a par-
ticular community to be only that falling within the arda boundaries. Densities over the entire plateau are lower
because of the larger forra areas to which all Boran have access.Chapter 2, but incorporating site-specific
information. As noted, we do not have good
enough information on community-level
herd mobility, so we cannot estimate this
equation. Instead, we estimate stock densi-
ties, the proportion of land allocated to
crops, and the proportion of land allocated
to private pastures. The reduced-form input
demand equations are:
SD = f(Coop, Rain, CoV Rain, Range-
Qual, InMig, PopDen, Hay, YCyult,
TotalHa, P l/P g, MktDist) (3.1)
PAcrops = f(Coop, Rain, CoV Rain, Range-
Qual, InMig, PopDen, Hay, YCult,
TotalHa, P l/P g, MktDist) (3.2)
PApvtpas = f(Coop, Rain, CoV Rain,
RangeQual, InMig, PopDen, Hay,
YCult, TotalHa, P l/P g, MktDist) (3.3)
All three input demands are functions of
the capacity of the community to cooperate,
represented in the above equations by the
variable Coop; we develop an empirical es-
timate of this capacity later in this section.
We hypothesize that greater cooperative ca-
pacity reduces stock densities and reduces
land allocated to private activities, both
cropland and private pastures. Alternatively,
greater cooperative capacity increases land
in common pasture, the omitted category.
To capture the underlying agro-ecological
characteristics, we include mean rainfall, the
coefficient of variation of rainfall, and a
range quality index. Higher mean rainfall,
Rain, is expected to increase stock densities
and land allocated to crops. Also, because
higher rainfall is expected to reduce the need
for mobility in any given year (as distinct
from the rainfall variability effect), we expect
higher mean rainfall to also increase land
appropriated as private pastures. As previ-
ously discussed in detail, we expect the co-
efficient of variation in rainfall, CoV Rain, to
lead to lower stock densities. We also allow
for a nonlinear impact of the coefficients
of variation by including a square of the co-
efficient of variation of rainfall, to capture
potential differences in impact in the “equi-
librial” vs. “nonequilibrial” environments.
It is more difficult to predict the effect of
rainfall variability on land allocation in the
absence of specific information on the vari-
ance of crops, livestock outputs, and the co-
variance between these activities. Land in
the study area is fairly marginal land (except
key points), and the rainfall distribution is
bimodal, resulting in short growing seasons.
Under these conditions, it is likely that crop
output is more variable than livestock out-
put, as livestock production is more mobile
and flexible. Even so, the greater relative
variability of crops vs. livestock is not suf-
ficient to determine the sign of the direct
impact of rainfall variability. Nonetheless,
under plausible assumptions on variability
and covariance across activities, we expect
that land allocated to crops will be a nega-
tive function of rainfall variability. Greater
range quality, RangeQual,22 is expected to
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22RangeQual is an index of rangeland quality based on the extent and degree of slopes in the arda, on soil water
retention characteristics, and on crude protein content of forage species taken from samples; for a complete de-
scription of the range data collected, see Kamara (2001). Given that we have cross-sectional data, the empirical
model is based on factors affecting current period animal production. As developed thus far, noncooperation is
hypothesized to lead to negative crowding externalities that are not internalized, and which thus reduce profits
from the current-period animal production. However, it is possible that certain range quality characteristics are
themselves a function of past stock densities, so that we would have potential endogeneity problems if these char-
acteristics were used, because we do not have the data to estimate a dynamic system incorporating the impact of
current stock densities on future forage productivity. We did not use data on dry matter production and the extent
of bush encroachment to construct the range quality index, for instance, precisely to avoid problems of endo-
geneity. Instead, we have used only those range quality characteristics that we have reason to believe are less
subject to change due to human use.lead to higher stock densities. Although the
impact on land allocation is ambiguous, we
expect that better range quality will lead to
less land allocated to crops but more to pri-
vate pastures, to the extent that range quality
improves the relative profitability of live-
stock vs. crops and increases the incentives
to appropriate private pasture.
In terms of community-specific char-
acteristics affecting relative profitability of
livestock and crop production, we include
a dummy variable capturing whether or not
community lands are accessed by non-
members, InMig, a dummy variable cap-
turing whether or not haymaking has been
adopted in the community, Hay, the number
of years that cultivation has occurred in the
community, YCult, population density, Pop-
Den, and the total land constraint, TotalHa.
The variable InMig is hypothesized to in-
crease stock densities and land allocated to
private pastures, since in-migration by out-
siders increases competition for scarce graz-
ing resources. Given increasing population
densities, households may intensify either
agriculture or livestock production or both,
following the standard Boserupian hy-
pothesis of density-driven intensification.
We noted earlier that although some crop-
ping has long been undertaken in certain
key areas of the plateau, for many Borana
households, it is a relatively new activity
undertaken on what appears to be a more
permanent basis. We did not specifically
gather information on intensification of
agricultural activities at the community
level; based on our experiences and pilot-
testing, there is little apparent intensifica-
tion of either crop or livestock production.
Nonetheless, greater population densities
may still be driving unobserved changes in
livestock or cropping production, leading to
higher optimal stock densities or more land
allocated to crops, and so we include popu-
lation density in all three equations. We did
gather information on whether any member
in a community undertook haymaking ac-
tivities to capture technological change, and
we include a dummy for this variable in the
stock density equation and private grazing
land equations.
The number of years that the commu-
nity members have been cultivating is in-
cluded to capture learning-by-doing effects,
Cult. The total land constraint enters the
land allocated to crops and private pasture
equations, though a priori, we do not have
enough information to sign the impact of
the land constraint.
Stock densities are a positive function
of market variables captured in relative live-
stock to crop prices, P l/P g, and distance to
livestock markets, MktDist. We hypothesize
that being farther from the market increases
the transaction costs associated with crop
markets more than those associated with
livestock, thereby decreasing the percentage
of land in crops, which seems reasonable,
given that livestock are more mobile. The
impact of relative price on land allocation is
less certain; to the extent that crop-livestock
interactions are important, higher livestock
prices may actually increase land allocated
to crops.
Developing a Measure of
Capacity to Cooperate
We return now to the actual measurement
of cooperative capacity. Theoretically, it is
simple enough to define cooperation as the
actions taken to internalize externalities,
and cooperative capacity as the ability to
undertake those actions. In the communities
studied, we did not observe explicit rules
on stocking rates or land allocation. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, however, we posit that
the capacity of a community to cooperate to
manage externalities can be recovered by
observable indicators of cooperation in other
activities; to recover such indicators, we
perform a factor analysis on these variables.
Variables in the factor analysis include
the number of meetings per year and the
percentage of the community members
attending, as we expect that both will be
higher for increased capacity to cooperate.
The sum of rules pertaining to grazing, water,
30 CHAPTER 3settlement, and cultivation are also hypoth-
esized to be positively correlated with coop-
erative capacity, whereas the number of
violations of these rules occurring in the
past five years is considered to reflect a
lower level of cooperative capacity. We note
that collecting data on violations proved
relatively easy, whereas collecting data on
enforcement mechanisms and whether stated
punishments were actually enforced proved
more difficult. Thus, we include only data
on violations, but stress that information on
violations is distinct from information on en-
forcement. Grazing rules mostly referred to
restrictions on types of animals using vari-
ous parts of the range, seasonal restrictions
on access, and the use of calf and draft an-
imal enclosures. Water rules are largely re-
lated to maintenance activities and seasonal
restrictions. Settlement and cultivation rules
mainly consisted of fence maintenance for
cultivated areas and certain zoning rules
regarding settlement patterns.
Results from the factor analysis show
that three components had eigenvalues
greater than 1, together accounting for a cu-
mulative loading of .7, which indicates that
the variables jointly exhibited only a rather
modest degree of correlation. We chose to
retain only the first factor when creating the
cooperative capacity index, which has scor-
ing coefficients as shown in Table 3.1.
The scoring coefficients are relatively
low but still positive on many of the vari-
ables thought to represent cooperative ca-
pacity. However, loadings on violations are
all positive and relatively high. We thus
hypothesize that this factor actually cap-
tures lack of cooperative capacity, reflecting
noncooperation. To construct a measure of
cooperation, we normalized the factor to lie
in the [0,1] interval, and then transposed the
index to create our index of cooperative
capacity, Coop.
To test whether the index indeed cap-
tures cooperation, we estimate the deter-
minants of this index using variables often
hypothesized to affect collective action and
group management, as described earlier in
the report. Cooperative capacity is hypothe-
sized to be at first increasing and then de-
creasing with increases in the total number
of households. As the number of households
increase, sharing fixed costs of cooperation
decrease, which decreases incentives not
to cooperate, but at some point, increased
numbers of households leads to increased
transactions costs of negotiating, monitor-
ing, and enforcing agreements, which even-
tually overwhelm the benefits of sharing
fixed costs. Greater heterogeneity in wealth
is hypothesized to lead to differences in in-
come diversification strategies and levels of
risk aversion; the greater these differences,
the more difficult it will be for members
to find agreements that leave all members
better off, which results in lower capacity.
Capacity is also hypothesized to be a nega-
tive function of whether outsiders regularly
come into the arda, because negotiating and
enforcing agreements among this expanded
set of resources will be more costly. Mem-
bers engaging in seasonal migration outside
the community may represent less pressure
on resources—and is, in fact, one mechanism
to reduce grazing pressure, as previously dis-
cussed—but its direct impact on coopera-
tive capacity is hypothesized to be negative,
because it may make it more difficult to
make and enforce rules. Outside wage work
is hypothesized to be associated with greater
opportunity costs of participating in coop-
erative activities and meetings, and thus
reduced cooperative capacity. Favorable
ETHIOPIA 31
Table 3.1 Scoring coefficients 
Scoring
Variable coefficient
Number of meetings per year 0.035
Members attending (%) 0.288
Sum of grazing rules 0.140
Sum of water rules –0.044
Sum of settlement and cultivation rules 0.074
Violations: grazing rules 0.622
Violations: water rules 0.122
Violations: settlement and cultivation  0.412
rulesrelative livestock prices, shorter distances to
markets, and range quality are all hypothe-
sized to positively affect cooperative capac-
ity. As profitability increases, individual
incentives to cooperate and to not cooper-
ate both increase, but incentives to cooperate
increase more rapidly than to do incentives
not to cooperate. Thus, the overall effect
should be to favor cooperative capacity (see
McCarthy et al. 2001). Finally, rainfall
variability is also hypothesized to increase
capacity, because the increased variability
results in greater gains to cooperation rela-
tive to the gains obtained from cheating
(McCarthy 1999). The regression results are
reported in Table 3.2.
Estimated coefficients generally support
the interpretation of the Coop index as cap-
turing cooperative capacity. One oddity is
that the impact of total households is nega-
tive but increasing; the turning point is at
200 households. As discussed, we hypothe-
size that increasing the number of house-
holds will at first lead to greater capacity,
but at some point, will reduce it. We thus
reject the hypothesis that Coop has an in-
verted U-shaped relationship with total
number of households. Instead, increasing
the number of households decreases coop-
erative capacity; the marginal impact is
negative for all but two communities. High
prices, shorter distances to market, and
greater range quality all positively affect
cooperative capacity, as hypothesized. In-
migration negatively affects Coop, giving
support to the hypothesis that the use of
community resources by others reduces
incentives for community members them-
selves to cooperate. At the same time, when
community members use outside pastures,
cooperative capacity actually increases. In-
stead of capturing additional costs of moni-
toring and enforcing agreements within the
community when members are absent, out-
migration may relieve pressure on commu-
nity grazing and water resources, thereby
contributing to easier management of core
resources. A higher percentage of members
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Size of community –0.06 1.99*
Size of community squared 1.90 × 10–4 2.03**
Heterogeneity in cattle holding –0.08 3.24**
Percentage of adults migrating 0.002 1.5
Agro-ecological characteristics
Coefficient of variation, rainfall^ 0.06 0.41
Range quality index 0.05 1.8*
Markets and infrastructure
Distance to livestock market^ 0.09 1.73*
Relative livestock:grain price^ 0.31 1.47
External pressure
Dummy, out migration 0.33 4.08**
Dummy, outsiders use home pastures –0.22 2.31**
Constant –1.46 4.29**
Number of observations 37
R2 0.66
Notes: ^ Indicates variables in natural logs.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.engaged in outside wage work has a nega-
tive impact on the index, but is not signif-
icant. Finally, the greater the degree of
heterogeneity in wealth, the lower is Coop.
We used the coefficient of variation in
cattle holdings, based on the minimum,
maximum, and median cattle holdings of
households in the community, to proxy
heterogeneity in wealth. Overall, regression
results are consistent with the main hypoth-
esis regarding factors influencing the degree
of noncooperation.
Stock Density and Land
Allocation Equations
Here, we present results for the stock den-
sity and land allocation equations. Initially,
we intended to collect data on 40 commu-
nities, but were only able to complete data
collection for 38 of the communities. Addi-
tionally, in one community, land allocated
to private grazing areas accounted for
nearly 90 percent of the total land area;
whereas the distribution of private grazing
land is quite continuous from 0 to 50 per-
cent for the remaining 37 communities. We
chose to eliminate this observation. Further-
more, there are six communities in which
no land is allocated to crops, and three that
have no land allocated to private pastures.
Thus, we present both generalized least
squares and censored regression results for
the land allocation equations.23
Stock densities in TLU were constructed
from information on community-level stock-
holdings of different species,24 and trans-
formed into natural logarithms, divided by
the area of grazing land measured in
hectares.25 Survey respondents identified
the major livestock markets that community
members predominantly used; data on cattle
and grain prices were then collected in these
markets. Because cattle are sold standing
and unweighed, data were collected on con-
dition score, and height and girth of 3- to 
4-year-old males—the most common type
of cattle sold. Unit values were then esti-
mated to form the prices used in the regres-
sion analysis. Distance to market is based
on the distance from the community to the
major market. Range quality scores, rainfall
data, the haymaking dummy variable, and
years of cultivation are as defined above;
the natural logarithm of rainfall is used in
the estimations.
There is also a potential for the cooper-
ative capacity indices to be endogenous in
the land use and allocation equations. We
tested for statistical exogeneity using the
Hausman-Wu test for the stock density ordi-
nary least squares regression, and the simi-
lar Smith-Blundell test for the censored land
allocation regressions (Greene 2000); results
support statistical exogeneity in all three
cases. However, to facilitate comparison with
the Niger case study in particular, we also
present results for each equation using the
exogenous explanatory variables used in the
Coop equation. Note that certain variables
are included in both cooperative capacity
and the land use and allocation equations;
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23Estimations were performed using STATA. Breuch-Pagan tests indicate heteroskedasticity in all three equa-
tions. We used the robust command, which provides the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of the variance-
covariance matrix. For the censored regressions, we use the interval regression command in STATA, along with
the robust command; this is a standard tobit model corrected for heteroskedasticity.
24Stockholdings at the household level were animals held or managed by the household, regardless of whether
the animals were actually at home at the time of the survey.
25Because cropland is used by grazing animals at least part of the year, we tried a number of specifications for
the stock density variable, including dividing by total hectares, or dividing by total grazing areas plus a weighted
cropland area, where the weights were based on the number of months that cattle grazed cropland post-harvest
and before preparing for the next crop season. All three of these divisors worked very similarly in all three coun-
try studies; we thus chose to use the area in grazing land, as it follows the model most closely.thus, in this second specification, the co-
efficients on these variables will be made
up of both the direct impact on land use and
allocation variables, as well as the indirect
impact via cooperative capacity. In certain
cases, the hypothesized direct and indirect
impacts are of opposite signs, and we can
examine whether the estimated coefficients
in the two different equations are consistent
with these hypothesized impacts. For in-
stance, higher relative livestock prices
should directly increase stock densities, but
should also increase cooperative capacity,
thereby leading to lower stock densities.
Similarly, rainfall variability, distance to
market, and range quality all have offsetting
impacts, so that when entered into the
equations directly, the estimated coefficients
should be lower than those obtaining in the
first specification.
Finally, we address the issue raised by
drought cycles and the use of stock densities
and land allocation in the single period of
observation as choice variables. Immediately
after a drought, it is generally assumed that
stock levels will be below long-term desired
levels and, perhaps, that land allocated to
crops will be greater if cropping is generally
a short-term coping strategy. Given our data-
set, however, we argue that observed stock
densities and land-use patterns are actually
at long-term desired levels, because of the
“position” of the communities in the drought
cycle. We base this argument on two data
series. The first is an examination of aver-
age rainfall at eight of the stations for which
rainfall data are most complete. We com-
puted the percentage deviation from average
rainfall for each station to facilitate compar-
ison across sites. The data series depicted in
Figure 3.1 clearly highlight the 1984/1985
and 1991/1992 droughts. All of the 21
simple correlation coefficients between the
seven rainfall series are positive, and more
than half are over 40 percent, indicating a
fair degree of similarity in rainfall patterns.
Note, too, that we expect idiosyncratic rain-
fall events to be managed largely by herd
mobility, meaning that the impact of any
one period’s rainfall should not affect stock
densities unless rainfall is uniformly low,
which was not the case for the period cov-
ered by the surveys. Furthermore, Desta
(1999) estimated that livestock numbers on
the plateau had recovered to pre-1984/1985
drought levels by 1990; we believe that
the similar rainfall patterns from 1986–1990
and 1993–1996 indicate that recovery levels
should be similar in 1997/1998 to those
observed in 1990. We also collected data
on the normalized division vegetation index
(NDVI) (Clark Labs 2000) at stations dur-
ing 1982–1997. Figure 3.2 presents the
percentage deviation from average annual
NDVI.26The pattern is quite similar, though
deviations are much smaller. Deviations
from average are generally positive follow-
ing both drought episodes, though they are
lower in the second post-drought recovery
period for both series.27
Regression results are presented in
Table 3.3. First, consider the impact of agro-
ecological variables. In the stock density
equation, the coefficient on mean rainfall is
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26It is difficult to know, a priori, what would be the best NDVI indicator. We present results here for an annualized
average NDVI index; but we also ran the same regressions using NDVI for one of the driest months, January, and
the wettest month, May, as well as two-month averages for January–February and May–June. Results do not dif-
fer substantially no matter what NDVI index is used.
27We could simply test whether adjustments to previous rainfall events affected current stock densities by in-
cluding lagged rainfall variables, but rainfall data for three of the weather stations are not available for the two or
three years previous to the survey year, and the dataset is simply too small to drop the communities in the vicinity
of these stations. Instead, we use lagged values of NDVI for which complete data are available. Coefficients on
these lagged NDVI indices under different specifications are generally insignificant; specification tests lead us to
retain equations with no lagged variables.negative and significant, whereas the esti-
mated coefficients on the coefficient of vari-
ation and its square are positive and nega-
tive, respectively, and significant. In fact,
the estimated turning point is at .38, which
is the sample mean. This result indicates
that, whereas increasing stock densities may
be used as a strategy to manage higher risk
in the relatively low-variability areas, it is
precisely in the high rainfall variability
ETHIOPIA 35













Figure 3.1 Proportional deviation from average annual rainfall, Ethiopia






















Table 3.3 Determinants of land allocation, stock densities, and herd mobility, Ethiopia
Stock density Percentage land cropped Percentage land private pasture
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Parameter Coefficient t–statistic Coefficient t–statistic Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z
Cooperation indexes/determinants
Index of cooperation –0.87 –1.95 –2.82 –0.27 –17.24 –1.66*
Heterogeneity of  0.19 3.18*** 0.47 0.42 1.97 2.03**
livestock holdings
Percentage households  0.01 2.00 0.05 0.57 0.08 0.92
migrating for work
Dummy, out migration –0.01 –0.05 4.54 1.00 –0.31 –0.08
Agro-ecological
Mean rainfall^ –1.00 –2.64** –1.38 –3.08*** 7.67 0.52 3.18 0.19 –0.04 –3.78*** –0.05 –3.3***
Coefficient of  10.74 2.36** 11.53 3.09*** 0.68 0.01 18.10 0.17 –18.50 –0.29 –16.94 –0.26
variation, rainfall
Coefficient of variation, –14.45 –2.29** –14.90 –3.14*** 43.39 0.32 13.98 0.10 48.26 0.65 33.40 0.41
rainfall, squared
Range quality index 0.16 2.30** 0.08 1.21 0.93 0.50 0.85 0.43 –0.71 –0.46 –1.34 –0.87
Community characteristics
Population density 0.91 7.61*** 0.96 7.95*** –0.88 –0.26 –1.18 –0.32 3.92 1.51 4.56 1.73
Hay 0.02 0.07 –0.11 –0.47 6.27 0.79 5.94 0.71 –5.11 –1.26 –5.56 –1.42
Years cultivating –0.01 –0.82 4.34 × 10–4 0.05 0.65 3.71*** 0.71 3.83*** 0.17 0.97 0.25 1.39
Dummy, outsiders  0.26 1.29 0.61 2.40** –6.87 –1.60 –6.63 –1.20 8.30 1.61 11.78 2.14**
using home pastures
Total size of  0.42 2.26** 0.46 2.40** 0.50 0.09 –0.02 0.00 4.23 1.01 4.33 1.07
community land
Market and infrastructures
Relative livestock: 0.93 1.69* 0.97 1.75* 14.92 1.00 18.17 1.10 –7.28 –0.63 –8.66 –0.73
grain price^
Distance to livestock  –0.27 –1.97* –0.10 –1.04 –3.13 –1.20 –2.60 –0.87 –2.09 –1.01 –0.41 –0.22
market^
Constant 3.54 1.28 3.68 1.12 –40.38 –0.43 –20.21 –0.18 29.48 1.11 8.80 0.34
ln(Sigma) 2.40 15.7 2.38 15.66 2.19 14.9
Number of observations 37 37 37 37 37 37
R2 0.71 0.76
Probability (χ2 > 0) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
Notes: ^ Indicates variables in natural logs. *, Significant at 10% level; **, significant at 5% level; ***, significant at 1% level.areas that stock densities decrease as vari-
ability further increases.
In the cropland equation, none of the
rainfall variables have statistically signifi-
cant coefficients. Regarding mean rainfall,
we note that the correlation between rainfall
and years cultivating is quite high. As high-
lighted in Appendix 3, the average number
of years cultivating in the low-rainfall com-
munities is about 4, but is more than 18 in
the high rainfall communitites, so that the
dataset may simply be too small to handle
the correlation between these variables. For
land allocated to private pastures, there is a
very strong negative impact of mean rainfall
on land allocated to private pasture. This re-
sult is interesting, since a priori we expected
that more land would be privatized in the
higher rainfall areas; in a wider context,
many other empirical studies have shown
that privatization is more likely to occur for
the most productive land resources in the
most productive areas. Here, we do not
know whether the land privatized is of bet-
ter quality; however, more land is being ap-
propriated in communities with lower mean
rainfall, which is generally associated with
lower overall productivity. Theoretical re-
sults indicate that the impact is ambiguous,
however; in this case, the strategic incen-
tives to underprovide common land at low
rainfall realizations appear to dominate. The
rainfall variation measures, however, are
not significant in this equation. Finally, as
hypothesized, the coefficient on range
quality index is significant and positive in
the stock density equations and negative
in the land allocated to private pasture, al-
though it is not significant in the latter case.
Range quality has no estimated impact on
land allocated to crops.
In terms of community characteristics,
we first note that stock densities are a posi-
tive function of household density, although
the coefficient on the haymaking dummy
variable is not significant. These results in-
dicate that some innovations in response to
population density may have been intro-
duced to augment livestock feed resources,
even though there were no apparent inno-
vations in the communities studied besides
haymaking. Neither variable has a statisti-
cally significant impact on land allocation,
which is particularly surprising for crop-
land. The number of years that a community
has been cultivating has a positive and sig-
nificant impact on the cropland allocation.
This result suggests that there is a structural
shift toward cropping, and calls into ques-
tion the assertion that cropping is a crisis-
related response. The years of cultivation
variable is negative in the stock density
equation, hinting at a substitution effect
between crops and livestock, but the coeffi-
cient is not significant.
The coefficient on the dummy variable
for outsiders using home pastures has no
impact on any of the land use or allocation
equations in the first specification. This is a
surprising result; we would expect that the
greater use of home resources by outsiders
should increase incentives to privatize land
at any level of cooperative capacity. Inter-
estingly, the land constraint has a positive
impact on stock densities but no signifi-
cant impact on land allocation. In fact, pop-
ulation density and landholdings are nega-
tively correlated, so we are cautious about
interpreting these results. Nonetheless, the
evidence here suggests that stock densities
increase in communities with relatively large
landholdings. Regarding market factors, the
estimated relative livestock price is positive
and significant; stock densities have a nearly
unitary elasticity with respect to relative
prices of livestock. The coefficient on the
distance to market variable in the stock den-
sity equation is significant and negative, as
expected. Neither relative livestock prices
nor distance to market affect the land allo-
cation decisions.
With respect to the cooperative capacity
index, Coop, the coefficient on this variable
is negative and statistically significant in
the stock density and the land allocated to
private pasture censored regressions. This in-
dicates that, in communities with low coop-
erative capacity, overexploitation of common
ETHIOPIA 37pastures and overappropriation of common
land is occurring, to the extent that our
measure captures the inability of community
members to internalize externalities. How-
ever, although cooperative capacity appears
to mitigate incentives to enclose pastureland,
it does not appear to impact the expansion
of cropland. When we exclude the index and,
instead, include the exogenous explanatory
variables in the stock density equation, the
proportion of households migrating for
wage work and the heterogeneity in live-
stock holdings are statistically significant
and positive, and heterogeneity in livestock
holdings is statistically significant in land
allocated to private pasture. None of the
exogenous factors hypothesized to lower
cooperative capacity affect the cropland
equation, mirroring the insignificant coeffi-
cient on Coop. In the stock density equa-
tion, relative livestock price is now signifi-
cant and positive, but market distance is no
longer significant. The coefficient on out-
siders using home pastures is now signifi-
cant and positive. In this specification, we
expect that the coefficients on variables af-
fecting livestock productivity will be lower
than in the first specification, because the
coefficients will be picking up both direct
and indirect effects on cooperative capacity.
The coefficients on pasture productivity and
distance to market both decrease, as ex-
pected, but relative livestock prices increase
and are now statistically significant. Simi-
larly, the dummy variable for outsiders using
home pastures remains positive but is now
statistically significant—this variable should
be picking up both direct and indirect posi-
tive effects, which, together, are statistically
significant. Finally, the coefficients of vari-
ation of rainfall variables have the same sign
as in the previous equation, but the turning
point is now .37, indicating that stock den-
sities begin declining more quickly when
calculating the direct and indirect impacts
on higher cooperative capacity. For the pri-
vate pasture equation, outsiders using home
pastures now has a statistically significant
and positive coefficient.
As can be seen, the stock density equa-
tions have good explanatory power with
most variables significant, but the land allo-
cation equations are rather poorly estimated.
The stock density equations provide strong
evidence that cooperative capacity does re-
duce pressures to overstock home pastures,
and that stock densities are lower in areas
subject to high rainfall variability. With re-
spect to land allocation, as discussed earlier
in the chapter, the institutions through
which household members effectively pri-
vatize common resources are complex and
differ across communities in subtle ways;
factors affecting this process are difficult to
quantify. Nonetheless, the econometric re-
sults suggest that cooperative capacity does
affect incentives to privatize pasture; hetero-
geneity in livestock holdings and pressures
by outsiders to access home resources ap-
pear particularly important.
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Niger
I
n Niger, the government began implementing a new rural code in 1993 that attempted to
redefine the access, use, and management of natural resources (Comité National du Code
Rural, Secrétariat Permanent 1993, 1997), although it is generally acknowledged that im-
plementation had stalled, at least up through the time of our fieldwork (Ngaido 1996; Gado
1996; Kirk and Ngaido 2001). At present, village and canton chiefs remain the principal au-
thority regarding land allocation decisions de facto, meaning that customary tenurial arrange-
ments still prevail in most areas of the country (Gavian and Fafchamps 1996). Although it is
widely recognized that climate variability is an important characteristic underlying the logic
of the agropastoral system, a legal framework that addresses the need for flexible access while
maintaining incentives to use and manage the resource has yet to be developed. Results from
our research should help shed light on these wider issues.
The study area is located in south-central Niger, with communities located in the area
12.7–4.5° N and 2.1–4.0° E. The study area includes both the more arid Sahelian belt in the
north and the Sudano-Sahelian belt, considered primarily suited for livestock production but
with important opportunities for crop production, particularly in the communities located
farther south. Rainfall is unimodal, with an average of 498 millimeters, ranging from 335 to
650 millimeters. Although rainfall on average is lower than in Ethiopia, the unimodal distri-
bution is more favorable to crop production.
The sample selection process and survey design were very similar to that for Ethiopia.
Rainfall stations were first identified and data collected to generate a list of potential commu-
nities to survey. Monthly rainfall data were collected at 17 rainfall stations for 1985–1996, and
a list was made of all communities within a 50-kilometer radius of each station. Forty com-
munity names were randomly drawn from this list. Data were collected at the village level, the
primary contact was the village chief, and at least one of the authors was present at every in-
terview. The data were collected during the middle to the end of 1997. As in Ethiopia, a global
positioning system instrument was used to georeference key points and boundaries, generate
a community map, and to derive information on total land area and land allocation patterns. In
the Niger case, aerial photographs (1/50,000) were also available for all communities, which
enabled researchers to more easily generate a base map. Range assessments were also under-
taken; data included species composition for the herbaceous and tree layers, slope, drainage
characteristics, and the like. Finally, grain and livestock price data—including height and girth
measurements and animal condition scores—were collected at markets identified as the pri-
mary markets used by community members.
39Descriptive Statistics
There is a good deal of variation in the total
number of households within each commu-
nity, ranging from 20 to 307, with an aver-
age of 100 households. Total landholdings
range from 121 to over 4,000 hectares, with
an average of nearly 1,800 hectares. Pop-
ulation densities range from about two to
42 households per 100 hectares, with an
average of nine households per 100 hectares.
Compared with the study area in Ethiopia,
ethnic diversity within and across commu-
nities is more important in this region. Four
major ethnic groups form the large majority
in the study communities, including tradi-
tionally pastoralist Peuhl and Bella, and tra-
ditionally agriculturalist Zarma and Houssa.
Nonetheless, on average, there are less than
two ethnic groups per community, indicat-
ing a relatively homogeneous ethnic com-
position within villages. Certain ethnic
groups, such as the Peuhl, are considered
to be traditionally pastoralist, whereas other
ethnic groups (e.g., the Dzarma) are consid-
ered to be traditionally crop farmers. In our
sample communities, the ethnic majority in
12 communities are traditional pastoralists.
Additionally, the proportion of the popula-
tion coming from a traditionally pastoralist
ethnic group is approximately 20 percent
for the sample as a whole.
Households in this area of Niger hold a
mix of cattle, sheep, and goats, unlike those
in Ethiopia, in which cattle strongly domi-
nate. On average, there are 880 sheep, 1,480
goats, and 946 cattle per community, which
translates into approximately 10 sheep per
household, 17 goats per household, and nine
cattle per household. Using the same defini-
tion of tropical livestock units (TLU) as used
in Ethiopia, there are 10 TLU per house-
hold, compared to 17 in Ethiopia. However,
there is a great deal of variation in livestock
holdings within communities. The mean
coefficient of variation in livestock holdings
is 1.18. Also, far more households are per-
manently engaged in crop activities than was
the case in Ethiopia; the average cropland
per person is nearly 9 hectares, three times
the figure for Ethiopia. As with livestock
holdings, household millet harvests vary
within villages, but not nearly as much as
livestock holdings, the mean coefficient of
variation being .33.
Average stock densities on home pas-
tures are high at 1.08; seven communities
have densities greater than 1.2, but the
median density is .48. Various estimates of
carrying capacity in “normal” years in the
Sahel vary between .13 and .25 for the
ranges falling on the 400-millimeter rainfall
isohyet (de Leeuw and Tothill 1993, p. 78);
we suppose that such estimates of normal
year carrying capacity would be somewhat
higher in the study area, because average
rainfall is somewhat higher. This density is
measured in TLU/ha in home pastures with-
out adjusting for mobility. Estimates of graz-
ing pressure (stock days per unit of grazing
area) yield an average of .86 and a median
of .38, but with wide variation across com-
munities. In sample communities, the pro-
portion of herds that were mobile during
the year 1996/1997 ranged between 0 and
53 percent, with an average of 14 percent.
As shown later in an NDVI graph (see Fig-
ure 4.2), 1997 was a very poor rainfall year.
However, mobility figures are for the year
preceding the survey, starting in the begin-
ning of the rainy season 1996 through the
beginning of the rainy season in 1997; that
is, it did not reflect the very poor rainfall
of 1997. On average, the communities re-
ceived 90 percent of their long-term average
rainfall in 1996, with a wide range between
70 percent and 117 percent. Rainy season
mobility was 26 percent on average, ranging
from 0 to 86 percent. However, dry season
mobility was just 7 percent on average, rang-
ing between 0 and 44 percent. Combined
with the relatively high stock densities, the
relatively small extent of mobility suggests
that overstocking may be problematic in
certain communities.
Current land use can be categorized
broadly as being either individually man-
aged cropland or common-access pasture-
land; unlike Ethiopia, in Niger, we did not
40 CHAPTER 4observe enclosures of pastures at the sub-
group or individual level. Cropland accounts
for 33 percent of the total community land
on average, ranging from about 10 to 42
percent in sample communities; conversely,
current pastureland accounts for 67 percent
of community land. Community members
also have access to neighboring grazing
areas, but for the purpose of this survey, we
consider the “community’s pastureland” as
only that land which community elders
(including the chief) considered to form
part of the community proper. Although
there is certainly scope for the “fuzziness”
of boundaries, in practice, agreement on the
distinction between community and shared
pastureland was reached fairly quickly. As
in Ethiopia, non-community members also
accessed community pastures; in the case of
Niger, we distinguish between use by neigh-
bors and use by transhumants. During the
previous rainy season, neighbors used home
pastures in 11 communities; for the dry sea-
son, 13 communities had neighbors using
home pastures. Transhumant herds gener-
ally arrive at the end of the harvest season
and remain into the dry season, although
in some cases, transhumant herds moved
quickly through a community. Transhumant
herd sizes were estimated to be quite large,
ranging from 35 to 10,000 TLU with an
average of about 2,400 TLU. Full descrip-
tive statistics are found in Appendix 3.
Model Development
Following the model developed in Chap-
ter 2, we write the following equations for
stock densities (SD), land allocated to crops
(Plcrops), and mobility (Mob):
SD = f(Coop, PopDen, EthPas,
CAssetInf, InMig – N, InMig – T,
TotalHa, Rain, CoV Rain, RangeQual,
P l/P g, MktDist) (4.1)
PAcrops = f(Coop, PopDen, EthPas,
CAssetInf, InMig – N, InMig – T,
TotalHa, Rain, CoV Rain, RangeQual,
P l/P g, MktDist) (4.2)
Mob = f(Coop, PopDen, EthPas,
CAssetInf, InMig – N, InMig – T,
TotalHa, Rain, CoV Rain, RainDev,
RangeQual, P l/P g, MktDist) (4.3)
The stock density and proportion of land
allocated to crops equations are nearly the
same as those for Ethiopia, with the excep-
tion that here we have included information
on whether the dominant ethnic group is
from a traditionally pastoralist tribe, Eth-
Pas, and the stock of agricultural assets and
community-level infrastructure, CAssetInf.
We constructed the agricultural assets value
by summing over all plows, transport carts,
draft and transport animals (equine and
bovine), and crop-storage facilities and di-
vided this figure by the number of house-
holds, and added this to the number of
schools, shops, motorcycles, and vehicles.
We expect that greater infrastructure and
agricultural assets indicate greater produc-
tivity in all activities and in reduced market
transactions costs; with an expected increase
in stock densities and mobility and an in-
crease in cropland. We have also distin-
guished between use of home pastures by
neighbors, InMig – N, and by transhumants,
InMig – T. We expect that where the domi-
nant ethnic group is from a tribe tradition-
ally associated with pastoralism, less land
will be allocated to crops and stock densi-
ties will be higher, because we expect that
the stock of knowledge and experience fa-
vors livestock production relative to crops;
furthermore, we expect herd mobility to
be greater to the extent that such mobility
depends on networking and negotiation
among pastoralists (Niamir-Fuller and Turner
1999).
With the data collected in Niger, we can
also estimate the mobility equation, Mob,
where mobility is the proportion of the
total community herd migrating to outside
pastures during the rainy and dry seasons,
weighted by length of season (4 months
rainy season, 8 months dry season; the dry
season includes the cold and hot dry sea-
sons). In the mobility equation, we include
NIGER 41an indicator of relative rainfall deficit, con-
structed as the rainfall accruing at the rele-
vant rainfall station during 1996 divided by
mean rainfall. As discussed in Chapter 2,
mobility during the current year should be a
function both of the actual rainfall relative
to the long-term mean and actual rainfall
received in the community relative to rain-
fall received at all potential sites to which
community members might migrate with
their animals. We therefore constructed an-
other index of relative spatial rainfall by
dividing rainfall received in 1996 by the av-
erage rainfall received across all rainfall sta-
tions. As noted later, these two measures are
highly correlated; thus, later in the chapter,
we give two specifications of the equations
using each of these two indicators.
As before, all three input demands are a
function of the capacity of the community
to cooperate, represented in the above equa-
tions as Coop; however, we were not able to
recover a latent estimate of community ca-
pacity to cooperate, and instead rely only on
exogenous factors thought to impact that
capacity.
We also need to consider the time of our
data collection relative to the drought cycle,
which is more difficult to establish than was
the case in Ethiopia. In the region where the
study communities are located, the last well-
publicized, major generalized drought event
occurred in the 1980s; but during 1990–
1996, many communities experienced very
low rainfall, particularly in 1993. The dra-
matic shortfall in 1993 was preceded by
two years of relatively average rainfall, and,
most communities experienced better than
average rainfall in 1994. However, 1995
and 1996 were quite erratic years, with four
areas receiving above or near average rain-
fall, but three falling below; as the longer-
term NDVI series show, even 1995 and
1996 were rather poor years from a longer-
term standpoint (see Figure 4.2). In Figures
4.1 and 4.2, we present percentage devia-
tions of rainfall for the shorter rainfall sta-
tion time series and NDVI indices. As for
Ethiopia, we ran the stock density regression
with various lagged rainfall and/or NDVI
indices to test whether a lagged effect was
driving current stock densities. Different
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Figure 4.1 Proportional deviation from average annual rainfall, Nigerspecifications included measures of the
relative rainfall deficit for 1993, an average
of the 1992–1994 deficit, and 1995–1996
deficit. Variables capturing rainfall deficits
in the 1990s were never significant in any
of the equations, except for rainfall deficits
during 1996 in the herd mobility equation,
in which the deficits were to be included in
any case. Thus, previous rainfall measures
are only included in the mobility equation.
Measuring Cooperation
Before proceeding to the econometric esti-
mations, we consider how to capture coop-
erative capacity. As in the Ethiopian case, in
none of the study communities were there
explicit rules on maximum stock levels held
by households, total stock densities at the
community level, or mobility. However, un-
like Ethiopia, and as we shall see Burkina
Faso, there were few direct indicators of
cooperative capacity; nearly all communi-
ties had cooperatives with very similar rates
of membership, so that variability across
communities was small, but little consistent
and comparable information was gleaned
on active participation, rules, or violations.
Thus, for this case, we include only those
variables hypothesized to affect cooperative
capacity, including heterogeneity in live-
stock holdings and the proportion of com-
munity members engaged in wage work.
Additionally, we include an indicator of
ethnic heterogeneity, captured by the num-
ber of ethnic groups within a community. As
before, we expect that other included ex-
ogenous variables will now be picking up
the direct and indirect effects on coopera-
tive  capacity; particularly, pressure on
home resources by outsiders (neighbors
and transhumants).
Empirical Model Results
We now return to the model developed ear-
lier and attend to some practical difficulties
in estimating the model. Following test
results, we corrected for heteroskedasticity
in all three equations. Although all commu-
nities had at least some land allocated to
crops, mobility was not undertaken in 15 of
the 37 communities, and so we estimate this
equation as an interval regression model.
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Figure 4.2 Proportional deviation from average NDVI, NigerWe also note that there is a very strong
correlation between average rainfall and
both relative livestock:grain price ratios
and absolute livestock prices (.59 and .58,
respectively). The correlation with revenue
per head—unadjusted for animal condition
and size—is higher still at .67. Thus, even
though we have derived unit prices precisely
to overcome likely problems of collinearity
between revenue per head figures and local
climate and range conditions (as well as
potential endogeneity problems), there re-
mains a great deal of correlation between
the two measures. The correlation may be
because markets located in higher rainfall
areas subsequently face lower transporta-
tion costs for getting the animals to the next
destination point. However, it is interesting
that no such correlation exists in Ethiopia.
Nonetheless, given this correlation, we re-
port results for the stock density and crop-
land equations run with either the rainfall
variable or the price variable. Because the
price variable is not correlated with mea-
sures of current relative temporal and spatial
rainfall, we include price in the mobility
equation along with the current rainfall vari-
ables. We also present two specifications
for the mobility equation: one using current
rainfall relative to the long-term mean, and
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Table 4.1 Estimated land allocation, stock densities, and herd mobility, Niger
Stock density
Model 1 Model 2
Parameter Coefficient t–statistic Coefficient t–statistic
Cooperation indexes/determinants
Percentage households migrating for work 1.38 1.33 –0.41 –0.43
Heterogeneity of livestock holdings 0.42 2.98** 0.32 1.68*
Number of ethnic groups 0.34 1.85 0.30 1.47
Agro-ecological characteristics
Mean rainfall^ 3.66 3.51**
Rainfall 1996/long-term mean
Spatial deviation of rainfall
Community/areawide rainfall
Coefficient of variation, rainfall 33.79 2.39** 33.79 2.00**
Coefficient of variation, rainfall, squared –56.28 –1.83 –63.70 –1.68
Range condition score 0.45 1.22** 0.58 1.31*
Community characteristics
Population density^ 0.65 1.63** 0.64 1.33
Dummy, traditional pastoralist majority 1.69 3.23** 1.23 2.02**
Infrastructure and agricultural assets 4.55 × 10–3 0.02 –9.39 × 10–3 –0.04
Dummy, neighbors use home pastures –9.69 × 10–4 –1.38 –8.87 × 10–4 –1.07
Transhumants use home pastures (×1000) –2.58 × 10–5 –0.38 –4.58 × 10–5 –0.54
Total Land Endowment^ 0.25 0.72 0.10 0.24
Market
Relative livestock:grain price^ 1.81 1.92*
Distance to livestock market^ –0.83 –2.68** –0.71 –2.34**
Constant –30.12 –3.97** –6.38 –2.01**
ln(Sigma)
Number of observations 37
R2 0.71 0.64
Probability (χ2 > 0)
Notes: ^ Indicates variables in natural logs. *, Significant at 10% level; **, significant at 5% level; ***, significant at 1% level.the other using current rainfall in the com-
munity relative to rainfall received across
the area as a whole (Table 4.1).
Looking first at the climate variables,
we note that the coefficient of variation of
rainfall does indeed have a nonlinear rela-
tionship with stock densities, first increas-
ing and then decreasing, as was the case in
Ethiopia. Higher variability initially leads
to greater stock densities, but the marginal
impact becomes negative for coefficients
greater than about .3 for both specifications.
If it were rational to accumulate herds in
anticipation of a drought, particularly in the
high-variability areas in which long-term
forage productivity is posited to be rela-
tively unaffected by stock densities, then we
would expect higher stock densities, partic-
ularly in high-variability areas, ceteris
paribus. As in the Ethiopian case, our data
do not support this hypothesis. Rather, re-
gression results are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that the gains from shifting out of
cropping and into livestock as variability
increases are eventually outweighed by
greater livestock production variability gen-
erated from the use of common-pool pas-
tures, as rainfall variability increases still
further. Rainfall variability has a similar im-
pact on mobility: mobility at first increases
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Percentage land cropped Herd mobility
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z
–0.14 –0.79 –0.15 –0.95 0.10 0.58 –0.20 –0.87*
–0.04 –1.61 –0.03 –1.13 7.97 × 10–2 1.56 0.04 1.06
–0.03 –1.08 –0.04 –1.17 3.87 × 10–2 0.82 0.02 0.45
–4.99 × 10–3 –0.03
–0.84 –1.86*
–0.55 –1.81
–0.80 –0.36 –0.72 –0.34 7.97 3.50** 8.72 2.84**
1.55 0.3 1.24 0.24 –17.48 –3.63 –20.00 –3.26
0.04 0.76 0.04 0.74 4.01 × 10–2 0.62 0.06 0.9
–0.07 –1.06 –0.08 –1.21 0.12 1.73* 0.13 1.71*
0.02 0.2 1.16 × 10–2 0.14 0.08 0.77 –0.01 –0.11
1.38 × 10–2 0.6 1.45 × 10–2 0.6 –0.02 –0.88 –0.03 –1.22
2.6 × 10–5 0.34 3.07 × 10–5 0.4 5.72 × 10–5 0.45 8.72 × 10–5 0.66
1.20 × 10–5 0.81 1.02 × 10–5 0.69 2.19 × 10–5 1.67* 1.98 × 10–5 1.25
–5.67 × 10–3 –0.07 –1.16 × 10–2 –0.16 7.47 × 10–2 1.27 0.07 1.08
0.14 0.88 9.22 × 10–2 0.5 0.43 1.67*
9.47 × 10–3 0.23 3.83 × 10–3 0.11 –3.95 × 10–3 –0.11 0.03 0.62




0.0000 0.0000and then decreases with increases in vari-
ability. In this reduced-form model, rainfall
variability should be picking up the effect
of stock densities on mobility; higher stock
densities lead to greater mobility, as pre-
dicted. Furthermore, communities in areas
that received high rainfall relative to long-
term means and relative to average rainfall
across the area had lower mobility, as ex-
pected. Finally, higher mean rainfall leads
to higher stock densities, but is not statisti-
cally significant in the cropland equation.
Of the cooperation variables, hetero-
geneity in livestock holdings and ethnic het-
erogeneity both have statistically significant
and positive impacts on stock densities in
the first specification, and livestock hetero-
geneity is statistically significant in the sec-
ond specification. These results indicate that
when cooperation is more costly to negoti-
ate and enforce, stock densities are higher.
Coefficients for these variables are not sta-
tistically significant in either the cropland or
mobility equations. The percentage of total
households with at least one member mi-
grating for wage work does not affect stock
densities or cropland, but has a negative and
significant coefficient in the herd mobility
equation, in the second specification that
uses relative spatial rainfall. Thus, evidence
suggests that more costly cooperation leads
to higher stock densities and, to a lesser
extent, reduced herd mobility. Consistent
with results from Ethiopia, there is no im-
pact of the variables proxying costs of co-
operation on cropland. Pressure on commu-
nity resources stemming from their use by
outsiders, captured in the variables represent-
ing use by neighbors and by transhumants,
have no statistically significant impact on
either stock densities or cropland allocation.
However, higher use by transhumants does
have a positive impact on herd mobility.
With respect to community characteris-
tics and infrastructure, household density has
a positive and statistically significant im-
pact on stock densities and mobility, but a
negative, although not significant, impact on
land allocated to crops. Although the usual
presumption is that increasing population
density will increase the pressure to open up
marginal lands to cultivation, this does not
appear to be the case in the communities in
the study region in Niger. This result is all
the more surprising, given that government
and nongovernment organization technical
projects tend to support intensification of
cropping activities. If increasing household
density does indeed capture intensification,
the intensification in this system appears
to be occurring with respect to livestock, in-
ducing greater stock densities and increased
mobility.
The stock of agricultural assets per
household and community infrastructure has
no statistically significant impact on any of
the dependent variables. Whether the ethnic
majority is traditionally pastoralist has a sta-
tistically positive and significant impact on
stock densities, but somewhat surprisingly,
no impact on herd mobility. We tried other
proxies besides whether or not dominant
ethnic group was traditionally pastoralist,
such as the percent of the population that is
from a pastoralist group, but all performed
similarly to the dummy variable.
Range quality has a positive and statisti-
cally significant impact on stock densities,
and also has a positive impact on mobility
and land allocated to crops, but it is not sig-
nificant in either of the latter equations.
Relative livestock:millet price ratios have
a significant and positive impact on stock
densities, and is also positive and significant
in one specification for mobility; the impact
on mobility should be an indirect impact
through higher stock densities. Distance to
market has a negative impact on stock den-
sities, but no further impact on cropland or
mobility.
To summarize, there is evidence that the
variables hypothesized to increase the costs
of cooperation do indeed lead to higher stock
densities and less herd mobility. Further-
more, stock densities and consequently, herd
mobility, are lower precisely in those com-
munities located where rainfall variability is
highest. Both of these results are consistent
46 CHAPTER 4with results from Ethiopia, although the
indicators for cooperation are less well de-
veloped in Niger. Relative livestock prices
and distances to market appear to have a
stronger direct influence in Niger than in
Ethiopia; greater relative livestock prices and
lower transportation costs increase stock
densities. Also, the cropland equation is not
well estimated; indeed, none of the variables
are statistically significant. In striking simi-
larity with the Ethiopian case, this type of
modeling exercise has limited value in help-
ing us to understand land allocated to crop-
ping in areas where livestock production
should have a relatively strong comparative
advantage. Also similar is the impact of
population density, which leads to higher
stock densities and more herd mobility.
More specific to Niger, we note that ethnic
heterogeneity appears to increase the costs
of cooperation, at least in terms of pastures
use. Interestingly, whether or not the ethnic
majority is from a traditional pastoral tribe
has little impact on stock densities and land
allocation; the only significant impact is a
somewhat surprising negative impact on




ike Niger, Burkina Faso is an agropastoral Sahelian country, where livestock produc-
tion has always been a very important component of agricultural activity. However, a
number of factors led to a decline in livestock activity through the 1970s and particu-
larly the 1980s. These included major droughts, which were estimated to induce large losses
of livestock; the importation of cheap livestock products from the European Union (EU) dur-
ing the same period (Economic Commission for Africa 2000); and an overvalued exchange
rate. However, in the 1990s, conditions improved for livestock producers because of a rever-
sal of all three factors: the currency (FCFA) was devalued in 1994, leading to a 78 percent
increase in producer prices for live animals between 1993 and 1996 (Economic Commission
for Africa 2000); rainfall was generally more favorable; and antidumping restrictions reduced
importation of unfairly priced livestock products from the EU. The contribution of livestock
products to the country’s gross domestic product is currently about 12 percent, and these
products also account for 25 percent of export income. In fact, it is the second most important
source of export income (24 percent) after cotton, according to the International Monetary
Fund.28
The area of study is located in northeastern Burkina Faso, in the area .02–.76° E and
13.67–14.83º N. The agro-ecological conditions are very similar to those in Niger, with a
Sudano-Sahelian climate and a 3- to 4-month rainy season. Average rainfall ranges between
about 400 millimeters and just over 550 millimeters. The vegetation is of steppe type, domi-
nated by acacia trees. Surveys were administered in 48 communities of four administrative
regions of the provinces of Séno and Oudalan during the end of rainy season (August–October)
of 2000. Unlike the studies undertaken in Ethiopia and Niger, the sampling framework is not
based on local rainfall characteristics. Because the study was undertaken in collaboration with
the Programme Sahel Burkinabe (PSB) supported by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ),
one of the objectives of the research was to measure the impact of the various projects and
programs on natural resource management and household livelihood strategies. Thus, four
categories of all communities falling in the administrative regions were created, based on the
length of participation of the community in various PSB/GTZ programs, as follows: villages
working with PSB/GTZ before 1996 (13), villages that entered the program between 1996 and
1999 (12), new PSB/GTZ villages (9), and a group of control villages that have never worked
with GTZ (14). With respect to rainfall characteristics, we relied exclusively on rainfall data
from a secondary source, and used the Hutchinson (2001) rainfall database to generate long-
time–series information on the mean and variability of rainfall. As already noted, such data
28See www.imf.org/external/NP/PFP/1999/Burkina/INDEX.HTM#IVB.
48series tend to underestimate rainfall vari-
ability, and to smooth variation spatially.
Basically, this leads to high correlations be-
tween mean rainfall and the coefficient of
variation, with a simple correlation coeffi-
cient of –.94 in our sample. Thus, we chose
to use only the coefficient of variation in our
analyses, but it must be stressed that the
interpretation is different from that of the
other two countries studied, because we
are not holding the mean rainfall constant.
We will not be able to test whether stock
densities are lower in high-variability envi-
ronments; but we can test whether stock
densities are lower in low rainfall, high-
variability environments.
Data Collection
As in Ethiopia and Niger, data were col-
lected at a number of levels. Unlike those
two cases, however, there were many more
institutions involved in natural resource man-
agement, and a good deal more data were
collected at the institution/organization
level. The next three sections provide more
detail on community-, institution- and
market-level data collection.
Community-Level Questionnaire
and Resource Mapping Exercise
Data on the main characteristics of the com-
munity were collected, such as basic demo-
graphic data (e.g., number of households
by ethnicity, number of households headed
by women, number of quarters within the
community), resources shared with other
communities, herd demography and mobil-
ity, community infrastructure, and identifi-
cation of major markets used by community
members. Collection of data on large and
small ruminants was largely accomplished
by considering the number of cattle, goats,
and sheep of each individual household,
usually counted by quarter in the larger
villages. Information on herd mobility, fol-
lowing a 12-month calendar, was also
elicited in this manner. In addition, aerial
photographs were used to construct resource
maps for every community and to identify
community boundaries—including identifi-
cation of areas in which resources were
shared with other communities. Boundary
coordinates were also obtained with global
positioning system units. Hand-drawn maps,
overlaying the aerial photographs, included
information on land use and soil types, key
resources (e.g., water points and sand dunes),
and the locations of villages, hamlets, and
roads.
Institutional Questionnaire
This questionnaire was administered to
key representatives of each major natural
resource management (NRM) institution.
Three broad types of data were collected.
First, a census was taken of all institutions
and organizations in charge of any aspect
of NRM, and detailed information was
recorded regarding the structure of manage-
ment, how the organization was created, who
or what group founded the organization, the
number of members, frequency of meetings,
attendance at those meetings, and the like.
This section was followed by an enumera-
tion of all activities related to NRM in the
community, with detailed information on
the activities, the institution or organizations
responsible, methods of monitoring and
enforcing participation, and actual participa-
tion rates. This part of the survey was struc-
tured to gather information by resource:
common pastures, water sources, soil, and
tree resources. Information gathered by
activity and resource could then be cross-
referenced with the institutional data gath-
ered in the first section. The final section
of the survey gathered information on rules
and regulations, following a similar format
to that for the activities section.
Market Questionnaire
Data on prices for 3- to 5-year-old male
bovines, cereals, and dairy products were
collected in six markets during three sepa-
rate months during the year: August 2000,
November 2000, and March 2001. Of the
six markets, three were major markets
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minor markets (Bombofa, Markoye, and
Gorgadji).
Descriptive Statistics
The number of households in sample com-
munities ranges from 14 to 280, with an
average of 91 households. As in Niger, the
communities are composed of different eth-
nic groups, although it appears that ethnic
diversity within a community is greater in
Burkina Faso than in Niger. Ethnic groups
considered traditional crop farmers include
the Rimaibe, Mossi, and Mallebe, whereas
the Fulbe are considered as traditional pas-
toralists. On average, there are more than
three different ethnic groups per commu-
nity, ranging between one and eight. Fur-
thermore, the ethnic majority in 25 of the
48 communities are traditional pastoralists,
or just over half of sampled communities.
As in Niger, wage work is important for
households in this region of Burkina Faso;
in the sample, on average, 25 percent of
households in a community rely on locally
available and/or short-term wage work out-
side the community, ranging from 0 to 60
percent. However, on average, only 6 per-
cent of households migrate for wage work,
defined as leaving the homestead for more
than three months per year. The range is quite
large, from 0 to 40 percent. The destinations
for migrant wage workers include the major
cities and more heavily cropped southern
regions in Burkina Faso, as well as Cote
d’Ivoire.
Households also tend to hold a mix of
livestock species, and, like Niger, small
ruminants form a substantial portion of
the total tropical livestock units (TLU) held.
On average, households hold about nine
head of cattle and 15 small ruminants, and
very few households hold camels. Using the
conversion rate to TLUs as in Chapters 3
and 4, households hold an average of just
over 8 TLU. At the community level, herd
size varies between 50 and 9,000 head of
cattle, with an average of 800, and mean
stock densities are .71 TLU/ha, but me-
dian stock densities are just .35, indicating a
few outliers with very high stock densities.
As in the previous cases, these outliers are
found in communities with very small land
endowments.
There are four broad categories of land
uses/types: cropped land (including land in
short-term fallow), pastures, denuded land
that is considered to be not arable and of
very limited or no use for animals, and areas
in bas-fonds. About 33 percent of commu-
nity land is dedicated to cropping, 44 per-
cent to pastures, 8 percent in denuded lands,
10 percent in bas-fonds, with residences
and lakes occupying the remaining 5 percent.
Population density is about four households
per 100 hectares, substantially below levels
in Niger and Ethiopia, although it must be
recalled that access to noncommunity pas-
ture resources is very important, particularly
in Ethiopia.
Detailed information on monthly herd
mobility indicates that herders practice both
short- and long-distance transhumance, and
that the cycle of mobility differs among
communities, depending on underlying
agro-ecological conditions. Among the
villages in which herders engaged in mobil-
ity, herders in nine villages practiced short-
distance transhumance (movement inside
the province, 5–100 kilometers), herders
in five villages practiced long-distance
transhumance (outside the province, greater
than 100 kilometers), and herders in 10
villages undertook both short- and long-
distance transhumance. In fact, no mobility
was undertaken in 15 villages in the his-
torically driest province, Oudalan; this, we
hypothesize, is mainly due to very good
rainfall occurring during the previous rainy
season. The general calendar for cattle move-
ment is:
November–December (harvest, or cold dry,
season): herds are largely on village crop-
land, grazing crops residues.
January–June (dry season): transhumance to
the “plateau Mossi” (Namentenga, Fada
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kina Faso, south of most of the study area.
July–October (rainy season): herds utilize
community pastures or move to the
north; in our sample, many of the more
southern communities in the Seno prov-
ince moved herds to Ouadalan province,
the northernmost part of the study area.
As noted above, little herd migration
was undertaken in Oudalan itself, be-
cause rains were very good. Herders
in Oudalan noted that, historically, they
move into Mali and even Niger, but
this practice was diminishing, because
it was becoming more difficult to cross
national borders. Given our one-period
dataset and the limited mobility during
that period, however, we cannot pursue
this issue further.
A full table of descriptive statistics dis-
cussed is presented in Appendix 3. More so
than in our other case studies, in Burkina
Faso we have a richer dataset on the insti-
tutions involved in natural resource man-
agement. In particular, we have information
on the structure of decisionmaking, and
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
for each institution. In this chapter, we pre-




In the study area, we observed the provision
and maintenance of public goods via such
activities as soil erosion control, employ-
ment of agroforestry techniques, and main-
tenance of water points. There were also
rules and restrictions on the use of some
agroforest and pasture products. We also
collected data on time and money allocated
to these activities by household, the pro-
portion of households actually contributing,
and details on violations of rules and regu-
lations.29 In the 48 communities surveyed,
there were 200 NRM institutions, with an
average of 4.5 institutions per village. We
group these institutions into six types:
General administration: the chief and/or
an administrative delegate (RAV) to the
local government, which are bodies that
deal with NRM as one of many activities.
Consultation committees: organizations
that  coordinate NRM activities across
several villages; these committees are
almost exclusively linked to the PSB/
GTZ project, which has been promoting
supracommunity resource management
since 1996.
Men’s, women’s, mixed gender, and youth
groups: these are officially recognized
and are based on traditional age- and
gender-specific mutual aid institutions.
These groups undertake a wide range
of activities, of which a subset directly
relates to NRM.
Herders’ and farmers’ groups: as with the
organizations named in the previous
entry, these are officially recognized
groups that focus on production and
marketing activities, and usually support
certain specific NRM activities directly
associated with production issues.
Water management committees: these are
generally formal but not officially rec-
ognized local groups.
Tree management committees: these are gen-
erally formal and often officially recog-
nized groups, many linked to NGOs
and/or government agencies.
In Table 5.1, we present the number of in-
stitutions observed in the sample, the per-
centage of all institutions falling under a
specific category, the number of villages in
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29Survey results indicated very few violations of rules and regulations. Team members discussed the process of
gathering this information, and it was determined that the way in which the questions regarding violations were
asked basically elicited information only on those violators who were actually punished.which at least one institution falling in a
specific category is present, and the per-
centage of villages in which a specific type
of institution is represented.
Although either a chief and/or an ad-
ministrative delegate is present in all com-
munities, consultation committees—which
are supracommunity-level committees—are
not widespread. Note that this type of or-
ganization is relatively new and is being
promoted by a specific nongovernmental
organization (NGO) working in the area.
The men’s, women’s, mixed gender, and
youth groups are present in 60 percent of
the communities, and make up 30 percent
of all institutions dealing with NRM issues.
Herders’or farmers’groups are only present
in one-third of the villages, and tree manage-
ment committees are present in 23 percent
of villages. Water management commit-
tees, however, are present in 90 percent of
the villages, and make up 37.5 percent of all
NRM institutions captured in the survey.
Details on membership in institutions as
a percentage of the total community mem-
bers, meetings, and participation in meetings
are presented in Table 5.2. All community
members are typically considered to belong
to the chief/RAV institutions, in the sense
that any member may attend meetings or-
ganized by the chief and/or the RAV. How-
ever, membership of at least one household
member in other NRM organizations or in-
stitutions typically accounts for between
40 percent (women’s groups) and 80 per-
cent (tree management committees) of the
total households on average.30 The number
of meetings averages about six per year. The
highest frequency of meetings occurs for
women’s groups, which are typically held
monthly; the least-frequent meetings occur
for tree and water management committees.
The level of participation of members at
meetings is rather homogeneous. Participa-
tion is 80 percent on average for all institu-
tions, always exceeds 70 percent, and as-
sumes a maximum of 91 percent for herders’
groups.
The various institutions and organiza-
tions in a community have different man-
agement structures. Whereas the chief is
often the head of various groups, there are
also instances of executive committees,
presidents, vice presidents, secretaries, and
the like, as well as such combinations as
the  chief plus an executive committee or
secretary. In some cases, the members of
the management committee are elected.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue that
nominations—say, to the executive com-
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30Participation was defined by household, so that households with more than one member attending meetings or
actively participating in the organization were not distinguished from those with only one participating member.
Also, membership in water management committees at the community level appears to be relatively low; this is
because in many communities, water committees are organized at a subcommunity level (i.e., by quarters). Nearly
every household belongs to one water committee.
Table 5.1 NRM institutions
Institutions Villages
Type of organization Number Percentage Number Percentage
General administration 48 24 48 100
Consultation committees 5 3 5 10
Men’s, women’s, mixed, or youth groups 38 19 29 60
Herder’s or farmer’s groups 21 11 16 33
Tree management committees 13 7 11 23
Water management committees 75 38 43 90mittee or as president—reflect less demo-
cratic means of determining leadership than
elections, because nominations may well
have come from consensus in community
meetings. We also collected information on
those responsible for making rules, moni-
toring users to make sure rules are followed,
and enforcing rules through punishments or
social sanctioning. In most cases, respon-
dents considered that it was the responsibil-
ity of all members to monitor and make sure
rules were followed, so there was limited
variation across groups on this measure.
Decisions on creating rules and deciding on
activities were generally considered to be
either the responsibility of the management
or of the management in consultation with
general membership. The chief or adminis-
trative delegates are responsible for creat-
ing 50 percent of all rules, collective rule-
making accounts for 16 percent of rules,
rules made without the chief account for
32 percent, with the remaining few per-
cent being rules made and enforced by out-
side agencies. Table 5.3 gives the structure
of management for the different types of
groups.
The chief or administrative delegate form
the basic administrative structure for 34
percent of all institutions involved in NRM.
A president alone, or with vice president,
secretary, or other officer, is the most
prevalent structure, accounting for nearly
52 percent; elected presidents are present
in 19 percent of NRM groups. An execu-
tive committee is in charge of 9 percent
of institutions, with various other types of
management structures accounting for the
remaining 5 percent.
Next, we consider the type of activities
undertaken by the different institutions. We
have grouped activities according to those
pertaining to erosion control, reforestation
or agroforestry measures, fence maintenance
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Table 5.2 Membership, meetings, and participation
Membership Number of Meeting
(% of total households) meetings per year participation (%)
General administration 100 6.1 81
Supracommunity committees 55 5.4 73
Men’s groups 56 9.3 84
Women’s groups 39 12.1 83
Adult groups 63 7 78
Youth groups 59 5.9 79
Farmers’ groups 66 5.8 77
Herders’ groups 48 6 91
Tree committees 80 4.3 74
Water committees 60 4.6 84
Total 69 6 79
Note: Numbers are averages per institutional categories.
Table 5.3 Management structure of NRM institutions
Structure Number of institutions Percentage of institutions
Chief 68 34
President, nonelected 29 15
President, elected 38 19
President plus others 36 18
Executive committee 18 9
Others 7 5between crop and pasture zones, and water-
point maintenance activities. Table 5.4 shows
the number of activities occurring in the pas-
toral zone, which can largely be described
as activities to provide pure public goods,
and those occurring in the agricultural zone,
the benefits of which are both private and
public. The collective maintenance of water
sources is the most widespread activity,
taking place in 75 percent of study commu-
nities. Soil erosion control occurs in 65 per-
cent of the communities. Erosion control
includes the strategic construction of half-
moon barriers (demi-lunes) and diguettes,
which are stone lines laid along the contours
of fields that catch rainwater and reduce
soil erosion. Such measures are more likely
to be undertaken on individual fields, but
some erosion control also occurs in the pas-
ture areas; unfortunately, we have no further
information on the density of activities in
either zone. Reforestation activities occur in
54 percent of the villages, in both the pas-
toral and agricultural zones, although the
number of activities is higher in the pastoral
zone. One-third of the villages collectively
organized the maintenance of fences to pro-
tect crops zone from animals and to give
well-defined boundaries to passage corridors.
Table 5.4 shows that soil erosion control
mobilizes by far the most labor, with 13 days
of work for each member household per
year, whereas other activities mobilize 3–4
days per member per year. The percentage
of total members who actively contribute
labor is 82 percent for all activities, with
90 percent in soil erosion control, 80 per-
cent in reforestation, and just 72 percent in
water maintenance. Participation rates are
just over 100 percent for fence maintenance;
the rate is greater than 100 percent because
this activity mobilizes labor beyond the
members of the institutions charged with
implementing fence maintenance activities.
Finally, we consider the rules and regu-
lations implemented by different commu-
nity groups. We have grouped these as
follows: rules setting dates for the entry
and removal of livestock from the crop
zone; prohibitions or limits on tree cutting,
slash-and-burn activities, hay cutting, and
use of common pastures by sick animals;
and rules regulating livestock use of water
points. Figures for the number and percent-
age of villages with various rules are pre-
sented in Table 5.5. Almost all villages have
rules regarding the date of entry and exit,
and prohibitions on tree cutting and slash-
and-burn activities. Whereas fixing dates
can be considered a traditional rule, the rules
prohibiting or limiting various activities have
largely been implemented since 1984.
Rules regulating the use of the land in
the crop zone are the most important, being
present in nearly all communities. Prohibi-
tions on tree cutting and slash-and-burn
activities—rules that have been promoted
by various government ministries and their
local officials during the past 25 or more
years—are also important in a majority of
the communities. Limits on cutting grasses
found on common pastures are more likely
to have been internally devised, and operate
in 42 percent of communities. Livestock
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Table 5.4 NRM activities
Total Total Members
Crop number of number of Work days contributing
Activity Pasture zone activities villages per person (%)
Water 42 36 4.4 72
Erosion control 15 21 36 31 13.3 90
Reforestation 23 13 36 26 2.9 80
Fences 9 5 14 14 3.8 101




Although the richness of detail of the in-
stitutional data is extremely valuable for
different purposes, for our analysis, we are
concerned with developing a measure of
underlying cooperative capacity found in
the community as a whole. Thus, we have
aggregated institution-level data to the com-
munity level. Variables used in the factor
analysis include network variables, such as
the density and active membership in NRM
and non-NRM institutions, and variables
capturing implementation of activities and/or
rules. Both types of variables capture insti-
tutional capacity at the community level,
networks being a traditional measure of
social capital, and implementation being a
measure of capacity to translate effectively
good intentions into concrete actions
(Krishna 2001). There are four network
variables: the density of NRM institutions,
the sum of the percentage of households
participating in each institution across NRM
institutions, the density of non-NRM insti-
tutions, and the sum of the percentage of
participating households across non-NRM
institutions.31 To capture implementation
capacity, we used the following variables:
the average number of meetings per year for
all NRM institutions, the average attendance
by members, the total number of rules and
regulations, the total number of NRM ac-
tivities (water point maintenance, zoning,
reforestation, and soil erosion control), the
total number of labor days allocated to
collective activities per year, and the aver-
age percentage of members who actively
contribute labor.
Scoring coefficients resulting from a fac-
tor analysis32 of these variables are pre-
sented in Table 5.6 for the first two factors,
which both had eigenvalues greater than 1.
The first factor exhibits high and positive
scoring coefficients on the network vari-
ables. We refer to the index generated from
this factor as the index of network capacity
(INC). The scoring coefficients for the sec-
ond factor are relatively high on the imple-
mentation variables, and quite low—and
usually negative—on the network variables.
We refer to the index generated from this
factor as the index of implementation ca-
pacity (IIC).
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31In each community, the density of institutions is defined as the total number of institutions divided by total num-
ber of households. The membership variable for NRM and non-NRM institutions is the sum across institutions of
the percentage of households participating in each type of institution. Because the percentage of total households
participating in any one institution declines as the number of institutions increases, we use the sum of the aver-
age number of households participating in different institutions as a measure to capture “density” of participation.
32All statistical analyses performed using STATA 7.0.
Table 5.5 Rules and regulations
Number of Percentage of
villages with rules villages with rules
Dates for using crop zone 47 98
Prohibitions on tree cutting 44 92
Prohibition on slash and burn 42 88
Limits or prohibition of hay cutting 20 42
Water-point use rules for livestock 12 25
Prohibition of use of pastures by sick animals 6 13As in the case of Ethiopia, we are also
interested in determining which factors af-
fect cooperative capacity as captured in the
indices derived from the factor analysis.
Here, we examine the determinants of the
estimated indices of cooperative capacity.
This is done to test whether the explanatory
factors are consistent with the theory, al-
though there remains wide disagreement on
the theoretical impact of many variables on
cooperative capacity. As before, we include
the total number of households and the
square of that number to test the hypothesis
that cooperation becomes more difficult
both with too few households and with too
many households. We include two measures
of social heterogeneity, the number of quar-
ters within a village, and the number of eth-
nic groups. Heterogeneity in cattle holdings
is used to proxy wealth differentiation; we
again use the coefficient of variation of cat-
tle holdings constructed from data on mini-
mum, maximum, and mean cattle holdings.
To capture the opportunity costs of engag-
ing in collective action, we again use the
percentage of households with at least one
member engaged in migration for wage
work. We also include variables that may
affect returns to collective action, including
distance to market, the coefficient of varia-
tion in rainfall, and relative livestock:millet
price ratios. The extent to which community
resources are shared with either neighboring
communities or with transhumant herders
may also reduce cooperative capacity by
making communication and enforcement
more costly. Unlike our study of Niger, we
do not have detailed information on the size
of transhumant herds, only whether trans-
humance generally uses community pastures,
so we use a dummy variable to capture this
external pressure. For neighbors, however,
we use the number of neighboring villages
whose members generally use community
pastures.
The abovementioned variables are sim-
ilar to those used in the case studies of
Ethiopia and Niger. However, we have ad-
ditional information to use for this case study.
Schools are more prevalent and have been
so for a longer time in Burkina Faso, so that
we can use the proportion of adults who
have attended public school as an explana-
tory variable in the cooperative capacity
equations. Education in general is hypothe-
sized to favor cooperative capacity by in-
creasing the individuals’capacity to acquire
information and transform such information
into useful knowledge.
We also consider a set of variables cap-
turing the structure of the organizations in
the community. Roughly following the struc-
ture, conduct, and performance literature, we
hypothesize that the structure of organiza-
tions can either enhance or diminish coop-
erative capacity. We propose that more
participatory forms of decisionmaking mean
that more decisions will be made, monitored,
and enforced. We created a variable called
“chief dominant” by using information on
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Table 5.6 Scoring coefficients
Variable Index of network capacity Index of implementation capacity
Network NRM 0.241 –0.065
Membership NRM 0.355 0.087
Network others 0.300 –0.291
Membership others 0.168 –0.175
Number of meetings 0.032 0.071
Number of activities 0.058 0.207
Number of rules –0.013 0.101
Participation in meetings 0.028 0.091
Participation in work 0.132 0.422
Number of days of work 0.087 0.223the proportion of organizations in which
the chief has sole responsibility for making,
monitoring abidance, and enforcing rules,
as well as information on whether the
general administration was under the chief
(as opposed to an administrative delegate).
The proportion of organizations/institutions
in which the chief plus others (e.g., members
of an executive committee) jointly make
rules (collective rule-making) and, finally,
the proportion of organizations in which the
rules are made by an executive committee
or elected (or nominated) president, but with-
out any involvement of the chief (members-
only rule-making). Because of potential
problems of multicollinearity between the
proportion of rules made with vs. without
the chief, we only include one or the other
in the regressions reported here. Finally, we
include a variable to capture the costs of
negotiating with regional government offi-
cials, captured by the distance to the re-
gional capital. On the one hand, greater dis-
tance to the capital may reflect higher costs
of learning about other instances of collec-
tive action in the region and reduced spill-
over benefits from examples of other suc-
cessful interventions, thereby leading to
lower cooperative capacity. On the other
hand, the greater this distance, the less likely
that the activities of noncommunity govern-
ment officials will interfere with the author-
ity and activities of local organizations. As
with other variables, then, the hypothesized
impact of this variable is ambiguous.
Finally, we take into account the presence
of external programs or projects (mainly
those of international NGOs) and the dura-
tion of these programs to test the effect on
cooperative capacity. We have divided the
number of programs into three categories:
those in existence since before 1986, those
beginning during 1987–1993, and those
beginning after 1993. As already noted, our
study was undertaken in conjunction with
PSB/GTZ, and the coordinator of PSB/GTZ
delineated three distinct conceptual frame-
works guiding project implementation and
noted that the change in frameworks leading
to a change in development paradigms
affected many projects in the region (Grell,
pers. comm.). In general, most programs or
projects beginning before 1986 had an over-
whelming focus on technical solutions to
crop production and NRM, whereas those
beginning in 1987–1993 largely adopted the
terroir approach, with a focus on specific
resources within given boundaries. Many
projects or programs beginning after 1993
expanded on the terroir approach to con-
sider the system as a whole, including com-
munity members’ use of noncommunity
resources and vice versa. It is generally
supposed that projects begun after 1993
should increase cooperative capacity the
most, followed by the second period and fi-
nally the earliest period. Regression results
are presented in Table 5.7.
The estimated equation for network
capacity has fairly good explanatory power,
although of the significant coefficients,
quite a few are opposite in sign to those pre-
dicted by theory. For instance, the impact of
the number of households is U-shaped and
significant, whereas we hypothesized an
inverted-U shape. Although of the wrong
shape, the impact of households is negative
until the turning point at about 180 house-
holds. Interestingly, the number of quarters
and heterogeneity in livestock holdings pos-
itively impact network capacity; migration
for wage work has a positive, but not signif-
icant, impact. Although it makes a good deal
of sense that having many distinct neigh-
borhoods, heterogeneity in wealth, and (per-
haps) many income sources all increase the
value of networks, this result highlights why
network capacity per se may not improve the
capacity of community members to under-
take collective action. Education is posi-
tively related to network capacity in the first
specification, as expected. Communities in
which a larger number of projects began
before 1986 have greater network capacity,
as do those closer to the regional capital.
Finally, communities with relatively low
rainfall but high rainfall variability also have












Table 5.7 Determinants of cooperative capacity, Burkina Faso
Index of network capacity Index of implementation capacity
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Demographic
Size of community –4.77 –2.97** –4.20 –2.43** 1.35 0.65 1.00 0.35
Size of community squared 0.01 2.43** 0.01 1.71** 0.00 –0.27 0.00 –0.07
Number of quarters 33.68 2.18** 35.28 2.70 8.23 0.48 9.63 0.53
Number of ethnic groups –7.35 –0.44 –7.63 –0.42 32.47 1.22 31.38 1.18
Heterogeneity in cattle holding 16.38 3.27** 11.62 1.91** –15.66 –1.89* –15.99 –1.89*
Percentage of adults migrating 578.05 1.30 576.03 1.19 –1083.70 –2.19* –1099.62 –2.20**
Percentage of households w/ public education 325.47 1.91* 267.01 1.29 404.69 1.37 411.43 1.36
Institutions structure
Chief dominant 25.09 0.45 11.34 0.21 –5.46 –0.08 –5.395116 –0.08
Percentage of rules made in collaboration 276.41 3.11** 10.41 0.04
Percentage of rules made without chief 45.35 0.45 –28.35712 –0.19
Number of projects
Before 1986 37.65 2.22** 39.63 1.85** –6.91 –0.26 –3.88 –0.13
1986–1993 (Terroir approach) 23.35 1.27 33.20 1.68* 98.59 3.81** 98.93 3.76**
1993–2001 (NRM approach) 29.77 0.89 36.05 0.97 80.45 1.67* 81.55 1.66**
Distance to regional capital –0.03 –2.16** –0.04 –2.46** –0.03 –0.99 –0.03 –0.94
External pressure
Number of villages sharing pastures 5.16 0.14 –14.50 –0.36 –65.89 –0.94 –64.79 –0.90
Transhumants using pastures –29.23 –0.54 –0.28 0.00 179.08 1.48 176.32 1.41
Market and agro-ecological
Relative livestock:grain price –50.49 –0.12 128.36 0.29 474.88 0.84 427.52 0.70
Distance to livestock market –6.49 –0.30 10.03 0.43 20.06 0.82 17.64 0.63
Coefficient of variation, rainfall 524.14 1.73* 403.17 1.19 –734.04 –1.89* –729.31 –1.90*
Constant 1141.13 2.18** 741.38 1.38 –1277.14 –1.83* –1197.32 –1.64
Number of observations 48 48 48 48
R2 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.55
Notes: *, Significant at 10% level; **, significant at 5% level; ***, significant at 1% level.appears that in populous, heterogeneous
communities located in the variable and low
rainfall areas relatively close to the regional
capital, there is a greater density of net-
works in both NRM and non-NRM orga-
nizations and thus, high network capacity.
Collaboration between the institution of
the chief and household members, and the
number of programs that began in the earli-
est period (before 1986) also lead to higher
network capacity.
At this point, it is worth comparing the
estimation results for the network capacity
index to previous research on social capital,
which focused on the ability of individuals
to rely on social relationships to accrue
private benefits—that is, to increase a
households’ access to insurance, credit,
and labor-sharing arrangements. The net-
work capacity index constructed here may
indeed reflect the capacity of individuals to
exploit social relationships to improve indi-
vidual or household well-being, and in that
sense, could be considered to proxy “social
capital,” as the term has been previously
employed.
Significant variables for the implemen-
tation capacity index are rather different from
those in the first equation. Here, coefficients
on heterogeneity in livestock holdings and
migration for wage work have negative
impacts on implementation capacity. The
number of projects undertaken during the
latter two periods lead to greater implemen-
tation capacity, indicating that the change in
project focus may favor community-level
implementation over individual household
adoption of specific techniques. Collabora-
tive rule-making, rules made without the
chief, and whether the chief plays a domi-
nant role have no statistically significant
impact on implementation capacity. Finally,
we note that the coefficient of variation in
rainfall has a negative impact on implemen-
tation capacity. This indicates that collective
action may be less valuable in such areas,
perhaps because returns to various collec-
tive activities themselves are riskier in those
areas. This is an interesting contrast with the
network capacity variable, which is higher
precisely in these areas.
Overall, the estimated equations provide
evidence that these indices capture different
aspects of cooperative capacity. In the next
section, we examine how these capacity in-
dices impact land use and allocation pat-
terns observed at the community level.
Empirical Model
Development
We write the equations for stock densities,
land allocated to crops and mobility as:
SD = f(Coop, Rain, CoV Rain, LandQual,
InMig – N, InMig – T, PopDen,
EthPas, CInf, Educ, TotalHa, 
P l/P g, MktDist) (5.1)
PLcrops = f(Coop, Rain, CoV Rain,
LandQual, InMig – N, InMig – T,
PopDen, EthPas, CInf, Educ, 
TotalHa, P l/P g, MktDist) (5.2)
Mob = f(Coop, Rain, CoV Rain,
LandQual, RainDev99, InMig – N,
InMig – T, PopDen, EthPas, CInf,
Educ, TotalHa, P l/P g, MktDist) (5.3)
As before, we include variables for cooper-
ation (Coop), rainfall (Rain), and the coeffi-
cient of variation of rainfall (CoV Rain). We
also include land quality (LandQual), neigh-
bors’ use of community pastures (InMig –
N), transhumance use of community pas-
tures (InMig – T), population density (Pop-
Den), a dummy variable capturing whether
the majority of community members are
from a traditional pastoralist tribe (EthPas),
community infrastructure (CInf), an index
of educational attainment in the commu-
nity (Educ), the total land endowment
(TotalHa), relative livestock to grain prices
(P l/P g), distances to market (MktDist), and,
in the mobility equation, the deviation be-
tween current rainfall and long-term means
or between current rainfall and a spatial
average (RainDev99). As with the Ethiopia
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operative capacity, one using the indices
for  network and implementation capacity
constructed in the previous section, and
one using the exogenous explanatory vari-
ables. Because there are quite a few explana-
tory variables, we did not include explanatory
variables that were not significant in either
the network or implementation capacity
equations, which is just two variables, the
number of ethnic groups in the community
and the index capturing the dominance of
the chief in local organizations.
For the agro-ecological variables, in this
case, we use just the coefficient of variation
in rainfall, CoVRain, to proxy both mean and
variability in rainfall, because the two mea-
sures are highly correlated, given the second-
ary dataset on which we are relying. For the
mobility equations, we constructed an index
of the proportionate difference between cur-
rent and long-term rainfall, and of spatial
deviations similar to that used in the Niger
case, which serve as measures of Rain-
Dev99. The spatial difference and differ-
ence from the long-term mean measures
are again highly correlated—with a simple
correlation coefficient of .82—and again,
we cannot include both in the same equa-
tion. Unlike the case for Niger, however, the
spatial measure is not significant (although
it is negative, as hypothesized), so we only
present model results using the difference
from the long-term means measure.
In addition, we did not collect the same
information on rangeland quality as was the
case for Ethiopia and Niger. Instead, we use
three proxies for the land quality variable,
LandQual. We have information on the dis-
tribution of three types of soils in the com-
munities: bolaare soils, which are clayey but
relatively rich in nutrients; seeno soils, which
are sandy soils that are less rich in nutrients
than bolaare soils; and kollade soils, which
are the degraded lateritic soils poor in nutri-
ents. The first two soils, although of different
types, are considered to favor crop produc-
tion relative to kollade soils. Thus, we use
two dummy variables indicating whether
the predominant soils are either bolaare or
seeno soils, with kollade being the omitted
categorical variable. We also use a dummy
variable for whether there is a permanent
surface-water source in the community.
For community characteristics, we in-
clude population density, a dummy variable
60 CHAPTER 5










Figure 5.1 Proportional deviation from average annual rainfall, Burkina Fasofor whether the major ethnic group is tradi-
tionally pastoralist, and the total land con-
straint. We also have additional information
on the number of households where at
least one adult has had some schooling,
Educ. The impact of education on land use
and allocation is, in general, ambiguous,
although anecdotal evidence supports the
notion that adopting new crop practices and
incorporating information from extension
agents (who are largely crop-focused) may
increase relative returns to education in crop-
ping vs. livestock activities, thereby increas-
ing land allocated to crops. As with the Niger
case study, for community infrastructure,
we summed up the number of motorcycles,
transport carts, plows, and shops. We also
include dummy variables for whether trans-
humants use community pastures, InMig –
T, and the number of neighbors that access
community pastures, InMig – N.
As before, the predicted impacts of rela-
tive livestock:grain price ratios and distance
to markets are ambiguous, and depend on
the relative value of crop production for grain
relative to the value of crop residues in live-
stock production (McCarthy et al. 1998), and
similarly, on the relative value of livestock
outputs directly consumed or sold vs. those
that are used as inputs into agriculture
(manure, draft power). Observations by team
members and conversations with those with
experience in the relevant regions of Niger
and Burkina Faso suggest that crops and
livestock production are more integrated in
Burkina Faso than in Niger, and certainly
more so than in Ethiopia. Thus, we hypoth-
esize that higher relative prices and shorter
distances to market increase stock densities
and also increase land allocated to crops.
Finally, we consider when the data were
collected in terms of the drought cycle; as
shown here, rainfall and normalized divi-
sion vegetative index (NDVI) patterns are
similar to Niger, although the low rainfall
years of 1994 and 1997 are much less pro-
nounced in the case of Burkina Faso (Fig-
ures 5.1 and 5.2). Thus, unlike Niger, where
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Figure 5.2 Proportional deviation from average NDVI, Burkina Fasorainfall at quite a few rainfall stations (and
in communities as proxied by the NDVI
values) was two standard deviations below
the mean, this was true of only two commu-
nities in Burkina Faso in 1997.33 As in the
Niger and Ethiopia case studies, we ran a
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Table 5.8 Impact of cooperative capacity on land allocation, stock densities, 
and herd mobility
Stock density
Model 1 Model 2
Parameter Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Cooperation indices/determinants
Index of network capacity 0.47 0.89
Index of implementation capacity –0.79 –1.87*
Total households 0.04 1.44
Total households squared –1.02 × 10–4 –1.68
Number of quarters in community –0.04 –0.52
Heterogeneity in livestock holdings 7.99 × 10–6 1.91*
Percentage of households migrate for wage work 0.51 0.29
Index of collective rule-making, chief + others –0.40 –0.81
Number of projects in community, before 1987 0.24 2.36**
Number of projects in community, 1988–1993 0.14 0.83
Number of projects in community, 1994–2000 0.19 1.26
Distance to regional capital –0.17 –0.83
Agro-ecological characteristics
Seeno soil, dominant 0.44 1.47 0.06 0.22
Bolaare soil, dominant –0.45 –1.24 –0.56 –1.76*
Pond –0.25 –1.02 –0.30 –1.32
Rainfall coefficient variation –22.56 –2.67*** –21.78 –2.92***
Proportion, 1999: mean rainfall –4.51 –1.74* –3.87 –1.45
Community characteristics
Population density^ 0.66 2.64*** –0.81 –0.73
Dominant ethnic group, traditionally pastoralist 0.90 2.94*** 0.73 2.76***
Percentage of households with public schooling –0.64 –0.48 –1.11 –0.81
Assets and infrastructure 0.51 2.28** 0.23 0.67
Size of community landholdings^ 0.05 0.14 –1.36 –1.31
Number of villages sharing pasture –0.06 –0.29 0.06 0.3
Transhumants 1.26 3.55*** 0.96 2.51**
Market
Livestock:grain price^ 2.47 1.06 1.36 0.71
Distance to cattle market (ln)^ 0.14 1.62 0.12 0.85
Constant 1.47 0.48 6.17 1.28
ln(Sigma)
Number of observations 48
R2 0.65 0.77
Probability >χ 2
Notes: ^ Indicates variables in natural logs. *, Significant at 10% level; **, significant at 5% level; ***, significant at 1% level.
33We stress here that we did not collect actual data at rainfall stations, and are relying only on secondary sources.
Practically, this means that many of the communities are estimated to have experienced the same rainfall (e.g.,
there are five different observations for rainfall covering the 48 communities).number of specifications with a lagged rain-
fall deviation variable; again, coefficients on
lagged effects were not significant, so we do
not include them in the regression results
reported in Table 5.8.
Looking first at the cooperation indices,
we see that network capacity is not statisti-
cally significant in any of the equations.
Implementation capacity, however, has a
negative and significant impact on stock
densities and land allocated to crops, indi-
cating that such capacity enables commu-
nity members to manage externalities. Im-
plementation capacity also has a positive
impact on herd mobility, indicating that it
also reflects coordination capacity in the
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Percentage land cropped Percentage herds migrating
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z
0.13 1.03 –0.39 –0.82
–0.34 –3.01*** 0.46 1.75*
2.95 × 10–3 0.36 0.02 1.55
–5.04 × 10–6 –0.29 –3.85 × 10–5 –1.70
–2.17 × 10–3 –0.14 –0.01 –0.37
1.81 × 10–6 1.93* 0.00 –1.89*
0.20 0.47 –0.67 –0.87
0.09 0.73 –0.32 –1.88*
0.04 1.53 0.03 0.93
0.02 0.59 –3.88 × 10–3 –0.06
0.02 0.32 –0.05 –0.74
–4.96 × 10–3 –0.12 –0.07 –0.81
0.19 3.10*** 0.12 1.46 –0.05 –0.47 –0.07 –0.77
–0.02 –0.26 –0.01 –0.18 0.12 0.92 0.03 0.26
0.03 0.53 –4.56 ×1 0–3 –0.06 –0.14 –1.25 –0.12 –1.18
–2.52 –1.56 –0.06 –0.03 –1.05 –0.33 –6.92 –2.40**
0.08 1.71* –0.08 –0.23 0.12 1.21 –0.49 –1.07
0.01 0.08 –0.04 –0.33 0.12 0.83 0.15 1.10
–0.36 –2.13** –0.20 –0.72 0.82 1.97** 0.47 1.23
0.06 1.65 –0.03 –0.6 –0.02 –0.2 –7.15 × 10–4 –0.01
2.87 × 10–3 0.05 –0.17 –0.49 0.06 0.44 –0.43 –1.04
0.02 1 0.03 0.89 –0.17 –2.27** –0.15 –2.34**
0.15 1.87* 0.02 0.16 0.21 1.29 0.28 1.64*
0.79 1.77* 0.57 1.23 –1.35 –1.59 –1.48 –1.50
0.04 1.73* 0.04 1.38 0.03 0.87 0.02 0.42
0.29 0.48 0.48 0.38 6.49 2.22** 8.34 2.37**
–1.52 –10.48*** –1.68 –11.54***
48 48 48 48
0.60 0.58
0.0002 0.0000community. In the second set of regressions,
we used the determinants of capacity in-
dices directly in the stock density, cropland,
and herd mobility equations. This adds an
additional 10 variables to the equation, and,
as can be seen, fewer coefficients are statis-
tically significant in the stock density equa-
tion, although the qualitative results are very
similar to the first set of regressions. None
of the coefficients are significant in the land
allocated to crops. In the stock density and
cropland equations, only the heterogeneity
in livestock holding variable is significant,
and positive, as we expect. Herd mobility is
lower when heterogeneity in livestock hold-
ings is greater as well, and is also lower in
communities in which the chief and com-
munity members more often collectively
engage in rule-making. Because, in many
communities, regulating herd movements
was one of the strongest roles that chiefs
played, this variable may be picking up the
diminished authority of the chief, and at
the same time, indicating that the new insti-
tutional structure has not been capable of
replacing this role in regulating and coordi-
nating herd movements.
Returning to the equations using the
cooperation indices, of the agro-ecological
variables, the dominance of seeno soil in a
community, which is sandy but of relatively
better quality than the kollade soils (the
omitted soil category), leads to more land
allocated to crops. The coefficient on the
bolaare soil dummy variable, however, is
not significant in any of the equations; nor
is the coefficient on the dummy variable for
whether the community has a permanent
pond. Areas with high coefficients of varia-
tion of rainfall have lower stock densities
and lower herd mobility in the second spec-
ification. The variable capturing the propor-
tion of current rainfall to long-term mean is
statistically significant and negative in the
first specification for herd mobility, indicat-
ing that greater relative rainfall induces less
mobility, as expected.
With respect to community characteris-
tics, higher population densities leads to
higher stock densities, and to more land
allocated to crops. Unlike the case of com-
munities in Niger, in Burkina Faso, ethnic
majority matters for stock densities—
communities with a traditionally pastoralist
majority have higher stock densities—but
there is no further impact on land allocated
to crops or herd mobility. An increasing
fraction of the population with some public
schooling decreases land allocated to crops,
indicating that greater schooling leads to
improved opportunities for livestock vs. crop
production in this area. This trend is also
reflected in the greater herd mobility in
communities with greater public education.
A greater stock of agricultural assets and
community infrastructure leads to higher
stock densities; the coefficient is just shy of
being significantly positive in the cropland
equation. Total land endowment has no
statistically significant impact on any of the
variables, a result consistent with constant
returns to scale in cropping and livestock
production. In terms of external pressure
on home resources, the number of villages
with which the community shares pastures
reduces herd mobility, indicating noncoop-
eration between village members and those
with whom they share pastures. Increasing
the number of transhumants using commu-
nity pastures leads to greater stock densities,
and more land allocated to crops, indicating
that members are appropriating land for the
purpose of limiting access to transhumant
herders. However, higher stock densities
may be accommodated by greater herd
mobility, as the coefficient on transhumants
is positive and significant in the herd mobil-
ity equation. The issue of negotiating access
and use by transhumants—who, in many
cases, have historical claims to access vari-
ous resources—can be a difficult and explo-
sive issue; our results indicate that efforts at
conflict negotiation and mediation are likely
to remain very important issues in the region.
Concerning the market variables, the
coefficient on relative livestock:grain price
ratios is only significant in the cropland
equation, indicating that greater relative live-
64 CHAPTER 5stock prices increases land allocated to crops;
the coefficient on mobility is negative but
not quite significant. Together, these results
indicate that, as livestock activities become
relatively more profitable, intensification
may be occurring through a substitution of
crop residues for external grazing resources,
leaving the use of home pastures stable.
Greater distances to cattle markets, however,
lead to more cropped land, indicating that
more land goes into cropping when markets
are costly to access.
To summarize, the evidence suggests that
increased cooperative capacity, as captured
in the implementation index, indeed leads to
lower stock densities, less land allocated
to crops, and greater mobility. Network ca-
pacity has no statistically significant impact,
and even the signs of the coefficients are op-
posite to what we would expect if this type
of capacity were used to help manage the
natural resource base. Recall that network
capacity is higher in regions where one might
expect individuals to participate in the
networks to manage essentially household-
level concerns (i.e., in populous, heteroge-
neous communities located in the variable
and low rainfall areas but relatively close
to the regional capital). Implementation ca-
pacity, however, is greater in higher and less
variable rainfall regions, in more homoge-
neous communities with less migration for
wage work, and in those that have more
external projects begun after 1986, when the
focus changed to community participation
in natural resource management instead of a
more narrow focus on individual household
adoption of various technologies. All of
these factors are more consistent with build-
ing capacity to manage community-level,
as opposed to household-level, concerns.
In addition, in Ethiopia, Niger, and Burkina
Faso, there is evidence that heterogeneity in
livestock holdings reduces the capacity of
community members to agree, even infor-
mally, on land use and allocation patterns.
Higher population densities lead to
greater stock densities—as is the case in
both Ethiopia and Niger—and to more land
allocated to crops. Greater public education
leads to less land in crops, more mobility,
and no increase in stock densities, indicat-
ing that greater human capital increases the
capacity of community members to exploit
the comparative advantage of livestock
production relative to crop production in this
marginal, semiarid region. Relative prices
and distance to market have different im-
pacts on land use and allocation variables
than in Niger and Ethiopia. In Burkina Faso,
higher relative prices but longer distances to
market lead to more land allocated to crops,
with no impact on stock densities or herd
mobility. This contrasts with results from
Ethiopia and Niger; in both of these coun-
tries, higher prices and shorter distances
to market lead to greater stock densities,
with no impact on land allocation or herd
mobility. Also, stock densities and cropland
are lower in areas of low rainfall and high
rainfall variability, although we cannot test
whether variability per se induces lower den-
sities, as in the cases of Niger and Ethiopia.
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Cross-Country Comparison
T
raditional, local-level, customary institutions prevail in all three countries that we
studied: Ethiopia, Niger, and Burkina Faso. However, in Ethiopia the overwhelming
majority of the people in the study area belongs to a single tribe, the Boran, who have
developed a very complex system of rangeland management, characterized by layers of ad-
ministration and delineation of various tribal tenurial arrangements, ranging from open access
to private enclosures and croplands (Kamara 2001). Herd mobility is generally practiced
within the boundaries of the Borana plateau; patterns of herd mobility are well established and
revolve around the operation and maintenance of deep wells, whose customary administration
is considered to be extremely efficient. Although interaction with the central government has
generally been weak, government-initiated peasant associations do influence land allocated to
crops within the study area (Kamara et al. 2004).
Alternatively, in southwestern Niger, many different ethnic groups are represented, both
traditional pastoralists and traditional crop farmers, very often within the same community.
The power and authority of traditional village and canton chiefs has waned and waxed through
colonization and several postindependence governments, although the most recent legislative
acts, the Act on Home Areas and the Act on Local Institutions, strongly support local custom-
ary authorities (Ngaido 1996). Nonetheless, there is a great deal more uncertainty about tenur-
ial relationships and authority to enforce resource management than is the case in Ethiopia,
and practical implementation of the rural code is largely stalled (Grell and Kirk 1999). Dif-
ferent groups also have different historical patterns of herd mobility; the patterns differ both
within and between tribes, depending on settlement patterns (Turner 1999). Finally, like Niger,
communities in Burkina Faso are composed of diverse ethnic groups, both pastoralist and
agriculturalist. The power of local chiefs, however, has eroded more steadily; current plans for
devolution of authority to manage local natural resources and the decentralization of public
administration focus on the creation of democratically elected local management committees.
As in Niger, historical patterns of herd mobility differ by ethnic groups, and options of mo-
bility are decreasing, as transnational boundaries are more difficult to cross (e.g., into Mali)
(Drabo et al. 2001).
In this chapter, we compare land use and allocation outcomes across countries. As might
be expected, given the coefficients on explanatory variables in the country-specific land use
and allocation equations found in Chapters 3–5, we reject a specification that pools observa-
tions across countries in favor of the country-specific regressions. We proceed by comparing
descriptive statistics, presenting first the land use and allocation patterns, next presenting in-
formation on agro-ecological traits, market conditions, and community characteristics, fol-
lowed by descriptive statistics on factors affecting cooperative capacity. We derive measures of
overstocking and overallocation of land to either private pastures or cropland and compare the
66mean and distribution of outcomes across
countries. We then return to a hypothesis
stemming from the first model developed in
Chapter 2, that overuse of pastures occurs
less often in communities facing higher
rainfall variability, because the difference
between the social optimum and the nonco-
operative outcome—and thus the external-
ities that condition costs of cooperation—
diminish as variability increases. Using the
constructed estimates of overstocking, we
present descriptive statistics on the relation-
ship between overstocking and the coeffi-
cient of variation of rainfall.
Descriptive Statistics
As can be seen in the Table 6.1, mean stock
densities calculated using the total land
endowment are higher in Ethiopia than in
either Burkina Faso or Niger, which are
quite similar. Stock densities on pastureland
in Ethiopia are similar to those in Niger, and
both remain quite a bit higher than stock
densities in Burkina Faso. However, herd mi-
gration to pastures outside community land
is far more important in Ethiopia, as evi-
denced by the fact that 84 percent of herds
were mobile during at least part of the year;
as noted in Chapter 3, most communities are
in fact surrounded by forra grazing areas
open to all Boran, thus making direct com-
parison difficult. The proportion of the year
during which livestock are mobile is quite
low in both Niger and Burkina Faso. This
result is intriguing, because in Niger, the year
to which survey data referred was a poor
rainfall year (although not nearly as poor as
1997), whereas rainfall was above average
in nearly all areas in Burkina Faso in the
year preceding the survey. Despite the rather
low overall proportion of time most of the
herds were migrating, in more than 40 per-
cent and 50 percent of communities in Niger
and Burkina Faso, respectively, at least some
households engaged in mobility, if only for
a relatively short time. Land in crops is much
smaller—by half—in Ethiopia than in the
West African countries; cultivated land per
household being only one-third and less than
one-quarter that figure in Niger and Burkina
Faso, respectively. However, nearly 18 per-
cent of community land in Ethiopia has
been allocated to pastures with individual-
ized rights of access and use. Thus, in terms
of proportion of total land allocated to indi-
vidual uses, all three countries have very sim-
ilar proportions, .33, .33, and .39 for Ethiopia,
Niger, and Burkina Faso, respectively.
To summarize, communities in Ethiopia
rely more heavily on livestock production
versus crops; tropical livestock units (TLU)
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Table 6.1 Land use and allocation patterns
Ethiopia Niger Burkina Faso
Stock densities (TLU/total ha), mean .91a,b .72 .71
Stock densities (TLU/total ha), median .62a,b .30c .35
Stock densities (TLU/pasture ha), mean 1.03b 1.08c .44
Stock densities (TLU/pasture ha), median .79a,b .48c .25
Livestock holdings per household 19a,b 10 9
Communities with mobile herds, part .84a,b .41c .52
of survey year, proportion
Herd mobility, proportion of year — .14 .15
Land in crops, proportion .15a,b .34 .39
Cropland per household (ha) 3a,b 9c 13
Land in private pastures, proportion .18 0 —
Note: —, Not available.
a Value for Ethiopia is significantly different from that for Niger.
b Value for Ethiopia is significantly different from that for Burkina Faso.
c Value for Niger is significantly different from that for Burkina Faso.per household are nearly double the figures
in Burkina Faso and Niger, whereas the
proportion of the land endowment allocated
to crops in Ethiopia is less than half those
in the West African countries. Unfortunately,
because mobility is heavily relied on, and
because the schedule of herd mobility is not
nearly as tied to the cropping cycle as is the
case in Niger and Burkina Faso, accurate
information on the extent of mobility by all
household herds throughout the year was
very difficult to collect, and we were suc-
cessful in doing so in less than half of the
communities included in the sample. None-
theless, the more crude measure of the pro-
portion of communities in which herds were
mobile during at least part of the previous
year is 85 percent, far greater than in Niger
and Burkina Faso. Overall, then, households
in Ethiopia rely more heavily on livestock
production and herd mobility. Compar-
ing Niger and Burkina Faso, we note that
stock densities are much greater in Niger,
although they are similar to densities in
Ethiopia. However, herd mobility appears
to be much lower, indicating greater grazing
pressure on home pastures than in either
Ethiopia or Burkina Faso.
Although it is not possible to isolate the
direct relationship between stockholding,
allocation of land to individual use, and
mobility, we can look at the correlation co-
efficients among these variables in each of
the three countries (Table 6.2). In Ethiopia
and Burkina Faso, there is a positive corre-
lation between land allocated to individual
use and stock densities, indicating that indi-
vidual crop and pasture activities might be
supporting greater stock densities in these
countries. However, the relationship is neg-
ative in Niger, indicating that these two
activities may be competing for scarce land
resources. Herd mobility is positively cor-
related with stock densities in both Niger
and Burkina Faso; this is expected, because
greater mobility can allow a community to
stock more livestock, and more livestock in-
creases the value of mobility. The correla-
tion between mobility and land allocated to
crops is positive but quite low in Niger, but
is negative in Burkina Faso, indicating that
herd mobility and crop production may be
competing activities in the latter country,
perhaps in terms of family labor time.
Table 6.3 presents descriptive statistics
for a subset of the agro-ecological, market,
and community characteristics for the three
countries. In general, the communities sur-
veyed in Ethiopia have the highest mean,
but most variable, rainfall; Ethiopia also
has a bimodal rainfall distribution, whereas
Niger and Burkina Faso have unimodal
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Table 6.2 Correlation coefficients—land allocation, use, and herd mobility
Ethiopia Stock densities Land in crops Land in private pastures
Stock densities 1
Land in crops, proportion .15 1
Land in private pastures, proportion .08 –.13 1
Niger Stock densities Land in crops Herd mobility
Stock densities 1
Land in crops, proportion –.13 1
Herd mobility .24 .04 1
Burkina Faso Stock densities Land in crops Herd mobility
Stock densities 1
Land in crops, proportion .64 1
Herd mobility .19 –.15 1rainfall distributions. Households in Ethiopia
and Niger are much farther from livestock
markets on average than is the case with
surveyed households in Burkina Faso. Prob-
ably the greatest difference among the
countries is in terms of cattle prices, crop
prices, and relative livestock:crop price
ratios. In Burkina Faso, where many live-
stock traders in the Dori region themselves
participate in markets and the end market
is the capital (Ouagadougou) or even the
market in Cote d’Ivoire, livestock prices are
the highest. The major export markets for
livestock in Ethiopia are in Kenya and, to
a lesser extent, the Middle East; however,
there are many middlemen and a long,
treacherous distance between the Ethiopian
cattle owner and the consumer in Nairobi.
In Niger, cattle prices are lower than in Bur-
kina Faso, but are still higher than in
Ethiopia. Also interesting are the grain
prices, which are very high relative to live-
stock prices in Ethiopia; as noted in Chap-
ter 3, the Boran are a traditionally pas-
toralist tribe, continual crop farming is a
relatively recent phenomenon for many
people, this region has the lowest proportion
of land allocated to crops, and the plateau is
geographically isolated from the highland
areas in Ethiopia, where most crop produc-
tion is undertaken.
In Table 6.4, we note that total commu-
nity landholdings are much larger in Bur-
kina Faso than in Ethiopia and Niger, and
households per hectare are correspondingly
lower—nearly half those realized in Ethiopia
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Table 6.3 Agro-ecological and market conditions
Ethiopia Niger Burkina Faso
Mean rainfall 599a,b 498 467
Coefficient of variation, rainfall .38a .23 .16
Distance to livestock markets (km) 41a,b 33c 13
Cattle price (U.S.$/kg) .27a,b .37 .41
Grain price (U.S.$/kg) .33b .29c .18
Relative cattle:grain price ratio .84a,b 1.31c 2.33
Note: We did not calculate whether the coefficient of variation of rainfall was significantly dif-
ferent between Ethiopia and Niger relative to Burkina Faso, as the data were from dif-
ferent sources.
a Figure is statistically different from corresponding figure for Niger.
b Figure is statistically different from corresponding figure for Burkina Faso.
c Figure is statistically different from corresponding figure for Burkina Faso.
Table 6.4 Community characteristics
Ethiopia Niger Burkina Faso
Total landholdings 1105a,b 1777c 3070
Number of ethnic groups — 1.62c 3.3
Proportion of population, dominant ethnic group — .95c .71
Heterogeneity, cattle holdings 2.4a 1.3c 2.5
Migrating for wage work (%) 25a,b 48c 25
Communities with schools (%) 0 41 42
Total number of households 71a,b 100 91
Household density .08b .09c .04
a Figure is statistically different from corresponding figure for Niger.
b Figure is statistically different from corresponding figure for Burkina Faso.
c Figure is statistically different from corresponding figure for Burkina Faso.and Niger. There is a great deal more ethnic
diversity in Burkina Faso as well, and het-
erogeneity in cattle holdings is greater there
than in Niger, although very similar to
Ethiopia. Despite the diversity, the range of
collective activities and rules over resource
use and management is greater in Burkina
Faso relative to either Ethiopia or Niger—
although it must also be noted that the
presence of large-scale externally funded
projects is also greater in Burkina Faso.
Still, lower relative household density, high
relative livestock prices, and a rich and
diverse set of institutions for collective
action—perhaps even because of ethnic
diversity—appear to be associated with a
lower stock densities and greater mobility
than is the case in Niger.
We can further compare communities
by using the results from the empirical
models given in Chapters 3–5 to estimate
overstocking and overallocation of land to
private uses.34 Starting with Ethiopia, we
calculate a “best cooperation” stock density,
SDBC
Estimated, using the coefficients from the
estimated equations and setting the coeffi-
cient for the (normalized) cooperation index
equal to 1 for each community. Note that
this is not necessarily the social optimum
that would arise if cooperation were cost-
less; it is simply the stocking rate that
would  result if all communities achieved
the same level of cooperative capacity as
that achieved by the community with the
highest cooperative capacity in the sample.
We then calculate overstocking and over-
allocation of land to individuals:
SDEstimated
– SDBC





Estimated = 100(—————–) LABC
Estimated
where SDBC
Estimated is the estimated socially
optimal stock density, and SDEstimated is
simply the predicted value. Similarly,
LABC
Estimated is the estimated socially optimal
land allocation, and LAEstimated is the pre-
dicted value.
In Burkina Faso, we have two indices of
cooperation, one reflecting network-based
capacity and the other reflecting implemen-
tation capacity. As expected, lower imple-
mentation capacity leads to greater stock
densities, more land allocated to crops, and
lower mobility, but lower network capacity
has no statistically significant impact. Be-
cause of this, we calculate best cooperative
stock densities and cropland by setting only
the coefficient on implementation capacity
to 1.
In Niger, the situation is more compli-
cated, because we do not have an index of
cooperation per se, only exogenous char-
acteristics thought to affect cooperation,
some of which are hypothesized to affect
stock densities directly, such as wage work.
However, in the estimation results, only het-
erogeneity in cattle holding and ethnic
heterogeneity were significant, so to derive
a measure of cooperation stock densities,
we set the coefficients on the heterogeneity
in livestock holdings and the ethnic hetero-
geneity index equal to the lowest value ob-
served in the sample. Because none of the
cooperation variables were statistically sig-
nificant in the mobility or land allocated to
crop equations, we do not calculate similar
figures for these variables. Simulated over-
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34As noted previously, we did attempt to pool the observations across countries and run stock density, land in
crops, and herd mobility equations (the latter using just Niger and Burkina Faso), but tests for the pooled regres-
sions led us to reject this specification in all three cases.stocking is illustrated in Figures 6.1–6.3,
which also give the mean and median sim-
ulated overstocking for each country. As
highlighted in these histograms, there is
evidence that communities are indeed over-
stocking, but the median, mean, and distri-
bution of estimated overstocking differs
substantially across countries. In Niger, re-
call that recent rainfall patterns have been
the worst relative to long-term average rain-
fall, but median estimated overstocking is
highest there, and there is a much wider
distribution of overstocking across commu-
nities. In Ethiopia, median overstocking is
27 percent, and there are 11 communities
with estimated overstocking at less than
20 percent, five of which are at less than 10
percent. Finally, Burkina Faso exhibits the
lowest estimated overstocking, with a me-
dian of just 22 percent, and, like Ethiopia, a
relatively small distribution, ranging from 0
to 120 percent.
We now consider overallocation of land
to individual use. In Ethiopia, there is no
evidence that cropland is increasing due to
noncooperation, but there is evidence that
land is being allocated to private pasture en-
closures. In Burkina Faso, there is evidence
that when cooperative capacity is decreased,
land is being allocated to cropland. Thus,
we develop a measure of overallocation
of land to private pasture enclosures in
Ethiopia, and to cropland in Burkina Faso.
Histograms, mean, and median figures
are presented in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. For
Ethiopia, only 32 observations are captured
on the graph; there were four observations
for which the calculated “optimal” alloca-
tion of land was negative, and one observa-
tion for which the calculated overallocation
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Figure 6.1 Simulated overstocking,
Ethiopia
Note: Mean overstocking, 36 percent; median over-
stocking, 27 percent.



















Figure 6.2 Simulated overstocking, Niger
Note: Mean overstocking, 112 percent; median overstocking, 48 percent.was approximately 1,000 percent. The latter
result is because the predicted optimal land
in pastures was very close to 0, driving the
ratio to an extremely high level. For Bur-
kina Faso, only 42 observations are used;
calculated “optimal” allocation was nega-
tive in six of the communities.
In general, the simulated percentage of
overallocation of land to private uses is
nearly the same, in terms of mean, median,
and distribution, in both Ethiopia and Bur-
kina Faso. As with the distribution of over-
stocking, overallocation of land to private
grazing is concentrated between 0 and 60
percent. Estimated percentages of the over-
allocation of land to private pastures in
Ethiopia are higher than for overstocking,
with a mean of about 58 percent and a
median of 44 percent. The mean allocation
of land to private pastures in this subsample
of 32 communities is approximately 18 per-
cent for both actual and predicted values,
whereas the mean allocation of land in pri-
vate pastures is predicted to be 12 percent
when the noncooperation variable takes a
value of 0. In other words, if cooperative
capacity across communities in Ethiopia
were raised to the level achieved in that
community with the highest capacity index,
land allocated to private pastures would drop
from 18 percent to 12 percent, on average.
Also, evidence suggests that overallocation
of land to cropland is a more important
concern in both Ethiopia and Burkina Faso
than is overstocking. Estimated percentages
of overallocation of land to cropping are
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Figure 6.3 Simulated overstocking,
Burkina Faso
Note: Mean overstocking, 29 percent; median over-
stocking, 22 percent.
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Figure 6.4 Simulated overallocation of land to private pastures, Ethiopia
Note: Mean overallocation, 58 percent; median overallocation, 44 percent.nearly double those for overstocking. In
Burkina Faso, the mean allocation of land to
cropland in the subsample of 42 is 41 per-
cent for both actual and predicted values,
whereas the mean simulated socially opti-
mal allocation is just 30 percent.
Taken as a whole, the comparison across
countries indicates that problems of overuse
of pastureland may be of particular impor-
tance in Niger, and it appears that both high
stock levels and limited herd mobility con-
tribute to high overall grazing pressure. At
the present time, there is less evidence to
suggest that land is being privately appro-
priated for crops in Niger; the simple corre-
lation coefficient between crops and stock
densities is negative, and the indicators of
cooperative capacity are not significant in
the regressions. In comparison with com-
munities with very similar agro-ecological
conditions in Burkina Faso, communities in
Niger have much smaller land endowments
per household, and relative cattle:grain price
ratios are much lower, distances to market
much greater, and migration for wage work
more prevalent. Also, greater ethnic and
economic heterogeneity within communi-
ties in Burkina Faso do not appear to have
large effects on cooperative capacity, al-
though economic heterogeneity does lead to
higher stock densities and less land allo-
cated to common pastures. And although
the power of traditional authorities may be
considered greater in Niger than in Burkina
Faso, there also remains a great deal of un-
certainty regarding the future roles of the
chief. Burkina Faso has also been going
through the process of adopting agrarian
reform laws and a complementary legal
framework for implementation, a process
that is still ongoing. Still, the process is
continual if slow, and uncertainty of the
role and authority of traditional chiefs has
already been transformed, in contrast to the
case of Niger.
Ethiopia is quite distinct, in that there is
little ethnic heterogeneity, and customary
institutions are still quite strong, although
local government-created peasant associa-
tions do exert influence, particularly in land
allocation patterns. Like Burkina Faso, how-
ever, the extent of uncertainty over who has
rights over land use and allocation decisions
is less well defined than is the case in
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Figure 6.5 Simulated overallocation of land to crops, Burkina Faso
Note: Mean overallocation, 56 percent; median overallocation, 42 percent.Niger.35 Although land endowments at the
community level are relatively low, the
Boran are far more mobile and have access
to large areas of both neighboring and dis-
tant pastures (forra). Still, pastoralists here
face the worst cattle:grain terms of trade and
are relatively isolated from markets. Evi-
dence suggests that privatization of land for
pasture is a greater problem on the Borana
Plateau than is overstocking per se.
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35Unlike the sedentary crop farmers located in the highlands of Ethiopia, because Borana lands have traditionally
been under various forms of common access, they were substantially less affected by rules on agrarian reforms
under the Derg and post-Derg regimes to limit landholding sizes and land redistribution programs (Kamara 2001);
thus, the uncertainty in land tenure is quite different on the Borana Plateau compared to the highlands.CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
T
here are two key sets of conclusions from the empirical research, the first related
to cooperation in the management of local natural resources and the second related to the
impact of climate variability. First, cooperative capacity does matter for such natural
resource management issues as land allocation, exploitation of common pastures, and herd
mobility—even though no formal rules and regulations were observed in the communities
studied. Because these areas are subject to large fluctuations in rainfall both spatially and tem-
porally, more flexible—and perhaps less formal—institutional arrangements may be best able
to handle such variability in the external environment. But that does not mean that such
arrangements will be equally successful across all communities at all times. Indeed, the ca-
pacity of communities to manage pastures and allocate land to its best use varies greatly both
within and among countries. Factors that are generally associated with greater coopera-
tive capacity include relatively small community size, more equal distribution of wealth, and
fewer adults migrating for wage work, all of which should reduce negotiation and enforcement
costs of undertaking collective action.
Formation of subgroups within communities may help to alleviate problems of group size
and heterogeneity in wealth in larger, more diverse communities. From results presented in the
Burkina Faso case study, we note that the number of quarters within a community increases
network capacity, and at least does not have a negative impact on implementation capacity.
Nevertheless, our research results do not provide direct evidence on whether subdivision
would be the best way to manage group size and heterogeneity, as we did not observe the more
formal division of resource management tasks in our country case studies, with the exception
of water management in Burkina Faso. Evidence presented in McCarthy et al. (2004) suggests
that subgroup management that occurs in large and heterogeneous communities performs
similarly to community-level management committees in smaller communities; however, it is
perhaps easier to assign roles and responsibilities to subgroups in the management of well-
defined water resources than in the management of pasture resources. Details of optimal or-
ganizational structure will differ across regions and perhaps even communities; the point is
that group size, wealth distribution, and opportunity costs of participation are likely to be key
issues to be addressed by any organizational structure.
Other factors affecting cooperation differ across countries. For instance, external pressure
to use community resources appears to have a much greater impact on cooperation in Ethiopia
than in Burkina Faso or Niger. In Burkina Faso, sharing pastures with neighbors does tend to
decrease herd mobility, but in Niger, it is associated with greater herd mobility. Higher pro-
ductivity rangelands and higher effective livestock prices are associated with greater cooper-
ative capacity in Ethiopia, but have no impact in Burkina Faso. Thus, the evidence suggests
that more favorable livestock market conditions either increase cooperative capacity or have
75no impact; in either case, there is no evi-
dence to suggest that better market condi-
tions erode this capacity.
There is little evidence to suggest that
livestock owners accumulate larger herds
to mitigate vulnerability to rainfall shocks
in high-variability environments. Our results
instead suggest that herd sizes increase with
rainfall variability at relatively low vari-
ability, but decrease in the higher-variability
environments. In other words, we would
expect that policies and programs that di-
rectly “insure” livestock owners—through
feed subsidies in response to drought, for
instance—would likely lead to larger herds
in high-variability environments. We must
emphasize that our results are consistent
with this hypothesis, but, given the one-
period nature of the survey, we did not test
the hypothesis directly. This is still a con-
tentious issue, as a wide range of researchers,
policymakers, and indeed, herders them-
selves, believe that holding onto more live-
stock is a strategy to mitigate the impact of
climate shocks, such as drought. Here, we
note that the theoretical reasoning under-
pinning such a strategy is based on the very
strong assumption that there are no exter-
nalities of any kind associated with grazing
livestock, and thus, that individually rational
strategies are also socially rational strategies.
More specifically, this proposition is based
on the assumption that there are no one-
period externalities affecting animal pro-
ductivity (including animal mortality), no
dynamic externalities affecting future forage
productivity, and no externalities affecting
the riskiness of livestock production.
Thus, we can only say that our results
imply that policymakers designing crises
mitigation strategies—as many governments
that are signatories to the UN Convention
to Combat Desertification are doing—must
carefully consider insurance and crises
mitigation mechanisms that do not lead to
dramatic increases in the national herd. On
a precautionary note, Hazell et al. (2003)
discuss the experiences of drought subsidy
schemes in Jordan, Syria, Morocco, and
Tunisia. Particularly in Jordan, stock num-
bers increased dramatically in response to a
drought feed subsidy program instituted after
1990, so much so that feed subsidies were
required to sustain the herd even in non-
drought years and ultimately proved fiscally
unsustainable (Hazell 1999). It is difficult,
of course, to sort out the effects of increas-
ing the mean returns to livestock implied by
the subsidies and the effect due to reducing
downside risk; but the fourfold increase wit-
nessed in Jordan certainly seems to indicate
that the response was due to both increase
mean and reduced variance of livestock
returns.
Mobility remains an important part of
these systems. Given the rather complicated
patterns of herd mobility into and out of
community areas in Ethiopia, we were not
able to gather good enough data to include
this variable in the statistical analyses. Still,
more than 84 percent of the communities
relied on mobility for at least part of the
previous year, and in the 12 communities
for which data were quite good, herds were
mobile for nearly 40 percent of the year. The
number of communities in which at least
some members engaged in herd mobility is
lower in Niger and Burkina Faso, but mo-
bility is still practiced in more than 40 per-
cent in both these countries. And better co-
operative capacity in communities supports
greater herd mobility. Nonetheless, herders’
rights to access traditional grazing areas are
generally eroding everywhere, perhaps par-
ticularly for livestock owners found in the
southern part of our survey region in Niger
(see Turner 1999). Results indicate that com-
munities with more traditional pastoralists
do tend to rely more heavily on herd mobil-
ity, but the impact is weak and not robust
across specifications. Given the nature of
our study, we did not collect data on exoge-
nous changes that limit mobility, such as
the establishment of state parks and re-
serves and encroachment of cropland; such
an analyses would likely require historical
or time-series data and coverage of a much
wider geographical area. Nonetheless, our re-
76 CHAPTER 7sults indicate that pastoral land tenure and
drought mitigation policies will need to take
into account the continued reliance on herd
mobility—even by those not considered to
be traditionally pastoralist—as well as fac-
tors that either directly or indirectly limit
mobility.
In addition, it is fitting to note that the
equations quite poorly estimated land allo-
cation decisions in both Niger and Ethiopia,
although the econometric results are fairly
good for Burkina Faso. These results suggest
that the overlapping jurisdiction of chiefs
and local representatives of the government
is likely to play an important role in the
decision to allocate cropland to individual
households (Swallow and Kamara 1999;
Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002), and that
the community-level, aggregated informa-
tion used in the econometric analysis fails to
capture key aspects of how these overlapping
institutions interact and affect land alloca-
tion decisions, and particularly, how these
relationships differ among communities in
the same region (and thus technically subject
to the same ambiguities).
This problem highlights one of the major
constraints of this type of study; namely, that
data on institutions—their goals and objec-
tives, managerial structure, and mechanisms
for implementing rules and undertaking
collective action—have been aggregated
to develop a community-level indicator of
cooperative capacity. Such aggregation
does not enable us to examine the multiple
claims over resources and the institutional
basis on which these claims are made. A
more detailed understanding of overlapping
claims of access, use, and management of
the various resources and the legal and nor-
mative frameworks supporting these mul-
tiple claims is particularly relevant for con-
sidering the equity aspects of various land
use and allocation outcomes (see Meinzen-
Dick and Pradhan 2002). Similarly, linking
community-level results with household
outcomes is critically important. After all, it
may be the case that lower stock densities,
greater mobility, and more land allocated to
common pastures do not have large impacts
on household welfare. The team did not
collect household data in Ethiopia or Niger,
but household data were collected in Burkina
Faso. As reported in Dutilly-Diane et al.
(2003), greater implementation capacity at
the community level—which leads to lower
stock densities and greater mobility, although
not necessarily more land in common pas-
tures—does indeed lead to higher incomes
from livestock and to higher overall income
at the household level. Thus, future research
should incorporate both household- and
community-level studies, even though such
research is quite data intensive.
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Proof That the Stocking Level Is Higher
under Noncooperation Than under 
Joint Maximization
In the following, we let R =σ θ
2φA. The maximization problems and first-order conditions for
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PN[f + LNf ′ – PRiLf [( f + NLf ′)]] – Nc = 0 (A2)






NC) = P LLi f – cLi – 
1 – 2Ri(P LLi f )2 (A4)
P L[f + Lif ′ – P LRiLi f [( f + Li f ′)]] – c = 0 (A5)
c [f + Li f ′ – P LRiLi f [( f + Li f ′)]] = — (A6)
P L
In equilibrium, both first order conditions must equal c/P L. By establishing the sign of equation
(A3), we can determine under what conditions the stocking rate under noncooperation is
greater than under joint maximization:
[f + Lf′][1 – P LRLf ]  [f + Lf′+(N – 1)Lf′][1 – P LRLf] (A7)
We immediately note that:
[f + Lf′] > [f + Lf′+(N – 1)Lf′] (A8)
78The left-hand side of the equation (non-
cooperation) is greater than the right-hand
side (joint maximization) at the same stock-
ing rate; therefore, in equilibrium, the stock
level must be greater under noncooperation
than under joint maximization.
We also note that [f+Lf′] >[f+Lf′][1
– P LRLf], or alternatively, that the stocking
rate when risk is greater than 0 is always
greater than the stocking rate when the risk
is less than 0. The risky, noncooperative
stocking rate may be less than the riskless,
joint-maximization solution:
[f + Lf′ – P LRlf ( f + Lf′)] 
 [f + NLf ′] (A9)
[f – P LRlf ( f + Lf′)] 
 [f + (N – 1)Lf ′] (A10)
So that:
[f – P LRlf ( f + Lf′)] > [f + (N – 1)Lf ′],
when P LRlf [f + Lf ′] < |(N – 1)Lf ′|
[f – P LRlf ( f + Lf′)] = [f + (N – 1)Lf ′],
when P LRlf [f + Lf ′] = |(N – 1)Lf ′|
[f – P LRlf ( f + Lf′)] < [f + (N – 1)Lf ′],
when P LRlf [f + Lf ′] > |(N – 1)Lf ′|
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Change in the Total Externality for
Increases in Risk
The externality is given by Lf′ – PRLfLf′, which can be rewritten as Lf′(1 – PRLf ). Differ-
entiating with respect to R gives:
dL dL (1 – PRLf )(f ′+Lf″) — – – Lf′[PLf + PR( f + Lf′)— –] (A11)
dR dR
First, we note that dL/dR < 0. Thus, the first term is positive, although the second term is in-
determinate. Rearranging the second term gives:
dL dL – PLf ′[Lf + RLf′ —–   + Rf —– ] (A12)
dR dR
Re-arranging the terms inside the bracket yields:
Rf ′ dL R dL Lf [1 + —– — – + — — –] (A13)
fd R L d R
If this term is positive, then equation (A11) will also be positive. Let εLR = (R/L)(dL/dR), the
elasticity of input levels with respect to a change in risk. Then,
Rf ′ dL Lf —– — – + Lf(1 +ε LR) (A14)
fd R
The first term is positive; a sufficient condition for the second term to be positive is that the
elasticity be less than one. In this case, the change in total externalities will decrease with in-
creases in risk.
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Descriptive Statistics for Ethiopia, Niger,
and Burkina Faso
Table A3.1 Descriptive statistics, Ethiopia
Standard
Variable Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Endogenous
Stock density (TLU/total ha) .91 .65 .10 2.92
Stock density (TLU/pasture ha) 1.03 1.24 .15 3.95
Land in private pastures, proportion .09 .08 0 .46
Land in crops, proportion .15 .15 0 .60
Climate
Average rainfall 599 167 353 873
Coefficient of variation of rainfall .38 .11 .21 .68
Rainfall in 1996 586 186 344 802
Cooperation: indicators
Number of meetings per year 37 23.4 6 114
Proportion of households attending (average) 39 33 4 100
Sum of grazing rules 1.8 .97 0 4
Sum of water-related rules 2.1 .70 1 3
Sum of settlement and cultivation rules 1.2 .66 0 2
Violations: grazing rules 5.7 10.3 0 50
Violations: water rules 1.5 2.2 0 9
Violations: settlement and cultivation rules 7.0 14.5 0 70
Cooperation: determinants
Total number of households 71 66 8 297
Coefficient of variation of livestock holdings 2.4 1.6 .83 9.0
Proportion of households with migrant worker 25 36 0 100
Use of community pastures by outsiders (dummy) .61 .50 0 1
Herd mobility (dummy) .82 .39 0 1
Production/profitability/demographic
Range quality index 3.6 1.2 2.1 5.7
Relative livestock:grain price ratio index .84 .19 .69 1.28
Distance to market (km) 41 29 5 120
Total land area (ha) 1,105 567 249 3,035
Population density (households/ha) .08 .10 .01 .58
Years cultivating 12 13 0 60
Practice haymaking (dummy) .29 .45 0 1
81Table A3.2 Descriptive statistics, Niger
Standard
Variable Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Endogenous
Mobility (proportion of year) .14 .18 0 .53
Stock density (TLU/total ha) .72 1.13 .01 4.02
Stock density (TLU/pasture ha) 1.08 1.61 .04 7.44
Proportion of land in crops .33 .16 .09 .42
Climate
Average rainfall 498.23 90.68 335.70 649.81
Coefficient of variation of rainfall .23 .06 .08 .37
Rainfall in 1996 567.05 109.18 429.75 750.83
Cooperation
Total number of households 99.51 70.40 20.00 307.00
Coefficient of variation of livestock holdings 1.18 .83 .25 4.50
Coefficient of variation of millet yields .33 .36 .08 2.22
Number of ethnic groups 1.62 .89 1.00 4.00
Proportion of households not of ethnic majority .05 .11 0 .42
Proportion of households with migrants .48 .20 .06 .83
Use of community pastures by outsiders in rainy season 590.37 1,151.29 121.00 4,050.00
(number of animals)
Use of community pastures by outsiders in dry season  128.32 350.58 0 1,800.00
(number of animals)
Transhumant herd sizes 2,408.92 3,600.00 0 10,000.00
Production/profitability/demographic
Range quality index 1.49 .69 0.01 2.73
Relative livestock:millet price ratio 1.31 .24 .87 1.60
Distance to market (km) 32.68 22.64 1.00 79.00
Total land area (ha)
Population density
Agricultural assets per household .29 .28 0 1.42
Schools, shops, transportation infrastructure .76 2.02 0 9
82 APPENDIX 3Table A3.3 Descriptive statistics, Burkina Faso
Standard
Variable Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Endogenous
Stock density (TLU/total ha) .71 .95 .05 4.00
Stock density (TLU/pasture ha) .44 .67 .04 3.60
Proportion of land in crops .39 .22 .06 .90
Herd mobility .15 .19 0 .67
Climate
Average rainfall 467 64 397 555
Coefficient of variation of rainfall .16 .01 .14 .17
Rainfall in 1996 610 58 544 703
Cooperation: indicators
Network NRM 4 2.1 1 11
Membership NRM .76 .23 .34 1.13
Network others 3.2 2.2 0 9
Membership others .28 .29 0 1
Number of meetings 6 4.3 2 25
Number of activities 2.7 1.8 0 7
Number of rules 3.6 .94 2 6
Participation in meetings .53 .22 0 1
Participation in work .52 .22 0 1
Cooperation: determinants
Total number of households 91 56 14 280
Coefficient of variation of livestock holdings 2.5 1.5 .49 7.64
Proportion of households with migrant workers .24 .16 0 .59
Transhumants (dummy) .5 .5 0 1
Number of ethnic groups 3.3 1.7 1 8
Production/profitability/demographic
“Richest” soil (bolaare) dominant (dummy) .38 .5 0 1
Relative livestock:grain price ratio index 2.33 .15 2.1 2.6
Distance to market (km) 23 36 0 196
Total land area (ha) 3,070 2,181 586 9,058
Population density .04 .04 .01 .20
Proportion of households with at least one member  .07 .11 0 .54
with public schooling
Dominant ethnic group: agriculturalist .48 .50 0 0
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 83References
Alesina, A., and E. La Ferrara. 1999. Participation in Heterogeneous Communities. Working Paper
7155. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Baland, J.-M., and J.-P. Platteau. 1996. Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for
Rural Communities? New York and Oxford: Food and Agricultural Organization and Clarendon
Press.
———. 1997. Wealth inequality and efficiency in the commons, part I: The unregulated case. Oxford
Economic Papers 49: 451–482.
Bardhan, P. 2000. Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical analysis of 48 irrigation communities in
South India. Economic Development and Cultural Change 48 (4): 847–856.
Begossi, A. 1998. Resilience and neo-traditional populations: The caicaras (Atlantic Forest) and caboc-
los (Amazon, Brazil). In Linking Social and Ecological Systems: Management Practices and
Social Mechanisms, eds. F. Berkes and C. Folke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Behnke, R. H., and I. Scoones. 1993. Rethinking range ecology: Implications for rangeland management
in Africa. In Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models of Natural Variability and Pastoral
Adaptation in African Savannas, eds. R. H. Behnke, I. Scoones, and C. Kerven. London: Over-
seas Development Institute, pp. 1–30.
Behnke, R. H., I. Scoones, and C. Kerven, eds. 1993. Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models of
Natural Variability and Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas. London: Overseas Develop-
ment Institute.
Berhanu, G., J. Pender, and G. Tesfay. 2003. Community Natural Resource Management: The Case of
Woodlots in Northern Ethiopia. Environment and Development Economics 8: 129–148.
Berkes, F., and C. Folke. 1998. Linking Social and Ecological Systems: Management Practices and
Social Mechanisms for Building Resilience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bromley, W. B., and M. M. Cernea. 1989. The Management of Common Property Natural Resources:
Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies. Discussion Paper 57. Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank.
Bromley, D.W., D. Feeny, M. A. McKean, P. Peters, J. L. Gilles, R. J. Oakerson, C. F. Runge, and J. T.
Thomson, eds. 1992. Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy. San Francisco:
Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.
Bruce, J. W., M. S. Freudenberger, and T. Ngaido. 1995. Old Wine in New Bottles: Creating New Insti-
tutions for Local Land Management. Land Tenure in Development Cooperation, Working Paper.
Eschborn, Germany: German Agency for Technical Cooperation.
Chopra, K., and S. C. Gulati. 1998. Environmental degradation, property rights and population move-
ments: Hypotheses and evidence from Rajasthan. Environment and Development Economics
31: 35–57.
Clark Labs. 2000. Global Change Data Archive. Volume 1: Africa monthly vegetation index (NDVI)
1982–1999. CD-ROM. Worcester, Mass.: Clark University.
85Comité National du Code Rural, Secrétariat Permanent. 1993. Ordonance 93-105 Principes d’orien-
tation du Code Rural. Niamey, Niger: Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Élevage, République
du Niger.
Comité National du Code Rural, Secrétariat Permanent. 1997. Recueil de textes complémentaires
à l’ordonnance 93-105 portant principes d’orientation du Code Rural. Niamey, Niger: Ministère
de l’Agriculture et de l’Élevage, République du Niger.
Coppock, D. L. 1994. The Borana Plateau of Southern Ethiopia: Synthesis of Pastoral Research, De-
velopment and Change, 1980–91. Addis Ababa: International Livestock Center for Africa.
Dasgupta, P., and G. M. Heal. 1979. Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Dasgupta, P., and I. Seregeldin. 2000. Social Capital: A Multifaceted Approach. Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank.
Dayton-Johnson, J. 2000. Determinants of collective action on the local commons: A model with evi-
dence from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics 62: 181–208.
de Janvry, A., N. McCarthy, and E. Sadoulet. 1998. Endogenous provision and cooperation on the com-
mons. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80: 658–664.
de Leeuw, P. N., and J. C. Tothill. 1993. The concept of rangeland carrying capacity in sub-Saharan
Africa: Myth or reality. In Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models of Natural Variability
and Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas, eds. R. H. Behnke, I. Scoones, and C. Kerven.
London: Overseas Development Institute, pp. 77–88.
Dercon, S., and P. Krishnan. 1998. Income portfolios in rural Ethiopia and Tanzania: Choices and con-
straints. Journal of Development Studies 32 (6): 850–875.
Desta, S. 1999. Diversification of Livestock Assets for Risk Management in the Borana Pastoral System
of Southern Ethiopia. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Rangeland Resources, Utah State Uni-
versity, Logan.
Dixon, J., A. Gulliver, and D. Gibbon, eds. 2001. Farming Systems and Poverty: Improving Farmers’
Livelihoods in a Changing World. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
Drabo, B., H. Grell, and A. Poda. 2001. Gestion concertée des ressources agropastorales : Cas du Sahel
Burkinabé. Dori, Burkina Faso: Programme Sahelian Burkinabe/German Technical Cooperation.
Dutilly-Diane, C., E. Sadoulet, and A. de Janvry. 2003. How improved natural resource management in
agriculture promotes the livestock economy in the Sahel. Journal of African Economies 12:
343–370.
Economic Commission for Africa. 2000. Globalization, regionalism and Africa’s development agenda.
Paper presented at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) X,
Bangkok, Thailand, February 12–19, 2000.
Fafchamps, M. 1998. The tragedy of the commons, livestock cycles and sustainability. Journal of
African Economies 7 (3): 384–423.
Fafchamps, M., K. Czukas, and C. Udry. 1999. Drought and saving in West Africa: Are livestock a
buffer stock? Journal of Development Economics 55: 273–305.
Fleuret, A. 1986. Indigenous responses to drought in sub-Saharan Africa. Disasters 10 (3): 224–228.
Gado, B. A. 1996. Le code rural au Niger: Une réforme prometteuse, une application difficile. In Dé-
mocratie, Enjeux Fonciers et Pratiques Locales en Afrique, eds. P. Mathieu, P.-J. Laurent, and
J.-C. Wilame. Brussels and Paris: Institut Africain-Centro para Desarollo Agropecuario y
Forestal and Harmattan.
Gavian, S., and M. Fafchamps. 1996. Land tenure and allocative efficiency in Niger. American Journal
of Agricultural Economics 78 (2): 460–471.
86 REFERENCESGebremedhin, B., J. Pender, and G. Tesfay. 2004. Collective action for grazing land management in
crop-livestock mixed systems in the highlands of Northern Ethiopia. Agricultural Systems,
in press.
Greene, William H. 2000. Econometric Analysis, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Grell, H., and M. Kirk. 1999. The role of the donors in influencing property rights over pastoral re-
sources in sub-Saharan Africa. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Property
Rights, Risk and Livestock Development in sub-Saharan Africa, eds. N. McCarthy, B. Swallow,
M. Kirk, and P. Hazell. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, pp. 55–85.
Hazell, P. 1999. Public policy and drought management in agropastoral systems. In Property Rights,
Risk and Livestock Development, eds. N. McCarthy, B. Swallow, M. Kirk, and P. Hazell. Wash-
ington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Hazell, P., P. Oram, and N. Chaherli. 2003. Managing livestock in drought-prone areas of the Middle
East and North Africa: Policy issues. In Food and Agriculture in the Middle East: Research in
Middle East Economics,Volume 5, ed. H. Löfgren. Amsterdam: JAI Press/Elsevier, pp. 79–104.
Hirschleifer, J., and J. Reilly. 1992. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Hogg, R. 1997. Pastoralists, Ethnicity and the State in Ethiopia. London: HAAN Publishing.
Hutchinson, M. F. 2001. Topographic and Climate Database for Africa. Version 1.0. Canberra: Centre
for Resource and Environmental Studies, Australian National University.
Isham, J., and S. Kahkonen. 2002. Institutional Determinants of the Impact of Community-Based Water
Services: Evidence from Sri Lanka and India. Middlebury College of Economics Discussion
Paper 02-20. Middlebury, Vt.: Middlebury College.
Jahnke, H. E. 1982. Livestock Production Systems and Livestock Development in Tropical Africa. Kiel,
Germany: Kieler Wissenschaftsverlag Vauk.
Johnson, R. N., and G. D. Libecap. 1982. Contracting problems and regulation: The case of the fishery.
American Economic Review 72: 1005–1021.
Kamara, A. 2001. Property Rights, Risk and Livestock Development in Southern Ethiopia. Socio-
economic Studies on Rural Development,Volume 123. Kiel, Germany: Wissenschaftsverlag Vauk.
Kamara, A. B., B. Swallow, and M. Kirk. 2004. Policies, interventions and institutional change in
pastoral resource management in Borana, southern Ethiopia. Development Policy Review 22:
381–403.
Kerven, C., and J. Cox. 1996. Changing Rangeland Management on the Borana Plateau, Ethiopia. Pas-
toral Development Network. London: Overseas Development Institute.
Khwaja, A. I. 2000. Can Good Projects Succeed in Bad Communities? Collective Action in the Himalayas.
Mimeograph. Boston: Department of Economics, Harvard University.
Kirk, M. 1999. The role of the state in influencing property rights over pastoral resources in sub-Saharan
Africa. In: Proceedings of the International Symposium on Property Rights, Risk and Livestock
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, eds. N. McCarthy, B. Swallow, M. Kirk, and P. Hazell.
Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, pp. 155–190.
Kirk, M., and T. Ngaido. 2001. Collective action, property rights and devolution of rangeland manage-
ment. In Collective Action, Property Rights and Devolution of Natural Resource Management:
Exchange of Knowledge and Implications for Policy, eds. R. Meinzen-Dick, A. Knox, and
M. Di Gregorio. Feldafing, Germany: German Foundation for International Development.
Krishna, A. 2001. Moving from the stock of social capital to the flow of benefits: The role of agency.
World Development 29 (6): 925–943.
Livingstone, I. 1991. Livestock management and “overgrazing” among pastoralists. Ambio 20 (2):
80–85.
REFERENCES 87Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford
University Press.
McCarthy, N. 1999. An economic analysis of the effects of production risk on the use and management
of common-pool rangelands. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Property Rights,
Risk and Livestock Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, eds. N. McCarthy, B. Swallow, M. Kirk,
and P. Hazell. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, pp. 155–190.
McCarthy, N., and J.-P. Vanderlinden. 2004. Resource management under climatic risk: Acase study of
Niger. Journal of Development Studies 40: 120–142.
McCarthy, N., A. de Janvry, and E. Sadoulet. 1998. Dual individual-common property rights and land
use in Mexico. Journal of Development Economics 56: 239–264.
McCarthy, N., E. Sadoulet, and A. de Janvry. 2001. Common pool resource appropriation under costly
cooperation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 42 (3): 297–309.
McCarthy, N., A. Kamara, and M. Kirk. 2003. Cooperation in risky environments: Evidence from south-
ern Ethiopia. Journal of African Economies 12: 236–270.
McCarthy, N., C. Dutilly-Diane, and D. Boureima. 2004. Cooperation, Collective Action and Natural
Resource Management in Burkina Faso. Agricultural Systems, in press.
Meinzen-Dick, R., and R. Pradhan. 2002. Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights. CAPRi Work-
ing Paper 22. System-Wide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights. Washington,
D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Meinzen-Dick, R., K. V. Raju, and A. Gulati. 2000. What Affects Organization and Collective Action for
Managing Resources? Evidence from Canal Irrigation Systems in India. EPTD Discussion
Paper 61. Environment and Production Technology Division. Washington, D.C.: International
Food Policy Research Institute.
Ngaido, T. 1996. Making laws and building institutions in the Sahel: The case of Niger. Agriculture and
Rural Development 3 (2): 18–21.
Niamir-Fuller, M. 1999. Managing mobility in African rangelands. In Proceedings of the International
Symposium on Property Rights, Risk and Livestock Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, eds.
N. McCarthy, B. Swallow, M. Kirk, and P. Hazell. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy
Research Institute, pp. 102–131.
Niamir-Fuller, M., and M. Turner. 1999. A review of recent literature on pastoralism and transhumance
in Africa. In Managing Mobility in African Rangelands: The Legitimization of Transhumance,
ed. M. Niamir-Fuller. London and Rome: Intermediate Technology Publications, Food and
Agriculture Organization, and Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics.
North, D. C. 1994. Constraints on institutional innovation: Transaction costs, incentive compatibility,
and historical considerations. In Agriculture, Environment and Health: Sustainable Develop-
ment in the 21st Century, ed. Vernon W. Ruttan. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
pp. 48–70.
Oakerson, R. J. 1992. Analyzing the commons: A framework. In Making the Commons Work. Theory,
Practice and Policy, ed. Daniel W. Bromley. San Francisco: ICS Press.
Okoth-Ogendo, H. W. O. 1995. Reform of land tenure resource management: A comment. Agriculture
and Rural Development 6: 16–18.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons—The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E., T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich, and E. U. Weber, eds. 2002. The Drama of the
Commons. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Painter, T., J. Sumberg, and T. Price. 1994. Your terroir and my “action space”: Implications of differ-
entiation, mobility and diversification for the Approche Terroir in Sahelian West Africa. Africa
64 (1): 447–464.
88 REFERENCESPaxson, C. H. 1992. Using weather variability to estimate the response of savings to transitory income
in Thailand. American Economic Review 82: 15–33.
Pender, J., and S. Scherr. 1999. Organizational Development and Natural Resource Management: Evi-
dence from Central Honduras. EPTD Discussion Paper 59. Environment and Production Tech-
nology Division. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Pender, J., S. Scherr, and G. Duron. 1999. Pathways of Development in the Hillsides of Honduras:
Causes and Implications for Agricultural Production, Poverty and Sustainable Resource Use.
EPTD Discussion Paper 45. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Place, F., and P. Hazell. 1993. Productivity effects of indigenous land tenure systems in sub-Saharan
Africa. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 (1): 10–19.
Rosenzweig, M. R., and K. I. Wolpin. 1993. Credit market constraints, consumption smoothing, and the
accumulation of durable production assets in low-income countries: Investment in bullocks in
India. Journal of Political Economy 101(2): 223–244.
Ruttan, L. 2000. Conservation and wealth asymmetries among East African pastoralists. Presented at
“Constituting the Commons,” the eighth annual conference of the International Association for
the Study of Common Property, May 31–June 4, Bloomington, Indiana.
Sandford, S. 1982. Pastoral strategies and desertification: Opportunism and conservatism in dry lands.
In Desertification and Development, eds. B. Spooner and H. S. Mann. London: Academic Press.
Sandler, T. 1992. Collective Action. Theory and Applications.Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Sandler, T., and F. A. Sterbenz. 1990. Harvest uncertainty and the tragedy of the commons. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 18: 155–167.
Schoonmaker-Freudenberger, M., and K. Schoonmaker-Freudenberger. 1993. Pastoralism in Peril:
Pressures on Grazing Land in Senegal. Pastoral Land Tenure Series 4. London: International
Institute for Environment and Development.
Scoones, I. 1994. Living with Uncertainty. London: International Institute for Environment and Devel-
opment, Intermediate Technology Publications.
Seabright, P. 1997. Is cooperation habit-forming? In The Environment and Emerging Development Issues,
eds. P. Dasgupta and K. G. Maler. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Swallow, B. M. 1994. The Role of Mobility within the Risk Management Strategies of Pastoralists and
Agro-pastoralists. Gatekeeper Series 47. London: International Institute for Environment and
Development.
Swallow, B. M., and A. B. Kamara. 1999. The dynamics of land use and property rights in semi-arid East
Africa. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Property Rights, Risk and Livestock
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, eds. N. McCarthy, B. Swallow, M. Kirk, and P. Hazell.
Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, pp. 243–275.
Thompson, G., and P. N. Wilson. 1994. Common property as an institutional response to environmental
variability. Contemporary Economic Policy 12: 10–21.
Turner, M. D. 1999. The role of social networks, indefinite boundaries and political bargaining in main-
taining the ecological and economic resilience of the transhumance systems of Sudano-Sahelian
West Africa. In Managing Mobility in African Rangelands: The Legitimization of Transhumance,
ed. M. Niamir-Fuller. London and Rome: Intermediate Technology Publications, Food and
Agriculture Organization, and Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics.
Udry C. 1994. Risk and insurance in a rural credit market: An empirical investigation in northern Nigeria.
Review of Economic Studies 61: 495–526.
van den Brink, R., D. Bromley, and J. P. Chavas. 1995. The economics of Cain and Abel: Agro-pastoral
property rights in the Sahel. Journal of Development Studies 31: 373–399.
White, T. A., and C. F. Runge. 1994. Common property and collective action: Lessons from cooperative
watershed management in Haiti. Economic Development and Cultural Change 43: 1–41.
REFERENCES 89